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Summary
This thesis examines the cognitive-psychological theory of autism, specifically the "theory 
o f mind" account. According to this theory, autistic people lack the ability to attribute 
mental states to other people and this underlies their social communication difficulties.
In the introductory chapters, autism is described, followed by a consideration of different 
theoretical accounts o f the normal child's theory o f mind and empirical evidence on the 
autistic child's theory o f mind. Finally, the introduction discusses whether the different 
theoretical accounts can explain autism.
A series o f  experiments are then described which investigated normal and autistic children's 
ability to understand knowledge as a mental state. Experiment 1 established a baseline for 
the subsequent experiments and included three groups of normal children with mean ages 
o f four years nine months, five years nine months and six years nine months. In this 
experiment the children's ability to differentiate the cognitive mental terms "know" and 
"guess" with reference to their own and another person's mental states was examined. 
Results o f this experiment indicated that all three groups of children could differentiate 
"know" and "guess" in reference to their own and another person's mental state.
Experiments 2 and 3 compared the ability to differentiate "know" from "guess" with 
reference to  their own and another persons mental state of high language level autistic 
children, low language level autistic children, children with Down's syndrome, four-year- 
old and five-year-old normal children. Results of these experiments showed that the high 
language level autistic children were able to refer to their and another person's mental state 
o f  knowledge. In addition the results were related to a number o f measures of language 
ability.
Experiment 4 compared the ability to attribute knowledge and ignorance to themselves and 
another person o f high language level autistic children, low language level autistic children, 
four-year-old and five-year-old normal children. In one task the experimental question 
involved the mental term "know", in another task, the term "could help" was used. Results 
o f  this experiment showed that all four groups o f children performed significantly better in 
the "know" task than in the "help" task. Performances on the tasks was again related to the 
children's language skills.
The thesis reaches two main conclusions. First that autistic children do not totally lack a 
theory o f mind, since high language level autistic children were able to refer to their and 
another person's knowledge state. Second, autistic children's language level is a strong 
predictor o f  their performance on theory of mind tasks. The thesis concludes by discussing 
a number o f  issues involved in autism research and indicating future directions for 
research.
VI
1. CH A PTER ONE
General Introduction
Arthur S. Reber (1985) defines psychology as:
. .what scientists and philosophers o f  various persuasions have created to try to fu lfil the 
need to understand the minds and behaviours o f  various organisms from  the most primitive 
to the most complex. As a distinct discipline it finds its roots a mere century or so back in 
the faculties o f  medicine and philosophy. From medicine it took the orientation that 
explication o f  that which is done, thought and fe lt ultimately must be couched in biology 
and physiology, from  philosophy it took a class o f deep problems concerning mind, will 
and knowledge. Since then, it has been variously defined as "the science o f m ind ," "the 
science o f  mental life," "the science o f  behaviour " (underlining added to emphasize, 
P-593).
Psychological research can contribute greatly to our knowledge and understanding o f some 
conditions which may still be a puzzle to medicine. One such condition is autism which is 
recognized by severe social communication difficulties and abnormal language patterns. 
Understanding the underlying cause or causes would have practical implications for the 
treatment and education o f people with autism. While biological research aims to 
investigate what causes the autistic condition, and asks questions such as "Is it a hereditary 
condition?" "Do autistic people have an abnormal brain structure?" "Do autistic people have 
an abnormal brain chemistry o r physiology?" etc., psychological research aims to 
investigate which cognitive mental processes are deviant in people with autism, and also to 
investigate whether any cognitive malfunctioning, which is specific to autism, can underlie 
the social communication difficulties of autistic children.
According to the current cognitive theory of autism which is known as "theory of mind", 
autistic children's inability to attribute mental states to themselves and others might be an 
underlying factor for their social communication difficulties (Baron-Cohen et al. 1985,
I
1986). The theory of mind account o f autism proposes that if a child is unable to 
understand other people's mental states such as, what they know, think, believe etc., 
he/she will not be able to predict how other people will behave. In o ther words,
the social world would seem chaotic, confusing and may be therefore even frightening. At 
worst this might lead one to withdraw from  it completely, but at the very least it might lead 
to very odd attempts at interaction with people, treating them as lacking 'minds', and 
therefore behaving towards them in a similar nutnner to the way one approaches inanimate 
objects. . .the behaviour o f  people with autism is often described in these terms ." (Baron- 
Cohen. 1990b, p.83).
Thus it seems that an investigation of the different aspects of the theory o f mind ability in 
autism, may provide a better understanding of this condition. This thesis is an attempt to 
contribute further to our knowledge about autistic people and also to our understanding of 
normal children's development. Specifically, it focuses on autism, and involves the 
investigation of both autistic and normal children's understanding of knowledge as a mental 
state. In a series of experiments it aims to investigate, whether autistic children and 
adolescents can differentiate mental terms such as "know" from "guess", and "know" from 
"not know", in referring to their own and others’ mental states.
Since this thesis is primarily about the theory of mind explanation of autism, in the 
following five chapters firstly, autism will be described, then the theoretical approaches to 
the child's "theory of mind" will be reviewed, and finally in the light of empirical 
evidence, how these accounts explain autism will be discussed. The content of the five 
chapters is as follows:
Following this introductory chapter the second chapter, will familiarize the reader with 
autism. This chapter begins with a section on "What is autism?". This section explains 
how and who first recognized the autistic condition. The following section considers the 
question "Is Asperger's Syndrome on a continuum with Kanner's Autism ?", discussing 
whether autism and Asperger's syndrome are different conditions, o r alternatively whether
2
autism is a continuum and Asperger's Syndrome falls at the top end of this continuum. It 
seems important to report this recent dispute -whether the difference between the two 
conditions o f autism and Asperger's Syndrome is qualitative or quantitative- since some of 
the autistic subjects included in the experiments in this thesis, were highly able autistic 
children and adolescents and therefore possibly Asperger's Syndrome.
A number of diagnostic criteria arc available which researchers could use to define their 
autistic sample. In the next section which is "Diagnosis of autism today”, the most 
frequently referred diagnostic criteria for autism will be reported. Then in the "What causes 
autism?" section the findings from biological research which strongly suggest that autism is 
a biologically caused condition will be considered briefly.
In chapter three, the cognitive psychological explanations of autism will be outlined. The 
first section reminds reader o f  the important advances in the understanding of autism with 
the progressing psychological research up to now. Then in the following section the 
current cognitive psychological theory of autism, the "theory of mind" account will be 
introduced.
In chapter four, the different theoretical approaches to the theory of "theory of mind" will 
be outlined. Firstly the term "theory of mind" is defined, then the outline of theory o f mind 
research with normal children is given. Then, in the following three sections, theoretical 
accounts due to Pemer, Leslie and Wellman which agree on the view that children develop 
a theory o f mind, will be explained. Next the theoretical accounts of Harris and Hobson, 
which argue against the theory of "theory of mind", will be reported.
The major part of chapter five considers the empirical evidence on whether autistic children 
lack a "theory of mind", and in the final part of this chapter the research on autistic 
children's understanding of emotions will be reported.
Chapter six discusses whether these theoretical accounts can explain the theory of mind 
impairment in autism.
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In this thesis, in order to investigate autistic children's understanding of knowledge as a 
mental state, their differentiation o f mental terms "know" and "guess" is tested. Thus, in 
chapter seven firstly, normal children's production and comprehension of cognitive mental 
terms will be explained, followed by a discussion o f when normal children begin to 
understand knowledge as a mental state.
The following four chapters (8-11) report four experiments which were carried out to 
investigate firstly at what age normal children can differentiate "know" from "guess” with 
reference to their and to other people's mental states, and then whether autistic children are 
able to differentiate these mental terms with reference to their own and to other people's 
mental states.
Finally, chapter twelve discusses the findings (from a total of 33 autistic children across the 
experiments) in relation to the theory of mind account of autism and the various 
methodological issues of the research in this area.
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2. C H A PT E R  TW O
Introduction to autism
2.1 . W hat is autism?
Autism is a developmental disorder which was first defined by Kanner (1943) who 
identified a peculiar pattern o f behaviours. He presented case studies o f 11 children and 
argued that despite the individual differences in these cases, they all had common 
characteristics distinctive from children with mental handicap or with childhood 
schizophrenia. These characteristics were as follows:
language - some of these children had no speech, or if speech was developed, they were 
unable to use it communicatively;
excellent rote memory -they could memorize numbers, poems, lists o f names, and nursery 
rhymes;
delayed echolalia -they repeated the utterances they heard and stored in the previous days;
literalness -they had an inability to use words other than as originally used;
personal pronouns repeated as heard -they were unable to use personal pronouns 
according to the changing speaker;
inability to relate themselves to other people -they showed an inability to develop 
relationships with other people, they seemed to be unaware or ignorant o f other people;
extreme autistic aloneness -they had a tendency to ignore anything coming from outside 
which could threaten self preservation;
obsessive desire for the maintenance o f  sameness -they showed resistance to change of 
familiar routines or environment;
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cognitive potentialities -they had an intelligent facial appearance;
physically -they had normal physical appearance.
A year after Kanner's paper was published, Asperger published very similar account. 
Asperger (1944)1 provided detailed case descriptions and discussed the common features 
of these cases. Like Kanner, Asperger also argued that although there were individual 
differences, all these cases had strongly distinct features which were present from the 
second year of life. These characteristics were as follows:
autistic intelligence -these children were not able to follow what was required from school 
for learning; on the o ther hand they might show excellent memory skills and be very good 
or knowledgeable in the area that they developed exceptional interest; they displayed superb 
abstraction abilities; they could spontaneously invent original expressions or words which 
were well suited to the situation;
physical appearance a nd expressive characteristics -the use o f gaze for communication 
appeared to be absent in these children, although they might show stereotypic movements 
they did not display any facial or bodily gestures and they avoided looking at people, their 
use o f language seemed to be odd and unnatural as if they were not speaking to people but 
to space;
social relationships -they showed an inability to develop normal relationships with people, 
they tended to ignore other people and other activities, but appeared engrossed in their own 
activities;
drive and affect -they might comply with their sexual or sadistic urges regardless of the 
acceptability o f these acts, and they were unable to show any affection to people;
1 Translated by Uta Frith (1991)
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relation to objects their relations to objects appeared to be odd too, they might ignore toys 
totally but develop an obsession with one object. Asperger called the existence o f these 
distinct features autistic psychopathy or autistic personality type.
Kanner (1943) and Asperger (1944) both listed distinctive behavioural features which they 
observed over the years in two groups of children, which were common within each group 
despite the individual differences. They both emphasized as main features o f autism an 
inability to develop normal relationships with other people, communication difficulties, 
unawareness or ignorance o f outside world but exceptional interests and superior skills. 
However there seem to be some differences between the two accounts. While Kanner 
stated that some children had no speech, or if speech had been acquired these children 
displayed delayed echolalia and reversal of personal pronouns, Asperger reported the 
presence o f odd and unnatural language but did not mention any case without any speech.
Although Kanner (1943) and Asperger (1944) are both recognized now as the pioneers of 
autism, for a long time researchers have referred to Kanner's work but not to Asperger's 
(Frith, 1989). Today, after the revisions o f their accounts by the original authors and by 
other researchers there is an ongoing debate whether the Asperger Syndrome is different 
from autism, or whether autism is a continuum and Asperger Syndrome is the top end of 
this continuum. This issue is important in the evaluation o f research in autism because if 
there is a qualitative difference between the two conditions, than autistic samples included 
in autism research should be clearly defined. In the next section the reviews and the studies 
which argue the similarities and differences between autism and Asperger's Syndrome will 
be reported.
2.2. Is Asperger's Syndrom e on a continuum  with K anner's Autism  ?
Some studies have suggested that Kanner's autism (early infantile autism) and Asperger's 
Syndrome (autistic psychopathy) are two different syndromes. For instance. Van Krevelen 
(1971, cited by Wing 1991) argued that early infantile autism (Kanner's autism) and 
autistic psychopathy (Asperger's Syndrome) were clearly different entities. He listed the
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major differences as follows: early infantile autism is present by the age o f one; a child with 
autism has none or retarded speech and fails to use language communicatively; he/she starts 
walking before he/she starts speaking; a child with autism displays poor eye contact which 
is due to his/her autistic aloneness, and their social impairment show poor prognosis. In 
contrast autistic psychopathy is a personality trait and not present before the age of three, a 
child with autistic psychopathy starts speaking before he/she can walk and makes attempts 
to communicate even if it is not appropriate, and their social impairment shows good 
prognosis. Furthermore Szatmari et al. (1986) argued that the available evidence is not 
sufficient to conclude that autism and Asperger's Syndrome are the same entities. They 
suggested that the term Asperger’s Syndrome should be maintained until studies prove that 
autism and Asperger's Syndrome have comparable "etiology, prognosis, and response to 
treatment" (p.517).
Other studies have looked closely at the similarities and differences between autism and 
Asperger's Syndrome, and have suggested that these two entities should be seen as on the 
same continuum. For instance Bowman (1988) reported a family of four brothers and a 
father who all displayed features of autism or Asperger's Syndrome and suggested that the 
difference between autism and Asperger's Syndrome "could be explained on the basis o f  
severity " (p.381). Further, Bowman (1988) argued that looking at the diagnostic criteria 
o f  autism today (Rutter, 1978), Asperger's original features (Asperger, 1944), and Wing’s 
(1981) diagnostic criteria for Asperger's Syndrome, it does not seem that there is a  clear- 
cut difference between autism and Asperger's Syndrome.
Similarly, Tantam (1988) highlighted the close relationship between the infantile autism and 
Asperger's Syndrome. He regarded the two conditions as falling into the autistic spectrum, 
and suggested that it would be right to use the term Asperger's Syndrome to refer to autistic 
children who a) are willing to be social but unable to develop relationships with people, b) 
are clumsy c) are unable to change their language "to f i t  different social contexts or the 
needs o f  different listener", d) are impaired in their use of non-verbal expressions like 
facial, gestural and posture and e) who have odd obsessive interests.
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Gillberg & Gillberg (1989) conducted an epidomological study in Göteborg in 1977 and 
screened all 6 year old children who did not have mental retardation. They found 14 
children showing motor clumsiness and attention perception deficits. They followed up 
these children and found that 8 of the 14 children showed autistic type behaviours at the age 
o f 7 ,4  children had all the diagnostic criteria for Asperger’s Syndrome and the remaining 
four children fulfilled either three or four of these criteria. In the light of these results 
Gillberg & Gillberg (1989) suggested a hypothetical continuum from severely mentally 
retarded "triadpatients " at one end (Wing, 1981b, cited by Gillberg & Gillberg, 1989), 
then Kanner's autism, then Asperger's Syndrome and then children with attention, 
perception deficits.
In a recent book on autism and Asperger's Syndrome edited by Frith (1991), Gillberg 
described six cases o f Asperger's Syndrome and argued that all six cases had features 
which are common to autism. These characteristics were: inability to attribute mental states 
of thinking and feeling to other people, showing difficulties in the areas o f  pragmatics, 
semantics and comprehension of language and having stereotypic motor m ovements in 
childhood but later they learn to control these behaviours. He emphasised the motor 
clumsiness as the main differentiating feature between autism and Asperger's Syndrome.
In conclusion Gillberg noted that there is a close link between the two entities. Some 
children demonstrate features of autism in their childhood, but later in life their condition 
might change so that they then fulfil the criteria for Asperger's Syndrome. A lso some 
children with autism could be initially diagnosed as having Asperger's Syndrome. 
However there are some cases of Asperger’s Syndrome which do not fulfil the features of 
infantile autism or autistic disorder.
In the same book Wing (1991) reviewed a number of studies which either claim ed that 
Kanner's autism (early infantile autism) and Asperger's Syndrome (autistic psychopathy) 
were definitely two different syndromes or claimed that there is a strong relationship 
between these syndromes. From the existing evidence Wing concluded that Kanner's 
autism and Asperger's Syndrome should be considered on the same continuum of "social
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impairment but characterised, at least in the earlier years o f  childhood, by somewhat 
differing profiles o f  cognitive, language and motor functions " (Wing, 1991, p. 115). Wing 
(1991) further noted that while the intelligence o f a person with Asperger's Syndrome 
ranges from mildly retarded to superior, a person with Kanner's autism displays severe 
retardation on general intelligence scales but their non-verbal intelligence would be in the 
range of mildly retarded to superior. In addition she argued that although some more able 
autistic children in their adult life may show features similar to Asperger's Syndrome, 
retaining the term Asperger's Syndrome in the autism continuum, rather than referring to it 
as high functioning autism, would lead to further research to investigate the underlying 
causes.
Wing (1991) argued for the practical advantages of keeping the term Asperger's Syndrome. 
She noted that the term autism could be thought of as the severe form of the condition, for 
some families it would be easier to accept that their child has a condition called Asperger's 
Syndrome which is towards the top end of autistic continuum. Secondly, the use of 
Asperger's Syndrome among other professionals like psychiatrists, may bring about an 
understanding that even though a child is not diagnosed as autistic later in their life, they 
may be referred for special help with autistic like deficits. However Scopler (1985) 
suggested that the term Asperger's Syndrome should not be used since there is not enough 
evidence to support a clear difference between Asperger's Syndrome and high functioning 
autism. Similarly Volkmar et. al. (1985) argued that existing evidence was not sufficient to 
differentiate autism from Asperger's Syndrome clearly.
There is further evidence to suggest that high functioning autism is not different from 
Asperger's Syndrome. To investigate the role o f  familial psychopathology for the etiology 
o f autism, DeLong & Dwyer (1988) collected the family histories of 51 people who had 
autism or pervasive developmental disorder. They concluded that high and low functioning 
autism have different etiologies. Low functioning autistic people tend to show neurological 
pathology, whereas high functioning autistic people have familial etiology. They further 
argued that high functioning autistic people could be diagnosed as having Asperger's
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Syndrome, thus high functioning autism and Asperger's Syndrome are basically the same 
entities both with familial etiology.
Recently some studies have compared people with high functioning autism to people with 
Asperger's Syndrome, in order to investigate whether the two entities could be clearly 
differentiated. Szatmari et al. (1989, cited by Ozonoff, Rogers and Pennington , 1991) 
found that Asperger's Syndrome people differed from the high functioning autism group 
not only in their early histories but also in their outcome. People with Asperger's 
Syndrome showed less impairment in communication, social responsiveness and 
circumscribed interests, furthermore their need for special education was less than high 
functioning autistic people. In a further study by Szatmari et al. (1990, cited by Ozonoff, 
Rogers and Pennington , 1991), the differences between the two groups on intelligence, 
neuropsychological and achievement tests were not marked enough to conclude that autism 
and Asperger's Syndrome are different entities.
However, Ozonoff, Rogers and Pennington (1991) found significant differences between 
people with high functioning autism and those with Asperger's Syndrome. High 
functioning autistic people were inferior to people with Asperger's Syndrome on theory of 
mind and verbal memory tests. However executive function, which is defined by Ozonoff 
Pennington and Rogers (1991) as “the ability to maintain an appropriate problem solving 
set fo r  attainment o f  a  future goal " (p. 1083), was a deficit shared by both high functioning 
autism and Asperger's Syndrome groups. Ozonoff, Rogers and Pennington (1991) argued 
that the reason for the Asperger's syndrome children's ability to pass theory o f mind tasks 
was that they might be using different strategies to solve these tasks, and the authors noted 
that more sensitive tasks should be developed to test the theory o f mind ability. Ozonoff, 
Rogers and Pennington (1991) further suggested that perhaps executive function and 
theory o f mind deficits are primary to the autism continuum.
In sum, all the studies mentioned in this section seem to suggest that there is a very close 
link between autism and Asperger's Syndrome. It appears that most authors agree with the
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idea of an autistic continuum and they seem to see Asperger's Syndrome as a subgroup of 
autism which includes more able autistic people. In addition, while some researchers want 
to retain the term "Asperger's Syndrome", others argue that there is no need for this term. 
To date, the evidence does not seem to be sufficiently clear to justify any conclusions. 
More neuropsychological and medical research is needed, to clarify whether the difference 
between the Asperger's Syndrome and autism is qualitative or quantitative.
In the next section, the international criteria for the diagnosis of autism will be described.
2.3. Diagnosis o f  autism  today
Rutter's (1978) criteria, the Diagnostic and Statistical manuals (DSM-III and DSM-III- 
Revised) of the American Psychiatric Association and the International Classification of 
Diseases (ICD) of the World Health Organization (9th and 10th) editions are the most 
commonly referred diagnostic criteria used by researchers in autism. Table 2.1. lists these 
criteria.
Table 2.1. Diagnostic criteria for autism *123
Rutter’s (1978) four criteria o f  autism
Rutter argued that to call a person autistic, it has to be clearly shown that all the diagnostic 
features are not the consequences of the child’s mental age. Rutter's four criteria are as 
follows:
1. Impaired social relationships. E.g. a lack of attachment behaviour, absence of normal 
use o f eye-to-eye gaze, inability to empathise and understand other people's feelings, 
inability to develop friendships.
2. Delayed and deviant language development. E.g. reversal o f personal pronouns, 
immediate echolalia, delayed repetition of stereotyped phrases, inability to use speech for 
social communication.
3. Insistence on the sameness. E.g. unusual obsessional interests, resistance to changes in 
the environment, limited play patterns, developing attachments to odd objects.
12
4. Age of onset before 30 months.
Diagnostic criteria of infantile autism-----PSM -III (APA. 1S>80. p.SSHMD
In DSM-III infantile autism is classified under the general category of pervasive 
developmental disorders which were identified with the deficiencies of attention, perception 
and motor movements.
A. Age of onset before 30 months.
B. Pervasive lack o f interest and responsiveness to other people.
C. Gross deficits in language development.
D. If speech present, peculiar speech patterns such as immediate and delayed echolalia, 
metaphorical language, pronominal reversal.
E. Bizarre responses to various aspects of the environment, e.g., resistance to changes in 
the environment, attachment to odd objects, peculiar interests.
F. Absence o f schizophrenic symptoms. 12345
Diagnostic criteria o f  autistic disorder___ D S M -lll-R  (APA. 1987. p.38-39)
In the revised version of DSM-III, due to invalidation o f age of onset, the two categories of 
Infantile Autism and Childhood Onset Pervasive Developmental Disorder were combined 
into one category o f Autistic disorder under more general category of Pervasive 
developmental disorders.
A. Qualitative impairment in reciprocal social interaction as manifested by at least two of the 
following features:
1. marked lack o f awareness o f the existence or feelings of others;
2. no or abnormal seeking o f comfort at times o f distress;
3. no or impaired imitation;
4. no or abnormal social play;
5. gross impairment in ability to make peer friendships.
B. Qualitative impairment in verbal and nonverbal communication, and in imaginative 
activity by at least one of the following features:
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1. no mode of communication, such as communicative babbling, facial expression, 
gesture, mime, or spoken language;
2. markedly abnormal nonverbal communication, as in the use of eye-to-eye gaze, facial 
expression, body posture, or gestures to initiate or modulate social interaction;
3. absence of imaginative activity, such as play-acting of adult roles, fantasy characters, or 
animals; lack o f interest in stories about imaginary events;
4. marked abnormalities in the production of speech, including volume, pitch, stress, rate, 
rhythm, and intonation;
5. marked abnormalities in the form or content of speech, including stereotyped and 
repetitive use o f speech;
6. marked impairment in the ability to initiate or sustain a conversation with others, despite 
adequate speech.
C. Markedly restricted repertoire o f activities and interests, as manifested by at least one of 
the following features:
1. stereotyped body movements e.g.hand flicking;
2. persistent preoccupation with parts of objects or attachment to objects;
3. marked distress over changes in trivial aspects of environment;
4. unreasonable insistence on following routines in precise detail;
5. markedly restricted range of interests and preoccupation with one narrow interest.
D. Onset during infancy or childhood.
Diagnostic criteria of childhood autism-----IC P-10 (WHO. 1987)
1. Qualitative impairments in reciprocal social interaction;
2. Qualitative impairments in communication;
C. Restricted, repetitive, and stereotyped patterns of behaviour, interests and activities;
D. Developmental abnormalities must have been present in the first 3 years for the 
diagnosis to be made (quoted from Gillberg, 1990, p.103).
Although these different sets of criteria for autism seem to differ in terms of details, they all 
emphasize impairments in social relationships with people, qualitative impairment in 
language and communication, and stereotypic patterns of behaviours and interests as the
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main features of autism. The only difference between the DSM-III-R and the other 
diagnostic criteria is the criterion about the age of onset. In DSM-III-R age o f onset is not 
restricted to the first 3 years o f life.
2.4. W hat causes autism?
Early theories o f autism suggested that autistic children come to the world potentially 
normal, but the environment they were brought up in caused their abnormality (Wing, 
1983). However, it is now known that autism has multiple biological causes.
Kanner (1943) originally suggested that autistic children "have come to the world with 
innate inability to form the usual, biologically provided affective contact with people  " 
(p.516-517, cited by Rutter, 1983). Then in his following papers he changed his argument 
from autism as an innate deficit, and suggested that autistic children's social communication 
difficulties were a response to their cold parents. As a result they ignored other people and 
sought peace by social withdrawal (Kanner 1946, 1949 cited by Rutter, 1983). Other 
authors also emphasised parental qualities as the cause o f autism (Eisenberg, 1957b; 
Bettelheim, 1967; Despert, 1951 cited by Wing. 1983). However, a study by Rutter et. al. 
(1971) (cited by Wing, 1983) compared the parents of autistic children with that o f the 
parents o f children with developmental receptive "aphasia", and found no differences 
between the parents of these two groups in terms of psychiatric illness, enthusiasm, 
empathy, obsessionality and the emotional warmth towards the child (Wing, 1983). Wing 
(1954) reported that Kanner (1954) argued that the parents o f  autistic children used 
abnormal, rigid child rearing practises. Studies which have compared the parents o f 
autistic children with that of parents of children with Down's syndrome or children with 
brain damage, in terms of their child rearing practices such as strictness, over- 
protectiveness, rejection and objectivity, have concluded that theories suggesting the 
parental factors as the cause of autism cannot be supported (Pitfield and Oppenheim, 1964; 
Gillies et. al., 1963; DeMyer et. al., 1972c; cited by Wing, 1983).
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Other authors have proposed that it is an interaction between abnormalities (vulnerability) 
autistic children already have and environmental factors which cause the autistic condition 
(Wing, 1983). For instance. Wing (1983) reports that Tinbergen and Tinbergen (1972) 
argued that, like every infant, an autistic child has a fear o f  others; if the parents of an 
autistic child are not sensitive to the needs of their child and fail to protect him/her from too 
much exposure to strangers, this chronic fear could lead to autism. However, this proposal 
lacks any experimental evidence and it is highly unlikely that chronic fear could lead to a 
condition characterized by qualitative language impairment, stereotyped behaviour as well 
as social communication difficulties.
In sum, early theories suggesting that autism had psychological causes -such as parental 
abnormalities (parents are cold, detached, formal, unsociable and belonging to a higher 
social class); or abnormal child rearing practices; or parental pathology - cannot be 
supported from the available evidence (Wing, 1983). On the contrary, it has been accepted 
by the majority o f authors that autism is a disorder with multiple biological causes 
(Gillberg, 1990; Frith, 1989; Folstein & Rutter. 1988).
2.4.1. G enetic evidence
The role o f genetic factors in autism has been shown by recent studies. One of the 
difficulties in genetic studies of autism is that it is very rare for autistic people to have 
children. For this reason, working with the siblings of autistic children appears to be the 
best way to investigate the possibility of familial inheritance in autism (Silliman et. al., 
1989). A study of an autistic twin population included twin pairs where at least one of the 
twins met the criteria for autism which was “a serious impairment in the development o f 
social relationships, delayed or deviant language development, and also stereotyped 
repetitetive or ritualistic play and interests " (Folstein & Rutter, 1977, p.299). The results 
of this study has shown that in monozygotic pairs the concordance rate of autism was 36% 
whereas in dizygotic pairs it was 0%. In addition in monozygotic twins the concordance 
rate for general cognitive abnormalities was 82% whereas in dizygotic pairs it was 10%
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Folstein & Rutter (1977) concluded that the difference of concordance rate between the 
monozygotic and dizygotic twin pairs indicate the role of genetic factors in the aetiology.of 
autism. Furthermore it has been argued that more general disorders such as low 
intelligence and language and reading problems seem to have higher rates o f occurrence in 
the families o f  autistic people (Bartak et al., 1975, cited by Folstein & Rutter, 1988 ; 
Folstein & Rutter, 1977). Folstein and Rutter (1988) suggested that if the more general 
language and intellectual deficit is inherited, that could explain the relation between the birth 
complications and the occurrence of autism. They suggested that since among the 
monozygotic twins who were not concordant for autism, the twins who had autism tended 
also to have birth complications, whereas their co-twin who had a general cognitive deficit 
did not have birth complications. Thus perhaps the inheritance of a general language- 
cognitive deficit combined with birth complications leads to autism.
Among the other genetic factors, single gene disorders have been suggested to be related to 
autism. For instance, fragile-X syndrome, tuberous sclerosis, neurofibromatosis, 
phenylketonuria (reported by Folstein & Rutter, 1988; Silliman et. al.,1989 and 
Steffenburg & Gillberg, 1989) have been implicated.
2.4.2. Pre- Peri* and Neonatal factors
Pré-, peri- and neonatal complications seem to be more frequent in autistic children than in 
their siblings or in control groups. Both the prenatal factors (bleeding in pregnancy, 
especially early and mid-trimester; birth order especially first, fourth and later bom; older 
mother; use o f  medication) and perinatal factors (meconium in the amniotic fluid) appear to 
have higher incidences in autistic children whose autistic features are present from the birth. 
In addition, it has been suggested that neonatal factors such as respiratory distress and 
septicemia or meningitis, which are both cerebral infections, are related to autism 
manifested after a normal developmental period (Tsai, 1987 and 1989). However, 
although pre- peri- and neonatal complications seem to he associated with autism, the
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available evidence is far from suggesting that there is single path between these 
complications and the incidence o f autism.
2 .4 .3 . Infectious D iseases
It has been suggested that congenital rubella, congenital cytomegalovirus and herpes may 
be associated with autism. However further extensive research is necessary to establish a 
cause-effect relationship (reported by Frith. 1989; Tsai, 1989 and Steffenburg & Gillberg, 
1989).
2.4.4. N europathological studies
Very few neuropathological studies have been reported. The most important one seems to 
be a single case study of a 29 year old autistic man compared to an age and sex matched 
person by Bauman & Kemper, 1985 (cited by Golden, 1987). They found increased cell 
picking in the amygdala, reduced size of neurons, a  lamina desicans in the entorhinal 
cortex, and a loss o f Purkinje and granule cells in the cerebellum. The loss of purkinje 
cells in the cerebellum in autistic people has been found also by Ritvo et. al. (1986, cited in 
Tsai, 1989).
2.4.5. Neuroradiological evidence
Studies using computerized tomographic (CT) scanning have not being able to detect 
consistent abnormalities which were not related to other neurological diseases. However 
studies using midsagittal magnetic resonance imaging (MRI), found that the fourth ventricle 
was larger and the brain stem was smaller in autistic people. In addition MRI scanning 
showed that in comparison to normal people, high functioning autistic people had 
neocerebellar damage (reported by Tsai. 1989 and Steffenburg & Gillherg, 1989).
2.4.6. Neurochem ical evidence
At present the neurochemical evidence does not seem to be sufficient to come to any 
conclusions about the etiology of autism. However there are some studies indicating that
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autistic people are significantly different from control samples "in platelet serotonin uptake, 
free blood trytophan, urinary HVA -creatinine ratio, circulating antibodies to 5HT1A  
receptors or myelin basic protein ” (p.277, Yuwiler & Freedman, 1987). Further research 
is needed in order to understand the role o f neurochemical factors in autism.
2 .4 .7 . N europhysiological evid en ce
Neurophysiological research in autism seems to suggest dysfunction both at the brainstem 
and at the cortical level. Results of EEG studies appear to indicate that autistic people have 
abnormal cerebral lateralization which supports the cortical-dysfunction hypothesis of 
autism (Tsai, 1989). In addition it has been found that autistic people have smaller P3b 
responses (indicating cognitive responses to stimuli) in comparison to controls. (P3b is "a 
component occurs 300-900 ms after stimulus which represents purely cognitive Junctions " 
, Tsai, 1989, p.94). Tsai, (1989) argued that all these findings indicate "a diminished or 
altered capacity fo r  selectively channeling information for further internal attention and 
processing, as well as that differential hemispheric involvement in the attentional deficits " 
(p.95) in autistic people. Furthermore studies o f vestibular function, autonomic responses, 
and auditory brainstem responses seem to support, the hypothesis o f  brain stem 
dysfunction in autism (reported by Tsai, 1989 and Steffenburg & Gillberg, 1989).
In sum, present evidence seem to suggest that a number of factors: neurobiological, 
genetics, pre- perinatal complications, infectious diseases, appear to play some role in the 
causation of autism. Although it is clear that autism has definite biological causes not 
psychogenic, it is not possible to suggest a single cause which leads to the autistic 
condition.
2.5. Summary
This chapter started with an account o f autism and then the similarities and differences 
between autism and Asperger's Syndrome were reported. The following section dealt with 
diagnoses of autism, and the different sets of diagnostic criteria for autism were listed.
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Finally, the evidence from biological research have been mentioned briefly. The evidence 
strongly suggests that autism has biological causes. However, whatever the cause (or 
causes), it is effecting certain brain systems which may be responsible for the autistic 
behavioural features o r more specific cognitive ability. For instance, recent cognitive 
psychological research indicate that autistic people are impaired in their theory of mind 
ability -the ability to attribute mental states to oneself or to others, which has been 
suggested as the possible reason for autistic people's communication difficulties.
In the next chapter firstly, the cognitive psychological explanations o f autism prior to the 
theory of mind account will be reported. Then a brief outline o f  the theory of mind 
explanation of autism will be given.
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3. C H A P T E R  TH REE
Cognitive approaches to autism
3.1. Cognitive explanations pre*dating theory o f mind
Since the first recognition of autism by Kanner 1943 our understanding of this condition 
has greatly expanded. With the increase in empirical research into autism and also into 
normal child development, researchers have increasingly sought a cognitive understanding 
of autism. Thinking has changed from a view that psychological factors, such as cold 
parents, are the primary underlying cause o f autism, to a view which proposes cognitive 
impairments as the primary underlying factor.
Researchers who have taken the cognitive approach to autism have emphasized various 
cognitive impairments as the primary basis o f the social impairment of autistic people. 
These areas include, general intellectual skills, language, information processing skills, 
memory, coding processes and symbolic use.
The use of standardized intelligence tests in the investigation of autistic children's general 
cognitive functioning, seems to be important in two ways. First, the general intelligence 
tests measure two types of cognitive functioning, information storage and cognitive 
processes, so autistic children's performance on the specific subtests indicate the nature of 
their impairment (Sigman et al., 1987). Second, the relationship between general cognitive 
ability and social functioning should indicate, whether or not general cognitive functioning 
is the primary underlying factor in autism.
Studies have shown that autistic children are impaired in both cognitive processes and 
stored knowledge (Sigman et al., 1987). To investigate the nature of the autistic 
impairment, children with Kanner's autism were compared with mentally retarded children. 
It was found that autistic children were unimpaired on the performance scales, they scored 
high on the object assembly and block design scales of WISC-R; but low on the verbal
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scales of comprehension, vocabulary and similarities subtests. Non-autistic mentally 
retarded children had similar scores on the verbal and performance scales (reported by 
Sigman et al., 1987).
Several studies have indicated both that the social impairment in autism can not account for 
the impairment in general intellectual skills, and that the general cognitive deficit can not 
cause the impairment in social skills, since there are autistic children with normal 
intellectual abilities and there arc mentally handicapped children, such as children with 
Down's Syndrome who do not show the social impairments characteristic o f autism (Rutter 
&  Lockyer, 1967; DeMyer et al., 1974 cited by Rutter, 1983). However the general 
cognitive abilities of autistic children do seem to predict the level o f  social impairment. For 
instance, Bartak & Rutter (1976) (cited by Shah & Wing, 1986) found that autistic children 
who had nonverbal IQs below 70, displayed severe social impairment in comparison to the 
autistic children with IQs above 70. Other studies have found similar results, reporting that 
overall IQ was the best predictor of autistic children's social adaptation level (DeMeyer, 
1976; Rutter, 1970; Lotter, 1974; Dawson & Everard, 1984, cited by Shah & Wing, 1986 
and Rutter, 1983). Epidemlogical study by Wing & Gould (1979) (cited by Shah & Wing. 
1986) showed that autistic children's varying levels of cognitive abilities were related to 
their communication and social adaptation levels. However the same study also showed 
that this relation was applicable to other mentally retarded children. In addition Shah & 
Wing, (1986) reports Wing’s (1981a) suggestion that differing degrees of overall 
intelligence was related to qualitatively differing degrees of social adaptation. For instance, 
while severely mentally handicapped autistic children were "completely aloof and 
indifferent to others and who really could be described as "treating people like objects 
(p.155), intellectually normal autistic children were willing to socialize with people, were 
aware o f the social environment but had subtle social cognitive problems, ”... shown in the 
naive and one-sided approaches made to others and a tendency to talk on and on about a 
limited range o f  special interests ” (p.155), and autistic children with mild mental 
retardation showed differing degrees of social impairment, they "passively accepted, and
22
quite enjoyed, social approaches made by others, b u t" they "rarely or never initiated  
approaches themselves " (Shah & Wing,1986, p.155).
In sum, findings from several studies seem to suggest that there is a relation betw een the 
severity o f autism and general cognitive ability, but this does not indicate a cause-effect 
relationship. In other words, general cognitive impairment cannot be the underlying factor 
in autism.
The commonality o f language deficiencies among autistic children led some researchers to 
hypothesize that perhaps faulty cognitive processes related to language and underlay the 
impaired social characteristics of the autistic condition. Researchers such as R utter (1965) 
and Churchill (1972) (cited by Prior, 1984) emphasized the similarities between 
developmental dysphasic children and autistic children. While Rutter (1965) suggested that 
"an aphasic-type disorder is probably a central element in the development o f  m any cases of 
autism  " (Prior, 1984, p.7), Churchill (1972) argued that both conditions had th e  same 
language disorder but that the difference between autism and developmental dysphasia was 
in the degree o f severity (reported by Prior, 1984). However a later study com pared the 
language of autistic children and dysphasic children, and showed that the difference 
between these conditions was qualitative, autistic children, compared to dysphasic children, 
had abnormal language features such as echolalia, pronomial reversal, and inferior 
comprehension o f language and use o f social language, and also inferior understanding of 
gestures (Bartak e t al., 1975, cited by Prior, 1984 and Rutter, 1983). It was concluded 
that receptive language disorder (dysphasia) could not account for autism. B esides the 
abnormal language patterns, autistic children also had a cognitive deficit which is not found 
in dysphasic children, so " ...language deviance as much as language delay .. was 
characteristic o f  autism " (Rutter, 1983, p.523). Rutter (1983) noted that even those 
autistic people who develop spoken language tend to use "stereotyped statements" rather 
than having conversations with other people. This feature has been emphasized also by 
other researchers showing that autistic children have pragmatic deficits, failing to  use
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appropriate language in a given context (Tager-Flusberg, 1981 cited by Shah & Wing, 
1986).
In sum, it appears that receptive language impairment can not account for autistic social 
impairment, it is clear that autistic children's impaired language is qualitatively different 
than dysphasic children’s. Research findings suggest that language impairment is an 
essential part of autism, even if autistic children develop certain level of spoken language, 
they still seem to fail to have conversations which require pragmatic as well as language 
skills. However one thing still seems to be unknown whether language impairment 
specific to autism has any underlying effect on the social impairment of these people.
Information processing skills is another important area which has been investigated in 
autism research. Hermelin and O'Connor (1970) compared autistic, normal and mentally 
handicapped children in series of experiments, and reported that although autistic children's 
performance in these experiments was related to their intellectual level, autistic children 
showed perceptual abnormalities especially in response to auditory stimuli. They also 
displayed shorter fixation times to visual stimuli. In other experiments these authors 
presented the three groups o f  children with lists of words which were either randomly or 
non-randomly ordered. They found that autistic children did equally well in recalling these 
lists while normal and mentally retarded children did better if the list was not random but 
meaningful. Hermelin and O'Connor (1970) suggested "the inability o f  autistic children to  
encode stimuli meaningfully as their basic cognitive deficit " (p. 129).
Furthermore Hermelin (1983) argued that it is not the selective perceptual impairment but 
an impairment in the processes involved in storing the information independently from its 
modality which appears to be central to autism. She noted that autistic children show good 
short term memories but that what seems to be missing is the processing and coding of this 
information in these children. If the child cannot code and store incoming information, 
with an increasing amount o f information the short term memory system would break 
down and may cause inappropriate behaviour. In sum, Hermelin (1983) concluded that.
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"This cognitive pathology seems to consist largely o f  an inability to reduce information 
through the appropriate extraction o f  crucial features such as rules and redundancies. The 
impairment in these processes imposes well remembered, stereotyped and restricted 
behaviour patterns, which become increasingly inappropriate as the requirements for  
complex, flexible codes increase. It is in the areas o f  language development and social 
interaction, which are governed by such complex and flexible rules, that the autistic child's 
cognitive impairment becomes most evident " (p. 167-168).
Another area o f cognitive research is discrimination learning. It has been shown that 
autistic children are unable to solve problems which involved two-dimentional symbolic 
stimuli. However, when autistic children were presented with concrete three dimensional 
stimuli they were able to solve the problems. The conclusion was that autistic children had 
problems with symbolic material which differentiated them from the mentally handicapped 
children (Prior, 1977 and Prior & McGillivray, 1980 reported by Prior, 1984). Further 
studies have shown that autistic children were also impaired in their symbolic play skills, 
which led researchers to conclude that autistic children with varying degrees of intellectual 
abilities, have "a syndrome-specific problem with symbolic material " (Prior. 1984, p .l 1).
In sum, evidence seem to suggest that autistic children show impairment in their 
information processing skills and discrimination learning. However one thing still seems 
to be unknown whether these impairments are specific to autism, and have any underlying 
effect on the social impairment o f these people. For instance, Hermelin and O'Connor 
(1970) found that autistic children's performance on the information processing tasks was 
related to their intellectual abilities which may suggest that there were some autistic children 
who could perform well on those tasks.
The most recent cognitive psychological theory of autism is the "theory of mind" account 
The following section outlines this theory.
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3.2. Introduction to the "theory o f mind" account o f autism
The theory o f mind account proposes that autistic children's inability to attribute mental 
states to themselves and others underlies their specific social communication difficulties. It 
is argued that: If a child is unable to understand other people’s mental states he/she will not 
be able to predict the social behaviour of others and this could make the world a confusing 
place for the child (Baron-Cohen, 1990b).
The theory of mind view of autism began with studies by Baron Cohen et al. (1985, 1986) 
which showed that autistic children were significantly worse than 4-year-old normal 
children and verbal MA matched Down's syndrome children, in their ability to attribute a 
false belief to a story character. Baron Cohen et al. (1985) concluded that autistic children 
had a specific cognitive deficit in their theory of mind. Several other studies have 
supported the findings of Baron-Cohen et al. (1985) that autistic children lack a "theory of 
mind" (Pemer et al., 1989; Leslie & Frith, 1988; Baron-Cohen, 1989a; Russell et al., 
1991).
Around the same time Leslie (1987) formulated the theoretical model of a representation 
mechanism (decoupler). According to this model, the decoupler mechanism produces 
secondary representations which are representations o f representations - for this reason 
Leslie called them metarepresentations. Leslie (1987) emphasised that autistic children 
were impaired not only in their theory o f mind but also in pretend play which both require 
metareprcsentational skills. Thus the decoupler mechanism underlies both the child's 
theory o f mind and pretend play skills. In other words Leslie (1987) suggested that 
autistic children's specific cognitive deficit could be due to an impaired decoupler 
mechanism which is responsible for metarepresentational skills. This model will be 
explained in detail in chapter 4.
In summary, the theory of mind account of autism proposes that the impaired decoupler 
mechanism is the underlying factor for in autistic child's impaired theory of mind which 
itself underlies the autism specific social communication difficulties.
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In the next chapter the different theoretical approaches to the theory of "theory o f mind" 
will be described. A number of theorists including Pemer, Leslie, Wellman and Harris 
have formulated views on this topic in the light of empirical evidence. Although Pemer, 
Leslie and Wellman agree that normal children around the age of four acquire a  theory of 
mind and become able to attribute mental states to themselves and others, their formulations 
of how children come to develop a theory of mind seem to be slightly different as will be 
explained in the next chapter. In addition two other theorists (Harris and Hobson) who 
claim that children do not develop a theory of mind. While Harris's view seems to be very 
similar to those theorists' who are in favour of the theory o f mind account, Hobson 
proposes affective-connative interpersonal relations as the origins of social and cognitive 
development. In the second part o f chapter four, Harris's and Hobson's accounts will be 
described.
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4. C H A PT ER  FOUR
Theoretical approaches to the theory o f "theory o f mind"
4.1. What is "theory of mind"?
The term "theory o f mind" was introduced by Premack & Woodruff (1978) in their study 
of a chimpanzee, to refer to the ability to attribute mental states to oneself and to others. 
Their aim was to investigate whether the chimpanzee had a "theory of mind" ability similar 
to that humans, by asking whether she could predict an actor's behaviour by attributing 
mental states to him. They called this ability a "theory" for two reasons. One was that 
mental states are not directly observable and the other was that one can make predictions 
about the behaviour o f others on the basis o f these mental states. This term was soon taken 
up by developmental psychologists. There is now a rapidly expanding body o f research to 
investigate when and how children develop a theory of mind, and what are the origins and 
the factors underlying this ability. Different theorists have proposed different explanations 
for the origins of theory of mind. In the following sections these theoretical accounts will 
be reported in detail. However, before the theoretical accounts, a brief account will be 
given of the main areas of research in the investigation of the child's theory o f mind.
The leading experimental paradigm which has been used to study children's theory of mind 
ability is the false belief task. The false belief task requires children to predict the 
behaviour of a person who holds a false belief about a situation because they are unaware 
of a change in the world. For instance, in the original study by Wimmer & Perner (1983) 
children were presented with a story which was enacted with doll characters. In this story 
Maxi puts some chocolate in the green cupboard and goes out to play. In his absence his 
mother takes the chocolate from the green cupboard and uses some for the cake that she is 
baking. Later she puts the remaining chocolate back in the blue cupboard. Maxi comes 
back from the playground hungry and wants to have some chocolate. Children were asked 
where Maxi will look for the chocolate. An awareness that Maxi should had a false belief
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will lead children to expect Maxi to look in the green cupboard, even though the children 
themselves know that the chocolate is in the blue cupboard.
After Wimmer & Pemer's (1983) original study investigating children's understanding of 
another person's false belief, a number o f other studies followed which addressed the same 
question but used a variety of different tasks: Pemer, Leekam & Wimmer, (1987), 
Hogrefe, Wimmer & Pemer, (1986), Gopnik & Astington, (1988), Zaitchik (1990), 
Freeman, Lewis & Doherty (1991), Mitchell & Lacohee (1991), Siegal & Beattie (1991) 
and Sullivan & Winner (1991). Children’s understanding of their own false beliefs has 
also been studied by Gopnik & Slaughter (1991) and Wimmer & Hard (1991).
Research on the child's theory of mind has not been limited only to the study of false 
belief. For example, children's ability to attribute second-order beliefs has been 
investigated by Pemer & Wimmer (1985). Children's understanding of deception has been 
investigated by Chandler, Fritz & Hala (1989), Hala, Chandler, & Fritz (1991) and 
Sodian, Taylor, Harris & Pemer (1991). Children's understanding of the appearance- 
reality distinction has been investigated by Flavell, et al. (1983) and Flavell, et al. (1987).
Independently of the first false belief studies, other authors have looked at children's 
spontaneous language production to investigate when they start to use mental terms (such 
as know, think, believe, guess, remember and forget) in order to attribute mental states to 
themselves and to others (Bretherton & Beeghly, 1982; Bretherton, et al,1981 and Shatz et 
al. 1983). These authors have argued that children's production o f mental terms to refer to 
people's mental states can be taken as an early indication of theory o f mind ability. This 
literature is reported in detail in chapter 7.
Furthermore, children's ability to pretend, and to understand pretence in others, has been 
argued to be an early manifestation of theory o f mind, since both pretence and theory of 
mind require metarepresentational ability - the ability to represent representations (Leslie, 
1987). However Pemer (1991) argues strongly against pretence requiring 
metarepresentational ability.
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In addition to these investigations o f the normal child's theory of mind, there is another 
body of research which looks at autistic children's theory o f mind. After reporting the 
theoretical views on theory of mind, the research in autism and theory of mind will be 
reviewed.
4.2. Theoretical views on the child's theory o f  mind
This section will consider, first, Pemer's account of children's developing understanding 
of mind and representation, second, Leslie's view on representation and the theory of 
mind, and third, Wellman's account o f theory o f mind. Finally, two other accounts which 
are opposed to the theory of mind, namely Harris' and Hobson's accounts, will be 
reported.
4.2.1. Perner
4.2.1.1. Definition o f representations
Pemer (1991) unhelpfully defines representation as ".. something that stands in a 
representing relation to something else " (p. 18). According to Pemer a representation can 
be external, such as pictures or language, or it can be mental, such as thoughts. Pemer 
clearly distinguishes representation (representational medium, e.g. a picture) from 
representational content (e.g. content depicted by that picture) and he defines 
representational relation as "representing something as being a certain way " (p.40). Pemer 
calls representations which represent things in the world primary representations - what 
Leslie (1987) calls, simply, representations. Perner argues that misrepresentations may 
occur when primary representations represent the world. These may he a result of either a 
perceptual error or a malfunctioning system.
Pemer (1991) adds that secondary representations represent "not how the things are, but 
how they could he they are "detached or 'decoupled' from  reality ". According to
Pemer, secondary representations are copies o f primary representations and they allow us 
"to think o f  the past and the possible future, and even the nonexisting, and to reason 
hypothetically ". The existence of secondary representations depends on the existence of 
primary representations which depends on the existence of reality in the world. This seems 
to be adequate for many purposes but it is extremely difficult to apply when the referents 
are themselves fictional; a substantial physical problem is involved but it would take us 
beyond this thesis.
Another term Pemer (1991) describes is metarepresentation, which is "the ability to 
represent that something (another organism) is representing something " (p.7) (see figure
4.1.). According to Pemer metarepresentation requires the understanding o f the difference 
between "what is represented (referent) and as what it is represented (sense) " and he 
argues that secondary representation is the only way to understand the difference between 
the referent and sense. He also characterises metarepresentation as a model that "models 
the representational relationship between a model and the environment (or whatever is 
being m odelled)" (p.41). He adds that in order to understand misrepresentation one must 
understand that a primary representation which has been formed at a certain time could be 
different from what a primary representation should be according to the external situation. 
Pemer claims that in order to contrast "what happened with what should have happened" it 
is necessary to metarepresent, and a representation o f what should have happened is a 
secondary representation since it is a hypothetical situation (see figure 4.2).
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F ig u re  4.1. P e rn e r 's  view o f  rep resen ta tio n a l levels
primary
representation
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F ig u re  4.2. U n d ers tand ing  m isrep resen ta tio n  a t  th e  m etarepresen ta tiona l
level
META REPRESENTATION 
of MISREPRESENTATION
4 .2 .I .2 .  C h i ld r e n 's  u n d e r s ta n d in g  o f  r e p r e s e n ta t io n a l  lev e ls
According to Pemer children go through three developmental levels in their understanding 
of representations. In the first year of life infants can represent only what is out there in the 
world as it is: Pemer calls these "primary representations". From the second year onwards 
infants begin to create multiple models (secondary representations) which enable them to 
compare past with present (e.g. past "I was two years old", present "I am three years old") 
or real with hypothetical (e.g. real "this is a banana", hypothetical "this is a phone") (see 
figure 4.3.), and enable them to pretend play, to understand external representations like 
language and pictures and to empathize with others. Pemer names children at this stage as 
"situation theorists". From the age o f three children begin to have representations of 
representations, which indicates that they have a metarepresentational ability. 
Metarcprcsentaiional ability enables children to distinguish appearance from reality, to
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understand misrepresentations and false belief. Pemer calls children at this level
"representation theorists".
Perner argues that at first infants have "a single mode! o f  the world ", later, at the age of 
one to one and a half years, they start developing "multiple models ". As an example of 
when infants start to use multiple models, Pemer refers to Haake &Somerville's (1985) 
invisible displacement task. He reports that in the experimental setting there were two 
pieces o f  cloth (used as covers) separate from one another. To start the task infants are 
shown an object in the experimenter's palm, then the experimenter closes his hand, 
covering the target object. The experimenter then puts his hand through the first cover, 
keeps it there two seconds, then takes his hand out. He then stops his hand between the 
two covers and opens it. Next he closes his hand and moves it under the second cover and 
out the other side. Then he opens his hand showing it to be empty. If the experimenter 
had the object in his hand when he opened it between the covers, the infant should look for 
the object under the second cover. However if he did not have the object in his hand when 
he opened his hand between the covers, the infant should look for the object under the first 
cover. Pem er reports Haake &Somerville (1985) found that at 15 months. 67% o f the time 
infants searched in the right location. From these results Perner concludes that at the age of 
15 months infants are able to have at least two models at the same time - one to show how 
the situation is now, the other to show how the situation used to be - which allow them to 
think about the past.
Another example of infants' usage o f multiple models appears to he pretend play. Pemer 
(1991) argues that in order to claim that a child's play is pretend play, rather than functional 
play, a  child should be aware that there are two models. In a "reality model" a child should 
realize what the object is in the real world [(Pemer's exampleV'ftjr real "this object is a 
piece o f  cloth" "] and an "as-if model" where a child pretends it to be something else 
[(Perner's exampleY'/o r  ft/n "this object is my pillow" "J (p.54). According to Pemer if a 
child is able to change his/her actions between two situations of reality and pretence, this
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indicates that the child is aware of the distinction between real and pretend, and he/she is 
not making a mistake. In this case the child's play is pretend play.
Pemer highlights three points about pretend play:
1) In pretend play modelling two different situations at the same time, a "real situation” and 
a "hypothetical situation", does not indicate that one situation represents the other.
2) Pretend play involves substitution, where one object "stands in for" another object. 
However, one object does not "stand for" another object in the sense o f being a 
representation. Thus pretend play should not be seen as a symbolic activity "in the sense 
that some substituted object represents what it has been substituted fo r  " (p.59).
3) Creating multiple models is sufficient for pretence. According to Pemer pretend play 
does not require metarepresentational ability. Pemer criticizes Leslie’s argument that
"pretend representations are not representations o f the world but representations o f 
representations " (Leslie, 1987, p.417 quoted by Perner, 1991, p.59). However, Pemer 
argues that "pretend representations are not representations o f  the world as it is but o f  the 
world as it might be " (Perner, 1991, p.59).
According to Perner, with the acquisition of the ability to form multiple models, around the 
age o f two, a child also becomes able to understand the use o f  symbolic input (pictures or 
language). Pemer argues that at this stage children begin "to understand representations as 
a special kind o f represented situation in which the same people, objects, and relations 
occur as in real life but in which they behave and exist in a quite different, "nonreal" way " 
(p.71). Pemer calls children at this stage situation theorists. For instance, around the age 
of one and a half years children become able to interpret their mirror image. While younger 
infants treat the mirror image of themselves as another person, later on they begin to 
recognize themselves in the mirror which, according to Pemer, requires the child to have 
two models: one to represent him/her in reality and the other to represent him/her in the 
mirror.
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Another example of children’s use o f  multiple models is their understanding o f pictures. 
Pemer notes that around the age o f  one children do not show an interest in pictures; they 
cannot appreciate them because they have only a single model of reality. However, in the 
second year of life children begin to understand that objects have different properties in 
pictures than in reality. This is why one and a half year old children do not bite the picture 
of an apple (Pemer, 1991). According to Pemer children at this stage are able to 
understand that a picture of daddy may present daddy in a  different situation than in real 
life. Children also understand that there is only one daddy, but that he can be in two 
different situations.
Another ability that appears to be acquired by children just before the age o f three is an 
understanding of correspondence. Pemer reports Deloache's (1989) correspondence task, 
in which children were shown two rooms, one large and one small, with identical furniture 
in each. Children were told that the large room was Daddy Snoopy's and that the small 
room was Baby Snoopy’s room. They were also told that Baby Snoopy likes to do 
whatever Daddy Snoopy does. After placing Daddy Snoopy in the cupboard in the large 
room, the experimenter asked the child "where is Baby Snoopy?" Children between the 
ages of two and half to three were able to understand the correspondence between the two 
rooms. According to Perner, the situation theorist can understand the correspondence by 
seeing the two rooms as two different situations (see figure 4.3.).
F igure  4.3. R epresentational ab ility  o f  s itu a tio n  theorist.
Situation theorist
PAST FUTURE
Pemer notes that in the second year of life "children have implicit understanding o f  
representations ...they can use them as representations " (p.72). But children at this age 
have not developed an explicit understanding of representations, thus they cannot "model 
the representational relationship between picture and depicted or model the fa c t that a 
picture needs to be interpreted " (p.73).
Pemer argues that explicit understanding of representations, which is an ability to model 
representational relationship, emerges between the ages o f three and four. For instance, by 
the age of four children can understand that people looking from different angles can give 
different interpretations to the same picture. Pemer gives Flavell et al.'s (1981) visual
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perspective-taking task as an example. In this task children were shown a drawing of a 
turtle. If the turtle's feet were pointing towards the child, the turtle was standing on its 
feet, but when the turtle was rotated 180°. facing the other way, it was lying on its back. 
While three-year-old children had no difficulty saying whether the turtle was standing or 
lying on its back, they did find it difficult to interpret that, if the turtle w as standing on its 
feet from their point o f view, to the experimenter who was sitting opposite to the child, the 
turtle was lying on its back. However, four-year-olds could understand that the 
experimenter might give a different interpretation to the same picture, which according to 
Pemer indicates that these children have metarepresentational ability. Pem er argues that the 
ability to understand alternative interpretations requires an ability to m odel "the relationship 
between a representation (picture) and what it represents (the turtle's position)"'.
Furthermore, four-year-old children seem to be able to understand misrepresentations in 
their verbal statements. According to Pemer, understanding misrepresentations requires 
metarepresentational ability, which enables children to differentiate referent (what is 
represented) from sense (as what it is represented). Pemer, (1991) gives W immer & 
Pemer's (1990) task as an example: in this task a child was given a familiar chocolate box 
and a puppet asked them what was in the box. All the children answered that there was 
chocolate in the box, but when they opened the box they found a car. Then the children 
were asked: "When the puppet asked you what was in the box what did you say was in the 
box?” While only a very small number of three-year-olds could answer this question 
correctly, most o f the four-year-olds had no difficulty giving the right answer. Pemer 
argues that these results show the four-year-old child's ability to metarepresent. They 
could pass this task because they could remember that they misdescribed the real situation 
(referent) as different (sense) from what it really was.
Children around the age of four also become able to differentiate appearance from reality 
which, according to Pemer (1991), also requires metarepresentational ability. Pemer 
argues that four-year-old children's success in Flavell et al.'s (1983) task is because they 
have a concept o f misrepresentation. In this task children were shown a piece of sponge
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that looked like granite, then they were asked two questions of reality "what is this really, 
really? Is it really, really a rock or is it really, really a piece o f sponge ?" and appearance 
"when you look at this with your eyes right now, does it look like a rock or does it look 
like a piece o f  sponge ?". While 3-year-old children had difficulty in this task 4-year-olds 
were able to say that it looks like a  rock but it is really a piece of sponge. Pemer argues 
that this is because 4-year-old children can understand that when the representational 
content (sponge) has a deceptive appearance (rock), its sense (looks like a rock) differs 
from its referent (sponge).
According to Pemer, alongside the child's developing understanding of "external means o f 
representation" (from understanding pictures and mirror images as depicted situations to 
understanding that the same picture can be given different interpretations by different 
people, and understanding that verbal statements can misrepresent reality and that 
appearance can be different than reality) there are also advances in the child's 
understanding that mind is representational (from understanding of behaviours like 
emotional expressions to the understanding that these behaviours are caused by mental 
states; at this stage children can talk about mental states, and show empathic behaviour to 
others, and to the next level understanding that mental states have a representational 
function).
4.2.1.3, Children's understanding o f mind
Pemer states three criteria for mentality: inner experience - understanding mental states 
because o f personal experience; theoretical constructs - using mental states to explain 
behaviour; ahoutness - which has three features o f 1) nonexistence (understanding of 
mental states as nonexistent entities), 2) aspectuality. and 3) misrepresentation.
Pemer argues that infants' early social interaction does not indicate their understanding o f 
mental states. In other words it does not indicate that they have an "implicit theory o f  
mind”. For instance, according to Pemer, one could not conclude, from infants' social 
referencing behaviour in the visual cliff task, they have an implicit mental representation
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that their mother's fearful face is caused by fear. Pemer argues that an infant's recognition 
of its mother's fearful face could be just innate recognition for the purpose o f survival, or it 
could be a learned behaviour as a result of experiencing the consequences.
Pemer also argues that infants' behaviour of following their mothers' gaze, or pointing to 
an object to gain their mother's attention and to check whether she is looking, does not 
necessarily require the understanding of an underlying mental mechanism o f attention. It 
could be that they are just manipulating their mother's look. He adds that even the infants' 
"protodeclarative" pointing - which is to get mother's attention in order to share his/her 
experience - does not show that "they understand attention as a mental state " (p. 131).
Pemer claims that children begin to understand mental states around the age o f two. 
According to Perner (1991) 2-year-old children's empathic behaviour towards other 
people's distress suggests that they use their own experiences to understand others. To do 
that they need to hold two models, one of reality - how the person feels - and one 
which is hypothetical - how they would feel in the same situation (Pemer, 1991). Pemer 
argues that this helping behaviour could not be a learned behaviour since children show that 
they are touched by the other person's distress. But it must be that children understand 
distress as a "hypothetically constructed state that is assumed to be analogous to the 
children's own inner experience o f  sadness " (p. 135).
Around the age of four with the acquisition of the concept of representation (which is 
"representing something (referent) as being a certain way (sense) ''), children's 
understanding of knowledge changes from theory o f behaviour to representational theory 
o f knowledge (Perner, 1991). They begin to understand knowledge as a mental 
representation. While at younger ages children tend to judge whether or not a person 
knows something on the basis of success - such as whether the person found the object 
- by the age o f four children begin to understand that it is the informational access which 
is the necessary factor for the knowledge formation. Pemer reports Wimmer et al.'s 
(1988) study which showed that although three-year-old children could tell whether or not
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they knew what was in the box if they were told or shown, when they were asked "How 
do you know ?" they had difficulty answering the question. However, four-year-old 
children could tell how they knew what was inside the box.
Pemer argues that from the age of four children begin to appreciate the crucial role of 
informational access in knowledge formation. The best way to test this is a lucky guess 
task, where the subjects were made to find the object although they did not have any 
informational access to it. If children said they knew where the object was, this would 
imply that they were judging their knowledge on the basis o f success. However, if they 
found the object to which they had no visual access, and said that they were guessing, this 
would imply that children were judging their knowledge on the basis o f informational 
access. Pemer reports that the results o f this study suggested that children between the 
ages of four and five develop an understanding that informational access is the crucial 
factor in knowledge formation.
Pemer argues that with the acquisition of theory of knowledge children also become able to 
understand the aspectuality o f knowledge. For instance, children between the ages of four 
and five begin to understand that to find out the object’s  colour one has to look at it, but to 
find out the weight of the object one has to feel it (Pemer, 1991).
According to Perner, with the acquisition o f representational theory o f  mind, children 
become able to understand that a person is (mentally) misrepresenting reality (false belief). 
Perner argues that the way to test children's understanding of representational theory of 
knowledge is the lucky guess task, in which one can compare whether children act on the 
basis of informational access or success. Similarly, asking a child to show where a person 
will look for an object on the basis of what the person is thinking, may indicate "whether 
children understand that thinking influences action ". However, to test whether children 
understand thinking as an indication o f belief, or in other words whether children 
understand "thinking as a representational activity " (p. 177), the task should contrast the 
prediction o f the person's action on the basis o f belief, with the prediction based on "other
41
well established rules o f  how people act " (p.177). This is the false belief paradigm which 
was first studied by Wimmer and Pemer (1983) using the "Maxi" task that was described at 
the beginning of this chapter (see also figure 4.4.). According to Pemer, understanding 
false belief indicates that children understand belief as a representational state o f mind.
Figure 4.4. Understanding False belief at m etarepresentational level.
MENTAL MISREPRESENTATION 
OF REALITY (FALSE BELIEF)
Young children have difficulty not just in understanding another person’s 
false belief, but also in understanding their "own false belief’ (Pemer, 1991). This has 
been investigated by Gopnik and Astington (1988) (reported by Pemer), who used the 
smarties task which was originally developed by Hogrefe et al. (1986) to test children's 
understanding of other people's false beliefs. Pemer reports that in this task Gopnik and 
Astington had shown a closed tube of "smarties" to children and asked them what was in 
the tube, to which all the children answered ''smarties'’. Then the children were shown that 
the tube contained a pencil and not smarties. Children's own false beliefs were tested by 
asking them what they thought was in the box when they were first shown the tube. For
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thought was in the box when they were first shown the tube. For children younger than 4 
years it was difficult to understand their own false belief (Pemer, 1991). Pemer argues 
that "false belief' requires the understanding of belief "as a misconception o f  reality ", a 
child needs to differentiate "beliefs referent (reality) ” from "its sense (what really is 
represented as) ", which could be achieved by the acquisition of metarepresentational 
ability.
In parallel to the understanding of false belief from the age of four, children begin to be 
able to manipulate other people's belief so as to cause a false belief o f reality (i.e. in 
deception) (Pemer, 1991). Pemer reports an experimental situation in which children were 
told that there is a puppet which likes to get whichever sticker the child likes to get. In 
this task most o f the 5-year-olds and some of the 4-year-olds pointed to the sticker they did 
not want, so as to deceive the puppet who would leave the stickers that the child really 
wanted. Pemer argues that the child's ability to affect competitors' beliefs indicates that 
they have a representational concept of mind.
In sum Pemer claims that "By conceptualizing the mind as a system o f  representations, the 
child switches fro m  a mentalistic theory o f  behaviour, in which mental states serve 
as concepts fo r  explaining action, to a representational theory o f  m ind, in which 
mental states are understood as serving a representational function " (p.l 1, bold added to 
the original since in the original these phrases were in italics).
4.2.2. Leslie's M etarepresentational theory o f  pretence
Leslie (1987) defines an internal representation of some aspect of the world as a primary 
representation. He also names the capacity for representing such representations as 
primary representation. According to Leslie, in pretence there are two representations: one 
is representing the real situation or the object as it is perceived, and the other is the pretend 
representation representing what it is pretended to be. Leslie argues that both 
representations, pretend and real, refer to the same object or situation - if they are both 
taken as primary representations this may cause a representational abuse. For example.
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consider the pretence that "this banana is a phone"; if the child does not have the 
underlying mechanism to pretend and to understand pretence in others he/she would be 
confused if a banana were referred to as a phone.
Leslie (1987) notes that "pretence affects the normal reference, truth, and existence 
relations o f  the representations it uses " (p.415), and for this reason he suggests that 
pretend representations are not the representations of the world (like primary 
representations) but are secondary representations which are copied from the primary 
representations. This is in agreement with Pemer (1991). Leslie (1987) suggests that in 
pretence a decoupling mechanism copies primary representations into a 
metarepresentational context within which these secondary representations, unlike the 
transparency of primary representations, become opaque. In the second order 
metarepresentalional context, reference, existence, and truth relations of the representation 
are suspended. Furthermore, in contrast to Perner (1991), Leslie (1987) claims that 
secondary representations are the representations of representations, and for this reason he 
calls them metarepresentations. For instance, in pretending that "a banana is a phone", a 
banana is representing a phone which is itself a representation.
Leslie (1987) further argues that pretence requires metarepresentational ability just as do the 
understanding of false belief, ignorance, and the appearance-reality distinction. Thus 
Leslie suggests that the common factor between pretence and these other manifestations of 
theory o f mind ability is metarepresentation.
Leslie (1987, 1988) notes that there are three types of pretence: 1) object substitution - 
for example, pretending that "a banana is a phone"; 2) attributions o f properties • for 
example, pretending that "doll's face is dirty"; and 31 imaginary objects - for example, 
pretending that "the empty cup contains water”. Leslie (1988) suggests that pretence 
distorts "the normal reference, truth and existence relations o f  primary representations " 
(p.25).
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Leslie (1987, 1988) argues that there is "a deep isomorphism " between pretence 
distortions and mental state reports. First, a mental state term "suspends normal reference 
relations " (1987, p.416). This is called referential opacity and it corresponds to object 
substitution in pretence (deviant reference). As an example o f referential opacity Leslie 
gives the following "ISarah-Jane believes that the prime minister o f Britain lives at Number 
10 Downing Street] in no ways entails the truth (or falsehood) o f  I  Sarah-Jane believes Mrs. 
Thatcher lives at Number 10 Downing Street]. In a mental state context one can no longer 
"look through" terms to see what they refer to in deciding such issues. " (Leslie, 1987, 
p.416). A second point about mental state reports is entailment o f  truth (or falsehood). 
which corresponds to the attribution of pretend properties in pretence (deviant truth 
pretend). For instance, "John believed that the cat was ill " (Leslie, 1988 p.26) could be 
true or false. The last point is nonentailment o f  existence (or nonexistence). Leslie's 
example is that "John believes the king o f  France is bald " (Leslie, 1988 p.27) does not 
necessarily imply the existence o f the king of France. This corresponds to imaginary 
objects in pretence (deviant existence).
Leslie (1987, 1988) suggests that the reason for this deep isomorphism between types of 
pretence and mental state reports is that they both have the same kind of internal 
representations. Leslie suggests that this internal representation, which he calls meta­
representation, has three components. The agent represents people, an expression refers to 
a primary representation but if "expression" is in quotation marks it refers to a decoupled 
secondary representation. The third component is the informational relation which has the 
function of relating decoupled secondary representations in a special way to primary 
representations, for instance to pretend, to think. Leslie (1988) suggests that this 
mechanism develops pretend representations such as "1 pretend 'this empty cup contains 
water ’" (p.28) which, according to Leslie, has the same underlying representation as 
mental state reports.
In sum, Leslie (1987, 1988) suggests that pretence and theory o f mind ability both require 
metarepresentalional ability. The same decoupling mechanism is the underlying factor for
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both of them. Thus, he suggests that early pretend play is the first manifestation o f theory 
of mind. However there is a two year gap between the emergence of pretence and the 
ability to understand false belief. Leslie (1988) suggests that perhaps early on young 
children have a causal view of the world. They understand that behaviours are caused by 
concrete objects or events. They also have a metarepresentational ability to pretend and to 
understand pretence in others. However by the age of four these two capacities start 
working together, so enabling the child to understand that mental states could be both 
"causes o f  behaviour and effects o f  perceptual exposure to a  situation " (Leslie, 1988, 
P-38).
4.2.3. W ellm an's view o f  theory of mind
Wellman's (1990) account of when children acquire a theory of mind seems to be based on 
two major developmental changes. One appears to be around the age o f three when there is 
a chance from simple-desire psychology to belief-desire psychology. The other is from "an 
initial copy theory o f  mind to a  later interpretative-homuncular theory " (p.315). Wellman 
(1990) argues that the three-year-old's transition from simple desires to belief-desire 
psychology "marks the onset o f  an understanding o f  representational states o f  mind " 
(p.244). He claims that at this stage three-year-olds have an initial theory o f mind. 
However, he notes that three-year-olds do not understand "the interpretative quality o f  
mental representations " (p.244). This understanding, according to Wellman (1990), is 
acquired around the age o f four or five. Wellman proposes that the infant's ability to 
understand people as agents is the precursor for the understanding of simple desires, which 
is in turn the precursor for the understanding of beliefs.
According to Wellman (1991) beliefs are representational - the child understands that 
another person has the representation of an object or situation in his/her mind. However, 
simple desires do not require the child to understand that another person is representing 
something. A simple-desire psychology involves the relation between an external state of 
wanting, but belief-desire psychology involves the representations of the "truths about the
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world" (p.29). Wellman suggests that while two-year-old children have simple-desire 
psychology, three-year-old children develop belief-desire psychology.
For instance, Wellman (1991) reports results from Wellman & Woolley's (1990) study, in 
which two-year-old children were able to predict whether a person searching for an object 
(which could be in one o f two locations) would continue to search for it after finding it in 
the first location. Also, they were able to predict whether a person would be happy if 
she/he were to find the object they wanted to find. Thus Wellman (1990) concludes that 
two-year-old children are able to predict action and emotions on the basis o f desires. 
However, Wellman argues that two-year-old children fail to predict actions on the basis of 
beliefs. Wellman (1990) reports the results o f Wellman and Woolley's (1990) study. In 
this experiment two-year-old children were given four tasks. In the not-own belief task a 
character was looking for an object and thought that it was in one location, although the 
object was in another location. Children were asked where the character would look for the 
object. In the not-own desire task children were asked to choose one o f two activities as 
their own preference, then told that the character wanted to do the other activity. Children 
were asked where the character would go. For the discrepant belief task a character was 
looking for an object which could be found in both locations, but the character thought it 
was only in one location. Children were asked where the character would look for the 
object. Finally, in the no preference desire task children were told that the target object was 
in both locations and the character wanted to get the object. Then children were asked 
where the character would look for the object. Results showed that while two-year-old 
children could pass not-own desire and no-preference desire tasks, they failed on the not- 
own belief and discrepant belief tasks. Wellman (1990) concludes that understanding of 
desires which are nonrepresentational comes before the understanding o f beliefs, which are 
representational mental states. Wellman's suggestion that nonrcpresentational 
understanding comes before the understanding of representational mental states is in 
agreement with Pemer (1991).
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Furthermore, Wellman (1990) claims that the emergence of belief-desire psychology at the 
age o f three suggests that children have acquired "theory of mind”. According to Wellman 
(1990), acquiring the belief-desire psychology which allows three-year-olds to predict 
action on the basis of beliefs, suggests that children at this age understand "the causal 
aspect o f  mind" (p.234). He also claims that three-year-old children can differentiate 
mental entities from real objects. However he does not claim that young children have an 
adult understanding of the mental /  real distinction. For instance, children may understand 
that by seeing things you know about them or you can imagine things, but they do not 
necessarily understand how thoughts work.
Furthermore Wellman (1990) argues that three-year-olds have "a representational 
understanding o f  mind", for instance they understand that beliefs, dreams and ideas are 
representational. He describes three-year-olds’ "representational understanding o f  reality 
oriented representations " as "a copy understanding " (p.249). According to Wellman what 
four- to five-year-olds acquire is the understanding of mental representations as 
"interpretative entities " (p.249). He argues that three-year-old children do not understand 
representations as interpretative entities but they misunderstand them as being direct copies 
o f reality. Wellman (1990) suggests that three-year-olds have a hit-or-miss understanding 
o f representations. For instance, they can understand that another person has a true belief 
o f reality in his/her head when the person hits (e.g. sees) the target object They can also 
understand that the other person has ignorance or incomplete knowledge o f reality when the 
person misses (e.g. does not see) the target object According to Wellman, the three-year- 
old’s understanding of misrepresentations such as ignorance or incomplete knowledge 
could be explained by the copy mechanism. For instance, if the copy mechanism 
completely misses the target this leads to ignorance, whereas if it misses the target partially 
this leads to incomplete knowledge.
Wellman (1990) argues that with the interpretational understanding o f representations four- 
to five-year-old children should be able to understand that two people could have diverse 
representations of one thing on the basis of their ideas and likes. He further argues that
young children with the copy view of representations would make errors o f two types, one 
is to attribute proper representation to a person when he/she does not have i t  For instance, 
Wellman cites Taylor's (1988) study, in which young children aged between three and four 
judged that by seeing only a small un-identifiable part o f  an object a person could tell what 
the object was. Wellman suggests that this is because, for the copy theorist, a 
representation is formed by exposure to that object. However with the interpretational 
understanding o f  representations, five-year-old children were able to judge that the person 
could not tell what the object was. According to Wellman, three-year-old copy theorists' 
second type o f  error would be to say that a person does not have a representation when 
actually they do. For instance, he reports Sodian and Wimmer's (1987) study as 
experimental evidence o f this type of error. In this study a child and another character were 
presented with a bag with red markers in it. Then one marker was taken from the bag and 
put into a box. The child and the character did not have visual access to this transfer.
When four-year-old children were asked whether they knew the colour of the marker in the 
box they answered "red". However when they were asked whether the other character 
knew the colour o f the marker in the box, four-year-old children replied that other person 
did not know because he/she had not seen the transfer. However, five- to six-year-old 
children were able to judge that the other person could infer the colour of the marker. 
Wellman (199(1) concludes that between the ages of three and six children begin to 
understand inference and interpretation with the development of an interpretative 
understanding o f  representation.
Wellman argues that the three-year-old copy theorist could understand true beliefs but fail 
on false belief tasks. According to him true beliefs are reality-oriented representations, 
they are direct copies of reality. Thus when a child is asked a question like "what does Joe 
think is in the box?", according to Wellman the child is being asked about Joe’s belief of 
reality which is reality. So a child could answer this question on the basis of what she/he 
knows reality is. If the reality in this situation is that there is a ball in the box then a child 
could say "Joe thinks a ball is in the box" and pass the true belief task.
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However, according to Wellman a copy theorist fails on the false belief task. An example 
of such a task is one involving a character who saw a chocolate in the kitchen but did not 
see that someone took it to the dining room. W hen a three-year-old child is asked where 
the character thinks the chocolate is, a copy theorist would answer the question on the basis 
of reality, since beliefs are copies of reality. Since in reality the chocolate is in the dining 
room, the copy theorist's answer would be "the character thinks the chocolate is in the 
dining room". Wellman (1990) also accounts for the three-year-old child's failure to pass 
appearance/reality tasks on the basis of the copy theorist view. According to him, FlavelTs 
(1983) task in which a three-year-old copy theorist is presented with a piece o f sponge that 
looks like a rock, they "say (correctly)'lt is a sponge', and (incorrectly), 'It looks like a 
sponge'"' (p.267). This is because, for the copy theorist, a representation is a copy of 
reality. Wellman notes that with the interpretative understanding of representations children 
between the ages of four and six begin to make a distinction between what the object looks 
like and what it really is.
Furthermore, according to Wellman, around the age o f four or five there are two 
transitions, one from understanding representations as direct copies of reality to the 
interpretive understanding o f representations; the other is the transition in children's 
understanding of mind from "a passive registry o f  reality " to "something on the order o f an 
active construer and processor o f  information " (p.268). Wellman suggests that while 
three-year-olds' theory o f mind is understanding mind as "containerlike ” the adult theory 
of mind which is acquired between the ages o f four-to-six, is "homunculuslike ". For 
instance, young children with the containerlike understanding of mind refer to dreams and 
imaginations as "they are in your head", or they might say "you can’t see the picture in my 
head but you can make one in your head". However, four- to five-year-old children begin 
to see mind as not only responsible for mental states like thinking and dreaming but also 
responsible for walking, hearing and seeing which implies an understanding of mind as 
interdependent with other senses. Older children also talk about mind "by personifications"
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for instance "the mind tells your legs where to go  " (p.271, Wellman, 1990, reporting 
results from Johnson &Wellman (1982)).
In sum, what Wellman (1990) argues is that three-year-old children have an initial theory of 
mind because they can differentiate what is mental from what is real. They can also predict 
human action on the basis of belief-desire psychology, so that a person would act not only 
to satisfy her/his desires but do this according to his/her beliefs. However, their belief- 
desire psychology is not as sophisticated as an adult; what they have is a copy 
understanding of representations and a copy view o f  mind. They have a hit-and-miss view 
o f representations. With this level of understanding three-year-olds are able to understand 
true beliefs, ignorance and incomplete knowledge, but they fail to understand that 
representations may occur with inference, and exposure to only one part o f an object may 
not always create a correct representation o f that object. In addition, three-year-old children 
fail to understand false beliefs and the appearance /  reality distinction. According to 
Wellman, what develops around the age of four or five is an interpretative understanding of 
representations and an understanding of mind as an active information processor. With 
this development a child reaches the adult-like homuncular theory o f mind.
Wellman's (1990) view on children's acquisition o f theory of mind has similarities and 
differences from Pemer's (1991) view. For instance Wellman's description of 
representation is similar to Pemer’s (1991). Wellman defines representation as “a separate 
representational entity that depicts or stands fo r  some other entity altogether, based on the 
establishment o f certain relationships between representation and referent (between 
representational- and thing entities) " (p.246). Wellman argues that reality-oriented 
representations are direct copies of reality. What Wellman calls reality-oriented 
representations are what Pemer (1991) call primary representations.
However, Wellman's proposal that around the age o f  three children begin to understand 
representational mental states like beliefs, contradicts Pemer’s (1991) suggestion that
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understanding mental states as representational emerges around the age o f four, such as 
attribution of knowledge and false belief.
4.3. Alternative to the theory o f "theory o f  mind"
4.3.1. H arris's proposal: M ental sim ulation
Harris (1991) argues against the view that children develop a theory o f  mind. According to 
him it is not the theory o f mind that allows children to predict and understand human action 
on the basis o f mental concepts like beliefs and desires. He suggests instead that what 
children have is "an increasingly sophisticated process o f  mental simulation that allows 
them to make quasi-theoreticaI predictions " (p.283). According to Harris, mental 
simulation requires the imagination o f having a belief or a desire, and also the imagination 
of likely emotions and actions which would emerge due to having that specific belief or 
desire. Then, with this imagination, a child can take the role of another person and attribute 
specific beliefs or desires to the other person.
According to Harris (1991), children's imaginations work with existing default settings.
He suggests that these default settings refer to the current state of the world and current 
state of the intentional self. For instance, one o f the existing default settings would be the 
child's own current desire of, e.g.wanting to get X; another would be the current state of 
the world, e.g.where X is. Harris claims that if the child imagines something different 
from the current default settings, there will be a need to adjust these default settings.
In pretence: Harris (1991) argues that in all types of pretence (imaginary objects, object 
substitution or the attribution of pretend properties) reality needs to be set aside. This is 
similar to Leslie's (1987) and Perner's (1991) suggestions that pretence representations are 
copied from primary representations. However Harris argues against the existence of a 
decoupling mechanism in pretence (Leslie, 1987, 1988). Instead he suggests that in 
pretence an "increasingly complex set o f  adjustments ” (p.283) is at work. In pretence
what a child needs to do is to adjust the existing default setting which corresponds to 
reality.
In mental state attribution: Harris (1991) argues that to understand that other people m ay 
want, like, know or expect different things from themselves, children need to adjust one of 
their default settings. They need to consider current reality as it is, but imagine taking the 
other person’s "intentional stance " towards reality, which is different from theirs. Harris 
argues that with the adjustment of the default setting from the child's own intentional stance 
to another person's stance, three-year-old children can understand that the other person 
may see something that they can not see. or the other person may not know what is in the 
box even though they do, or understand that while rinding one object makes one person 
happy, it may not make another person happy.
Harris (1991) further argues that simulation of mental states could vary in difficulty. For 
instance, while imagining another person's ignorance requires the alteration o f one default 
setting, imagining another person's false belief requires the alteration o f two default 
settings. In order to understand the other's false belief, the child needs to keep in mind the 
actual real situation, and imagine a counterfactual situation to the reality which is standing 
for the real situation. In addition to this, while keeping her/his intentional stance to the 
counterfactual situation in mind, he/she needs to take another person's intentional stance to 
the counterfactual situation (Harris, 1991). For instance, in the "smarties" false belief task 
a child is shown, to his/her surprise, that the smarties box contained a pencil and not 
smarties. Then he/she is asked what the other child will think is in the box. In order to say 
that the other child will think there are smarties in the box, while keeping in mind that the 
smarties box contains a pencil (in current reality), the child also needs to imagine the 
counterfactual situation to the current reality (smarties in the box). In addition, the child 
needs to keep in mind that the box contains a pencil, but should be able take the other 
person's stance to the counterfactual situation (seeing a smarties box). Harris (1991) 
suggests that with the ability to alter both default settings (reality and personal intentional 
stance to reality), four-year-old children can understand that another person can have a false
belief about something while they know what the thing is in Feality, and can also 
understand that because of their different viewpoint another person can give a different 
interpretation to the same object
In sum, as an alternative to the theory o f "theory o f mind" Harris (1991) suggests that by 
mental simulation children can predict other people's actions, emotions and thoughts. He 
argues that "simulation calls fo r  a working model o f  the other person but not a theory " 
(p.299). According to Harris children have a working model of other people from birth. 
By using analogies to their own minds they can make predictions about other people.
In comparison with Leslie (1987) Harris does not see understanding of other people's 
pretence as an early form of the ability to attribute mental states to other people. Instead he 
explains pretence in terms of mental simulation. In contrast to Pemer, Harris suggests that 
three-year old children, with the ad justment of one of their default settings (from their 
intentional stance to another person's) can understand that other people may want, like, 
know or expect different things to themselves. With this argument Harris, sees three-year- 
old children as more able than Pemer. However, Pem er (1991) argues that around the age 
of four children develop the representational ability, and with the representational view of 
mind four-year-old children can understand other people's false beliefs. But according to 
Harris (1991). what happens around the age of four is that children become able to adjust 
both default settings, so that they cun imagine taking another person's intentional stance not 
towards reality but towards the counterfactual situation.
4.3.2. Hobson's view: Affective-conative interpersonal relations as the 
origins o f social and cognitive development
Hobson (1991) argues against the view that children entertain a theory o f mind. According 
to him what children acquire through their interpersonal experiences is the knowledge that 
people have minds. Hobson (1991) argues that children come into world with the innate 
biological propensities which enable them to "perceive and relate towards the bodies o f
54
others " (p.44). This innate ability to perceive people's emotions, feelings, bodies and 
attitudes is "essential to our understanding o f  persons with subjective mental life " (p.45).
According to Hobson (1990b), from very early on infants can recognize people with certain 
perceptual properties and respond to them in an affective-conative way. This perception 
does not only involve the recognition o f bodies (in a depersonalized way); infants can 
recognize people with feelings, from their bodily expressions. Hobson argues that an 
infant's capacity for this personal relatedness is present even before he/she acquires the 
concepts of 'self and 'other selves'.
Hobson (1991) claims that acquisition of a 'self concept is necessary for one to be able to 
"explore one's own mind" and to understand other people's minds. According to Hobson 
(1990b) in order for an infant to develop self-awareness, the infant has to have a capacity to 
understand that other people are separate persons with alternative viewpoints "toward the 
world and toward itse lf, and this requires the understanding of "commonality" and 
difference between self and other people.
In other words, with this innate biological ability an infant can differentiate himself/hcrself 
from others, can interact with people in an affective-conative way which enables him/her to 
develop the concept of persons. With the availability o f a concept o f persons, the infant 
can develop self-awareness, which is itself a precondition for the conceptualization of 
his/her own mental states and for the use of an analogy between self and others in order to 
understand the mental states o f others (Hobson. 199()b & 199()c).
In sum, Hobson (1991) proposes that. "direct perception o f  bodily anchored 'personal 
life', and with this the experience o f  personal relatedness, is the source o f  an infant's 
developing awareness o f  persons and the grounding fo r  the young child's socially 
endorsed knowledge o f  minds. The crux is that it is only through the experience o f  
personal relations, that children can come to acquire a concept o f  persons with minds " 
(p.45-46). "Once a child has acquired a grasp o f  body-anchored and 'outer-directed' 
subjectively experienced mental states on a largely i f  not exclusively non-inferential basis,
then the child can employ inferences or other intellectual strategies to learn more about its 
own and 'others' minds vis-a-vis reality 'as represented'" (p.47).
4.4. Summary
While Pemer, Leslie and Wellman all agree that children develop a theory of mind, Harris 
and Hobson argue against this view and suggest alternative accounts.
However, although accounts such as Perner’s, Leslie's and Wellman’s agree that around 
the age o f four children develop a theory of mind, their explanations o f how children reach 
that development seem to differ. In comparison to Leslie and Wellman, Pemer's account 
appears to be the most extensive. Perner (1991) explained how children's understanding 
and usage o f representations develops, from primary representations to 
metarepresentations. He also explained how children begin to understand the mind "as a 
system o f  representations ". He proposed that children's understanding shifts from 
"mentalistic theory o f behaviour " (being able to explain behaviour on the basis o f mental 
states) to a "representational theory o f  mind " (being able to understand representational 
function of mental states).
Leslie's account focuses on the similarities o f  pretence and mental state attribution and 
suggests that they both have the same underlying factor, namely the usage o f secondary 
representations. In addition, Leslie proposes an organic base for the production o f 
secondary representations which he names a "decoupler". However, Leslie's account lacks 
a clear explanation of why there is a two year time lag between the emergence of pretence 
and mental state attribution in children.
Wellman's view focuses on two major changes in children's understanding. One is from 
simple-desire psychology (predicting a person's behaviour on the basis of that person’s 
desire) to belief-desire psychology (predicting a person's behaviour on the basis o f that 
person's belief). The other change is from a copy theory of mind to an interpretative theory 
of mind. According to W ellman's formulation, while simple-desire psychology is
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nonrepresentational, belief-desire psychology is representational. Furthermore, while a 
copy theory of mind seems to imply the usage o f primary representations, an interpretative 
theory of mind seems to suggest an understanding of the representational function of 
representations. Wellman's account does not seem to focus on the nature and creation of 
representations. In addition, in contrast to Perner and Leslie, Wellman does not mention 
the emergence o f pretence in children's development.
Although Harris (1991) claims that children do not develop a theory of mind, his view 
seems to be similar in certain respects to both Perner's and Leslie's views. For instance, 
what Harris calls default settings seem to correspond to primary representations (in 
Pemer's and Leslie's terms), what Harris calls adjusting default settings seems to 
correspond to secondary representations and what he proposes as imagining current reality 
and the counterfactual situation to the current reality seems to correspond to 
metarepresentational level (in Perner's terms). However, Harris's account appears to lack 
any explanation of the underlying factors for the development o f these imaginings.
Finally, Hobson's theory appears to have a totally different perspective from the previous 
theories. He argues that children's mental slate attribution originates in their affective- 
conative interpersonal relationships. Although he provides an extensive description of his 
account it appears to be mostly abstract and theoretical, and seems to lack any strong 
empirical evidence to support specifically the very early stages of the understanding of 
emotions.
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5. C H A P T E R  FIVE
Empirical evidence on the autistic child's "theory o f  mind"
If a  person lacks a theory o f mind, - which is an ability to understand another person's 
mental states such as what a person knows, intends, believes etc., that person would not be 
able to predict other people's actions which could lead him/her to have social 
communication difficulties. Autism is a condition which is identified with impairments in 
social communication. Thus, it makes sense to examine theory of mind ability in autism.
Investigating whether or not autistic children have a theory of mind might have two 
important conclusions. Since Leslie (1987, 1988) argued that a biologically based 
cognitive mechanism ('decoupler') underlies theory of mind, a lack o f this ability in autism 
might suggest that the social communication difficulties experienced are due to lack or 
impairment in the biologically based cognitive mechanism. Secondly such a finding would 
support the theory that there exists a biologically based innate mechanism, responsible for 
normal children's theory o f mind ability. In this chapter the studies which have 
investigated whether autistic children demonstrate the theory of mind ability in various 
experimental paradigms will be reviewed.
5.1 . Do autistic people lack the theory o f  mind ability?
If autistic children arc impaired in their theory o f mind, in the sense that Premack and 
Woodruff (1978) described - one's ability to attribute mental states to oneself and to others, 
then one would expect that they would have difficulties on all the tasks which require 
mental state attribution. For instance, they would have difficulties in attributing 
knowledge, ignorance, false belief and deception to others.
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5.1.1. F a ilu re  to  a tt r ib u te  false belief
While the Wimmer and Pemer's (1983) study was the pioneering work in the investigation 
o f normal children's theory of mind. Baron-Cohen, Leslie & Frith (1985, 1986) were the 
first researchers to ask whether autistic children had these abilities.
In the very first experimental study, the Sally-Anne paradigm was used to test autistic 
children's ability to attribute false belief to others in comparison to normal and verbal MA 
matched Down's Syndrome children (Baron-Cohen, Leslie & Frith, 1985). In this task 
there are two characters Sally and Anne. Sally has a basket and Anne has a box. First 
Sally puts her marble in the basket and goes out for a walk. While she is away, naughty 
Anne takes the marble from the basket and puts it in her box. Then Sally comes back. The 
results showed that all three groups of children passed the control questions o f "Where is 
the marble really?" and "Where was the marble in the beginning?". However, in response 
to the test question "W here will Sally look for her marble?" whereas 85% of normal 
children and 86% of Down's Syndrome children correctly predicted that Sally would look 
in the basket where she left her marble, 80% o f autistic children failed to appreciate Sally's 
false belief about her marble's location, and indicated that Sally would look in the box 
where the marble really was. The authors argued that passing the test was not dependent 
on the general mental ability since the children with Down's Syndrome could pass the task. 
They concluded that the autistic children had a specific cognitive deficit in employing theory 
of mind ability. The autistic children failed to attribute the mental state o f false belief to the 
story character, which required metarepresentational ability - representing somebody else's 
mental state.
The same authors conducted another study to test whether they could replicate the results of 
the first study using a different method (Baron-Cohen, Leslie & Frith, 1986). In this 
study, a picture sequencing task was used to compare the performance of autistic children 
with normal and verbal MA matched Down’s Syndrome children using three different story 
types.
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The "mechanical" story type depicted physical-casual relations , e.g."Man with rock, 
pushes rock, rolls down hill, fa ll in water " (p. 117).
The "behavioural" story type depicted people engaging in various activities and 
interactions, e.g. "boy eats ice-cream, girl sits down, girl takes away ice-cream, girl eats it
" (p.117).
The "intentional" story type which required an understanding of the mental state of the 
story character, that is, it required the theory o f mind ability, eg. "boy puts choc in box, 
goes out to play, mum eats chocolate, boy sees choc gone " (p. 117). In this study the 
children were presented with picture cards and were asked to make a story with them.
After they had ordered the cards they were asked to tell a story about the pictures. The 
authors hypothesized that the autistic children would have specific difficulty with the third 
story type which required the understanding of the story character's mental states. The 
results showed that autistic children were not impaired in their performance on the 
mechanical and behavioural stories in neither the sequencing nor verbal account of the 
story. However their performance on the intentional stories was not better than chance 
level. In addition in their story making the autistic children used significantly less mental 
terms in comparison to the other two groups. The authors concluded that the results of this 
study supported their previous findings, namely that autistic children have a specific 
cognitive deficit in that they are unable to show theory of mind.
Autistic children's difficulty with the false belief task has been replicated by one of Leslie & 
Frith 's (1988) tasks. They compared autistic children with a specific language impaired 
(SLI) control group matched according to verbal mental age (MA). In the false belief task 
there were three hiding places and a pound coin. To start the task the second experimenter 
hid a pound coin in one o f the three locations, then he/she left the room. In his/her absence 
the first experimenter asked the child "Where did (experimenter 2] hide the coin?". 
Following a correct answer, the first experimenter took the coin from where the second 
experimenter had previously hid it, and hid it in another location. Then the child was asked
6«
several questions: "Does [experimenter 2] know the coin is in here?" (knowing question). 
"When [experimenter 2] comes back, where will she look for the coin?" (prediction 
question 1. "Where did [experimenter 2] put the coin in the beginning?” (control question 
1), "Where is the coin now really?" (control question 2) and "Where does [experimenter 2] 
think the coin is?" (think question). They reported that while only five autistic children 
passed the prediction and thinking questions, all the specific language impaired control 
group children passed the both questions with the exception o f one child who failed the 
thinking question. The difference between the two groups was significant Leslie & Frith 
(1988) concluded that autistic children are unable to attribute false belief to others. They 
argued that this inability could not be due to language impairment since a language impaired 
control group was included in this study.
Furthermore, Pemer, Frith, Leslie & Leekam (1989) used Pemer, Leekam & Wimmer's 
(1987) smarties task to test autistic children's ability to attribute false belief to themselves as 
well as to other people. In the smarties task children were shown a smartie tube and asked 
what was in the tube. All the children answered with 'smarties' o r 'sweets’. Then the 
experimenter opened the tube, all the children were surprised to see that it contained a little 
pencil. The experimenter put the pencil back and shut the tube, then asked the child "What 
is  in here?" and "When I first asked you, what did you say?’’. Then the child was told that 
the next child, who had not seen the box was about to come to p lay the game. The child 
was asked "What will [name] say?" when the experimenter shows the box to the next child, 
and "Is that really what is in the box?", "Do you remember, when I took the box out of my 
bag and asked you what was in it, what did you say?". The results showed that 14 o f the 
22 autistic children could correctly remember what they said, the first time they saw the 
smartie tube and were asked what was in the tube which suggests that high proportion of 
the autistic children was able to refer to their own false belief. However only four of these 
children passed the prediction question by answering that the other child would say there 
were smarties in the lube, which is comparable to the results o f Baron-Cohen et al (1985). 
In comparison to severe language impaired children, the autistic children performed
significantly worse in response to the prediction question (attribution of false belief to 
others). These results support the previous findings that autistic children have difficulty in 
attributing false belief to others.
In order to conclude that autistic children are impaired in their theory of mind ability, it is 
necessary to test all types of mental state attributions. For instance, it is necessary to test 
not only the ability to attribute false beliefs to others but also deception and attribution of 
knowledge and ignorance.
5.1.2. F a ilu re  to deceive
It has been argued that children's ability to deceive another person indicates that the child is 
able to understand other people’s mental states, since deceiving someone is a deliberate act 
to lead the o ther person to have false beliefs about reality (Chandler, Fritz & Hala, 1989; 
Hala, Chandler, & Fritz, 1991; Sodian, Taylor. Harris & Perner, 1991).
Russell, M auther, Sharpe & Tidswell (1991) found that in a competitive game where it was 
in the child's interest to point to an empty box, autistic children, like three-year-old normal 
children, repeatedly pointed to the box which contained a chocolate. In this study four 
groups o f children took part: three and four-year-old normal children; children with 
Down's Syndrome and autistic children. The task involved two phases and in both phases 
the children w ere competing with the second experimenter. In the practise phase each child 
was given 15 trials in which the child was asked to point to one o f two boxes. If the child 
pointed to the box which was empty she/he got a chocolate, but if the child pointed to the 
box which contained a chocolate the second experimenter won the chocolate. In the second 
phase two boxes which had windows facing towards the child's side, so that the child 
could see the contents of both boxes were used. Each child was given 20 trials. As in the 
first phase, i f  the child pointed to the box which was empty she/he got the chocolate, but if 
the child pointed to the box which contained a chocolate the second experimenter won the 
chocolate. T he  results showed that while 62.5% of the four-year-olds and 84.6% o f  the 
Down's Syndrome children pointed to the empty box on the first trial, only 18% o f the
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autistic and 5.8% of the three-year-old children did so. In addition while 64% of the three- 
year-olds and 63% of the autistic children pointed in all 20 trials to the box which had the 
chocolate in it, none o f the four-year-olds and none of the children with Down's Syndrome 
did so. From these results it is possible to conclude that autistic children failed to deceive, 
or in other words they failed to lead another person to have a false belief.
5.1.3. Failure to attribute knowledge and ignorance
It has been shown that autistic children are also impaired in their ability to attribute 
knowledge and ignorance. One of the aims of Leslie and Frith’s (1988) study was to 
investigate autistic children's ability to attribute knowledge and ignorance. In one o f the 
tasks they administered (limited knowledge), the first experimenter hid a  red counter in one 
of three possible locations while the child and the second experimenter watched. Then the 
second experimenter left the room and in his/her absence the first experimenter produced a 
second red coin which was identical to the first one and asked the child to hide it 
somewhere different. Then the child was asked several questions: "Where did 
[experimenter 2] ssx me hide a counter?" (control question), "Does [experimenter 2] know 
there is a counter under here?" (knowing question). "When [experimenter 2] comes back 
in, where will she look for a counter?" (prediction question).
Leslie and Frith (1988) reported that in the limited knowledge task, 11 of the 18 autistic 
children completed the task by correctly identifying whether the second experimenter knew 
that there was a counter in the second location (where the child hid the second identical 
coin). However only 8 of the 18 autistic children passed both the knowing and prediction 
questions (where the second experimenter would look for the counter when she came 
back). Leslie & Frith (1988) concluded that autistic children not only fail to attribute false 
belief to others, but also fail to attribute knowledge to others, which supports the 
metarepresentational deficit hypothesis.
One of the limitations of this study is that Leslie and Frith (1988) did not report the 
performance of the control group on the limited knowledge task. However, the evidence
from studies of normal children (e.g Wimmer et al., 1988) suggests that, 4-year-old 
children are able to make knowledge attribution, and given that the control group had a 
mean verbal MA of 6;()9 one would expect them to be able to pass a limited knowledge 
task. Nevertheless this needs to he confirmed.
More evidence of autistic children's failure to attribute knowledge comes from a study by 
Pem eret al (1989). One of the tasks in this study involved the main experimenter choosing 
one of several objects from a box and putting it into a cup. The transfer was made out of 
sight of the child and the second experimenter. In the other ignorant condition the 
experimenter let the child see what was in the cup, in the subject ignorant condition the 
experimenter allowed the second experimenter to have a look into the cup. The child was 
then asked several questions,
other-knows: "Does [name of the experimenter] know which thing I put into the cup?"
justification: "Why does [name] not know that?"
other-seen: "Did I let [name] look into the cup?"
self-knows: "Do you know which object I put into the cup?"
justification: "Why do you know that?"
self-seen: "Did I let you look into the cup?" (p.693)
The results showed that nearly 75% of the autistic children answered the seeing questions 
correctly whether or not they or the second experimenter had looked in the cup. However 
only 10 out of 23 (43%) of the autistic children could attribute knowledge to the other 
person, and 13 out of 23 (56%) could attribute knowledge to themselves. Pemer et al 
(1989) concluded that some aspects of theory of mind are easier than others. For instance, 
autistic children's performance was higher in the knowledge attribution task (43%) than 
their performance on the false belief task (17.5%) in the same study.
One of the shortcomings of this study was that no controls completed the task. In addition 
some of the autistic children who were included in this study had verbal mental ages below
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4 years. Since studies of normal children (e.g Sodian and Wimmer, 1987) have suggested 
that the ability to attribute knowledge develops around the age o f four, children with lower 
verbal mental ages might be expected to fail in this task.
5.2. D o autistic people have a delay in their theory o f m ind ability?
Although the majority of the autistic children failed on the original theory of mind tasks 
(Baron-Cohen et al. 1985 and 1986) some of the autistic children passed the same tasks. It 
is therefore difficult to conclude that theory of mind ability is totally missing in autistic 
children. In the light o f this Baron-Cohen (1989a) has proposed that rather than a specific 
deficit, perhaps autistic children have specific delay in the development of theory o f mind, 
since a  minority o f autistic children can pass the first order belief attributions (eg. false 
belief, knowledge).
5.2 .1 . Failure to attribute second order beliefs
In order to investigate whether autistic children had a true delay in their theory o f mind 
ability Baron-Cohen (1989a) tested autistic children's ability to understand 'second order 
belief attributions' e.g. "Marry thinks John thinks the ice-cream van is in the park". Three 
groups o f children - autistic, normal and Down's Syndrome - who had passed first-order- 
belief attribution (e.g. Sally thinks the marble is in the basket) were included in this study. 
The children were presented with a toy village and the experimenter told a story while 
moving the toy characters around the village setting. The story went as follows "John and 
Mary are playing in the park. John wants to buy ice-cream but he does not have any 
money. The ice-cream man tells John that he will be in the park all afternoon, so John goes 
home to get some money. While John is away the ice-cream man tells Mary that he is 
moving his van to the church to sell ice-cream there. On the way to the church John sees 
the ice-cream man and asks him where he is going. The ice-cream man tells John that he is 
now going to the church. Mary goes home. Then Mary goes to John's house, John's 
mother tells Mary that John has gone to buy ice-cream". The children were asked several 
questions to ensure that they were able to follow the story, knew where John went to get an
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ice-cream and where the ice-cream man was in the beginning. They were also asked the 
second-order-belief test question "Where does Mary think John has gone to buy an ice­
cream?". The results showed that none of the autistic children could pass the second-order 
belief attribution, whereas 90% of the normal language matched children and 60% of the 
Down's Syndrome children passed this question. Baron-Cohen (1989a, p.293) concluded 
that "the autistic children who have developed a theory o f  mind at the lower level are 
nevertheless specifically delayed in the acquisition o f  a more complex theory o f  mind
In summary, all the aforementioned studies seem to suggest that autistic children are 
impaired or specifically delayed in their ability to attribute mental states, such as knowledge 
and false beliefs to others, which require metarepresentational skills. Thus it has been 
argued that autistic children have a metarepresentational deficit (Baron-Cohen et al. 1985, 
1986; Leslie & Frith, 1988; Pemer et al. 1989). However, in order to conclude that autistic 
children have a metarepresentational deficit one has to consider, both the ability to attribute 
mental states to oneself and others, and also abilities which have been suggested to require 
metarepresentational skills, such as the appearance-reality distinction, pretend play and the 
ability to understand non-mental representations e.g. photographs. Furthermore one has to 
consider autistic children's performance on the cognitive tasks which do not require 
metarepresentational ability such as visual perspective taking. If it is the case that autistic 
people fail on the tasks which require metarepresentational skills, but pass other cognitive 
tasks which do not require metarepresentational skills, then one could reasonably conclude 
that autistic people have a specific metarepresentational deficit.
5.3. Understanding o f  the appearance-reality distinction in autism
The understanding of the appearance-reality distinction appears to be another way of testing 
children's metarepresentational skills. In order for a child to differentiate w hat an object 
looks like from what it actually is, he/she should be able to aware that "even though 
something may be only one way out there in the world, it can be more than one way up 
here in our heads, in our mental representations o f  i t " (Flavell, 1988, p.246). Pemer
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(1991) argues that understanding the appearance-reality distinction requires 
metarepresentational ability since it is a misrepresentation of the referent. For instance 
when a child is presented with a sponge which looks like a  rock, in order for a child to say 
that it is really a sponge, and that it looks like a rock, he/she should be able to understand 
that e.g.when the representational content (sponge) has a deceptive appearance (rock), its 
sense (looks like a  rock) differs from its referent (sponge).
Autistic children have been found to have difficulties the with appearance-reality distinction 
which may support the hypothesis that they have a metarepresentational deficit. In his 
study Baron-Cohen (1989c) gave four appearance-reality tasks to autistic, mentally 
handicapped and normal children. In one task, the colour task, children were shown a milk 
bottle and asked what is the colour of the milk. Then the bottle was moved behind an 
orange filter and the child was asked what colour the milk looked, and what the colour 
really was. In another task, the size task, children were presented with a  penny and a ten 
pence on the table and asked whether the penny was smaller or bigger than the ten pence. 
Then the penny was made to look bigger than the ten pence by holding a magnifying glass 
over it, and the child was asked how the penny looked, whether it was smaller or bigger 
than the ten pence. Also the child was asked what the size of the penny really was, bigger 
or smaller than the ten pence. In the third task, the material task, children were presented 
with a chocolate made of plastic. First the child was asked what it was, after answering 
chocolate, the child was allowed to feel the chocolate, and asked what it was made of. The 
child was then asked what it looked like and what it really was. In the fourth task, ihfi 
identity task, children were presented with an egg which was made of stone. As in the 
material task, at first the child was asked what it was, after answering that it was an egg, 
the child was allowed to feel it until she/he found out what it was made of. Then the child 
was asked what it was made of, what it looked like, and what it really was. The results 
showed that while 78.9% of the mentally handicapped and 81.3% of the normal children 
could pass the appearance-reality distinction, only 35.3% of the autistic children passed the
task by responding correctly on at least three of the four tasks. These results seem to 
support the hypothesis that autistic children have a metarepresentational deficit.
5.4. Pretend play in autism
Theoretical views on whether pretend play requires metarepresentational ability appear to be 
conflicting. The link between theory of mind ability and pretend play has been argued 
extensively by Leslie (1987) (see chapter 4). Leslie's (1987, 1988) main point appears to 
be that pretend representations are the representations o f representations and are therefore 
metarepresentations. He argues that both mental state attribution and pretend play require 
metarepreseniational ability, and the same decoupling mechanism is responsible for these 
abilities. However Pemer (1991) criticized Leslie's view that pretend representations are 
metarepresentational. Pemer agrees with Leslie that pretend representations are secondary 
representations in that they are copied from the primary representations. However Pemer 
argues strongly against the view that these representations are metarepresentational (see 
chapter 4).
Recently, Baron-Cohen (1987) criticized previous studies which concluded that autistic 
children are impaired in their ability to pretend. His main criticisms were: an unclear 
definition of pretend play; children's spontaneous play was not tested and some studies did 
not include control groups. Baron-Cohen (1987) defined the criteria for the occurrence of 
pretend play as "a) the subject is using an object as i f  it were another object, and/or b) the 
subject is attributing properties to an object which it does not have, and/or c) the subject is 
referring to absent objects as i f  they were present " (p. 140). In his own study Baron- 
Cohen (1987) compared autistic children's spontaneous play with that of both children with 
Down's Syndrome and normal children. The children’s play was video recorded and 
assigned to the four play categories of sensorimotor, ordering, functional, and pretend 
play. It was found that while only 20% of the autistic children showed spontaneous 
pretend play, 90% of the normal children and 80% of the Down's syndrome children did. 
The differences between the autistic and the control groups were significant. Baron-Cohen
68
(1987) adopted Lunger's (1942) definition o f symbol as "a symbol is a representation o f  a 
concept (which itself refers to an object) " ( p. 146), and stated that "a symbol is a 
representation o f  a representation, or is a second order representation " (p. 146). 
Furthermore Baron-Cohen (1987) highlighted the link between the child's theory o f mind 
ability which also requires second order representations, and concluded that autistic 
children are impaired in their capacity to produce symbols or, in other words, second order 
representations.
In contrast to this study, Lewis and Boucher (1988) reported that relatively able autistic 
children can produce pretend play, when they were presented with toys and some junk 
material and asked "What can you do with these?" In this study Lewis and Boucher (1988) 
examined spontaneous, instructed and elicited play, and used toy-toy or toy-junk pairs to 
elicit play. Lewis and Boucher (1988) hypothesized that, if the symbolic deficit account is 
right, when children are given toy-toy pairs and instructed what to do, they should be 
unimpaired in producing functional play (defined by Baron-Cohen, 1987 as play with the 
objects appropriate to their real function e.g. pretending to drink water from a miniature toy 
cup), but when they are given toy-junk pairs, and instructed what to do they would be 
impaired in producing symbolic play. In addition they also hypothesized that if autistic 
children's impaired pretend play is due to motivational factors (conative hypothesis), they 
would be impaired in their production of functional as well as pretend play in the 
spontaneous condition but not in the elicited condition when they are presented with toy-toy 
or toy-junk pairs and asked " What can these do ?, Show me what do you do with these ?"
The results showed that there was no difference between the autistic, learning impaired and 
normal children, in the production of symbolic play in response to instructions. Similar 
results were obtained in the elicited play condition, there being no difference between the 
groups in the production of symbolic play with either the toy-toy pairs or the toy-junk 
pairs. Lewis & Boucher (1988) argued that unimpaired instructed and elicited symbolic 
play suggest that relatively able autistic children have "a good capacity fo r  symbolic play " 
(p. 335). In addition, in the spontaneous play condition the autistic children produced less
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functional play in comparison to controls. However symbolic play production did not 
differ between the groups in either terms of duration or the quantity of symbolic acts.
From these results the authors suggested that "the paucity o f  pretend play in autism may 
have a conative, as well as a cognitive, cause " (p.336).
Lewis & Boucher's (1988) findings seem to suggest that autistic children have the 
necessary capacity for pretend play. In relation to the child's mctareprcsentalional ability, 
these results could be interpreted in two ways. One is that pretend representations do not 
require metarepresentational ability, as Pcmer (1991) claims, contrary to Leslie's (1987, 
1988) argument. The other interpretation is that pretend play does require 
metarepresentational ability, as Leslie (1987, 1988) claims, and that the autistic children's 
ability to produce symbolic play in this study was due to their higher verbal MAs 
(measured by British Picture Vocabulary Scale). The mean BPVS score o f the autistic 
children in this study was 5;09 years, and the range was 4;04-9;00. In Baron-Cohen's 
(1987) study the mean BPVS score for the autistic children was 4;09 years, and the range 
was 2;03-10;02.
5.5. Ability to understand non-mental representations
Perner (1991) (see chapter 4) has argued that there are two types of representations, mental 
i.e. thoughts, and external i.e. language or pictures. A false belief is a very good example 
of the misrepresentation of reality in the mental sense. For instance, in the classic task 
where a character Sally puts an object in location X, then leaves the room and in her 
absence Anne moves the object to location Y. Children are then asked to predict where 
Sally will look for the object when she returns. In order for the child to point to the 
location X (the correct answer), he/she needs to mentally represent (thought) what Sally 
has in her mind (thought) about the object’s location, which is the case of a representation 
of a representation, - metarepresentation (in the mental sense). Children's 
metarepresentational ability has been also tested in the non-mental sense (Zaitchik, 1990). 
In the task children were shown how to use a polaroid camera, and were then asked to take
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the picture o f an object in location X then, while the photo was developing the object was 
moved to the location Y. Children were asked where the object would be in the photo. In 
order for a child to say that the object in the picture will be in location X, he/she has to have 
an "understanding o f the representational relationship between the photograph and what it 
depicts (hence requiring metarepresentation) " (Leekam & Pemer. 1991, p.6).
Leekam and Pemer (1991) adopted Zaitchik's (1990) task to test autistic children's 
performance. In their study, the children were first shown how to use the polaroid camera. 
They were then asked to take a picture of a doll named Judy wearing a red dress. While the 
film was developing the doll's dress was changed to a green one. The children were asked 
what colour Judy's dress would be in the picture. The results showed that while 95% of 
the autistic children gave the correct answer, only 51% of the normal control group could 
pass the test. In comparing the groups, the autistic children performed significantly better 
than normal children on the photograph task. The authors concluded that since the task 
required metarepresentational ability and the autistic children could pass the test, the claim 
that autistic children fail theory o f mind tasks because they have a metarepresentational 
deficit, could not be a general one. Instead they suggest that "either autistic children have 
problems with mental states fo r  some other reason not connected to the representational 
aspect o f  mind or alternatively that autistic children do have a metarepresentational 
impairment, but one which is specific to the mind ” (p. 15).
5.6. Visual perspective taking in autism
It has been shown that autistic children are able to appreciate another person's visual 
perspective (Hobson. 1984; Baron-Cohen, 1989b and Leslie & Frith, 1988). Hobson 
(1984) gave a series of visual perspective taking tasks to autistic, normal and Down's 
Syndrome children. He found that the autistic children were able to change a doll's 
position so that the doll could see either both the child and the experimenter, o r only the 
experimenter, and also they were able to say that when the doll faced the experimenter the 
doll was seeing the experimenter. In another task, autistic children were able to position a
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miniature figure appropriately on the different trials so that one or more seekers could not 
see it. Autistic children were also able to state a  doll's visual perspective of the sides of a 
cube which had either different colours or different pictures according to the child's age. 
The results of this study suggested that the autistic children's performance is related to their 
mental age rather than being autism specific.
Similarly, Baron-Cohen (1989b) found that autistic children are unimpaired in visual 
perspective taking ability. In this task the children were seated opposite the experimenter, 
and six objects were placed around and above the subject on a shelf. Then the 
experimenter, with his eyes closed, changed his eye orientation towards one of the target 
toys, and then opened his eyes. The children were asked which toy the experimenter was 
looking at. The results showed that 92.5% of the autistic children, 94.4% o f the normal 
children and 89.3% of the children with Down's Syndrome passed this perceptual 
perspective taking task. Baron-Cohen (1989b) concluded that autistic children are 
unimpaired in their visual perspective taking ability, "they understand the role o f another 
person's eyes in seeing, and appreciate that other people stand in a particular relationship to 
a perceived environment " (p.l 17).
The ability to understand what another person can or cannot see is a level 1 visual 
perspective taking ability and does not require metarcpresentational skills. However it is a 
necessary step in the development of level 2 cognitive perspective taking which is an 
understanding that a person who sees an object being hidden, is the person who knows 
what or where the object is. The results o f the reported studies Hobson (1984) and Baron- 
Cohen (1989b) suggest that autistic children have an intact visual perspective taking ability. 
Since this ability does not require metarepresentational skills, these results support the 
metarepresentational deficit account (theory of mind explanation of autism), which argues 
that autistic children would not have difficulties in tasks where metarepresentational skills 
are not required.
72
Furthermore it has been found that autistic children are able to recognize simple 
relationships like mother-child, father-child, peer, and husband-wife. They are able to 
show simple reciprocity, for instance, while they are sitting opposite to the experimenter 
they can correctly identify their own right hand, their own left hand, and also the 
experimenter's right hand and his/her left hand. In other words, they are able to distinguish 
their own left and right from another person's left and right. It has also been found that 
autistic children are able to distinguish animate objects from inanimate objects (Baron- 
Cohen, 1991b). Baron-Cohen concluded that "none o f  these skills, at this basic level, 
require mental state attribution. On this assumption, the present results are therefore 
consistent with the hypothesis that the deficit in the development o f a theory o f  mind in 
autism is highly specific " (p.311).
5.7. P recu rso rs  fo r  a  theory  of m ind
As was reported in chapter 2, different theoretical accounts o f children's developing 
understanding of mind seem to be in agreement that, with a fully developed theory of mind 
around the age o f four children become able to attribute mental states such as knowledge, 
false belief, deceit etc. to themselves and others. However, different authors have 
identified various factors as precursors to this ability. For instance, Wellman (1990) has 
suggested the child's ability to differentiate mental from physical entities as an initial theory 
o f mind ability. Baron-Cohen (1989b) has proposed the child's understanding and 
production of protodeclarative pointing as a precursor to theory of mind. Bretherton and 
Beeghly (1982) and Bretherton, McNew & Beeghly-Smith (1981) have suggested 
children's use of mental terms in their spontaneous speech as an initial theory of mind 
ability. In this section I will review the empirical evidence concerned with whether autistic 
children, who it is suggested lack theory o f mind skills, could be said to have an initial 
theory of mind.
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5.7.1. U n d ers tan d in g  m ental*physical d istin c tio n
Wellman (1990) argued that three-year-old children have an initial theory of mind since 
they can differentiate mental from physical entities. For instance, they are able to 
understand that dreams and imaginations occur in your head, and they are able to attribute 
mental functions to the brain such as thinking and dreaming. However, between the age of 
four-to-five children's understanding becomes more sophisticated, they begin to attribute 
motor functions as well as mental functions to the brain. Thus, according to Wellman's 
account, if autistic children can differentiate mental from physical entities, they could be 
said to have an initial theory o f mind ability.
Autistic children have been found to have difficulties in distinguishing mental and physical 
entities, and in recognizing the mental function o f the brain (Baron-Cohen, 1989c). For 
instance, when autistic children were told stories like "This is Sam. He likes biscuits. He is 
hungry, so his mother gives him a biscuit. This is Kate. She is hungry, but she is alone.
She is thinking about a b iscu it" (p.584), and asked questions like "Which child can eat the 
biscuit?", "Which child can touch the biscuit?", only 23.5% of the autistic children 
correctly answered these type of questions. However 78.9% of the normal children, and 
68.8% of the learning disabled subjects passed the questions. Baron-Cohen (1989c) 
concluded that autistic children are impaired in their ability to differentiate mental from 
physical entities. In addition, the autistic children were asked questions about the location 
and the function of their brain, for example, "Where is your brain?", and "What does your 
brain do?" While 23.5% o f the autistic children referred to mental functions o f the brain 
such as thinking, dreaming and remembering, 70.6%  o f them referred to motor functions 
of the brain such as running, and walking. In contrast, 84.2% of the normal children and 
68.8% o f the children with learning difficulties referred to the mental functions o f the brain 
and only after prompting did 31.3% o f the learning disabled children and 31.6% of the 
normal children mention the motor functions of the brain. On the basis of these results 
Baron-Cohen (1989c) concluded that autistic children are impaired in their understanding of 
mental unobservable events.
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5.7.2. J o in t a tte n tio n  behav iours in  au tism
It has been reported that autistic children show fewer joint attention behaviour than normal 
and learning disabled children who are matched on the basis o f mental age and mothers' 
education level (Mundy e t al.,1986 and Sigman et al., 1986). Mundy et al. (1986) defined 
jo in t attention behaviours as "behaviours involve the use o f  procedures (e.g. showing a toy 
) to co-ordinate attention between interactive social partners with respect to objects or 
events in order to share an awareness o f  the objects or events " (p.657). In this study the 
child sat opposite the experimenter at a  table. There were toys on the table and balloons 
and posters were located around the room out o f the child's reach. The children's play 
with the experimenter was video-recorded. From analyzing the video recordings the 
children's responses were classified into three categories of social interaction, joint 
attention and requesting. All these categories were scored separately for response and 
initiation. For example, if the child looked when the experimenter pointed to one of the 
posters on the wall, this behaviour would be scored as a response to joint attention, but if 
the child pointed to an object to direct the experimenter's attention this would be scored as 
an initiation of joint attention. The results showed that autistic children displayed 
significantly fewer responses to joint attention than the normal and Down's syndrome 
children, and also they initiated significantly fewer joint attention behaviours. However, 
the autistic children were not different from the controls "on following simple commands 
and on combining eye contact and gesture (reach or give) to elicit aid in obtaining a toy or 
reactivation o f  a toy " (p.666).
Similar results were obtained when autistic children were video-recorded while they were 
playing with their primary caregivers (Sigman et al., 1986). In this study, as in Mundy et 
al.'s (1986) study, the children's behaviours were classified into the three categories of 
social interaction, joint attention and requesting. The results showed that the autistic 
children produced significantly fewer joint attention behaviours than the normal and 
learning disabled children. In other words, they were less likely to initiate joint attention 
with their caregiver.
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Recently, Baron-Cohen (1989b) conducted a study to investigate autistic children’s 
comprehension and production o f pointing behaviour. He stated that, with protoimperative 
pointing, which is to "use another person to obtain an o b ject" (p .l 17), an infant aims to 
effect another person, but does not aim to effect the other person's mental states.
However, with protodeclarative pointing when "the infant points in order to comment or 
remark on the world to another person ” (118), an infant aims to influence the other 
person's m ental state. Baron-Cohen (1989b) hypothesized that autistic children would be 
impaired in their ability to understand or use protodeclarative pointing, since it is used to 
influence another person's mental state, but they would have intact protoimperative 
pointing since this type o f pointing does not seem to function to influence another person's 
mental state. He investigated this by studying autistic children's ability to comprehend, and 
produce protoimperative and protodeclarative pointing.
In the comprehension task the experimenter told the child that he was going to use his 
finger to say something. In the protoimperative pointing comprehension task four toy 
animals were placed near to the child, the experimenter faced to the child, pointed to one of 
the four toy animals and then asked the child what he was "saying". The child passed if 
he/she picked up the toy and gave it to the experimenter, or if she/he asked the experimenter 
whether he wanted that toy. In the protodeclarative pointing comprehension task the 
experimenter told the child that he was going to say something else with his finger, and 
asked what he w as saying. He walked to the window, looked up and pointed to the sky, 
then looked at the child while still pointing at the sky. This action was repeated by ¡minting 
to different locations. Children passed if they looked in the direction that the experimenter 
was pointing, or asked the experimenter what he was looking at, or asked the experimenter 
whether he wanted him/her to look at something. The results showed that while 70% of 
the autistic children passed protoimperative pointing comprehension task, only 10% of 
them passed protodeclarative pointing comprehension task. Although they had higher 
verbal and nonverbal MAs, in comparison to normal and Down's Syndrome children, the
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autistic children were significantly inferior to both control groups on the protodeclarative 
pointing comprehension task.
Baron-Cohen (1989b) also investigated autistic children's production o f the two types of 
pointing. Children in each group w ere separately video-recorded for 45 minutes while they 
were playing. Any pointing which occured was scored by independent judges as 
protodeclarative or protoimperative. The results showed that while 90% o f the normal 
children and 70% of the children with Down's Syndrome produced protodeclarative 
pointing none of the autistic children did. Although the percentage of the autistic children 
who produced protoimperative pointing seemed to be less than the both normal children 
and children with Down's Syndrome, the difference was not significant. The percentages 
of children who produced protoimperative pointing was 40%, 70% and 80% respectively. 
In sum. the results suggest that while autistic children are able to understand and produce 
protoimperative pointing, they seem to be unable to comprehend and produce 
protodeclarative pointing. Baron-Cohen ( 1989b) suggested that impaired protodeclarative 
pointing in autism may be taken as a precursor of their impaired theory of mind ability, 
since protodeclarative pointing requires the attribution o f mental states. In support o f this 
conclusion, he further noted that autistic children are unimpaired in their perspective taking 
ability, and so understanding "shared attention may not be the critical aspect o f  
protodeclarative pointing that autistic children fa il to untlerstand " (p. 125).
In a subsequent paper Baron-Cohen (1989d) elaborated his argument that impaired 
protodeclarative pointing behaviour in autism may be taken as a precursor of the autistic 
child's impaired theory of mind. In this paper he argued that joint attention behaviours 
(showing, giving, referential looking, offering etc.) involve "attention diagnosis " which is 
an understanding that another person is interested in an object. This understanding, 
according to Baron-Cohen, requires the representation of whether the other person can see 
the object, and also whether that person is "interested in (i.e., prefers to attend to) that 
ob ject" (p. 187). In order to achieve this, the child needs to represent that the other person 
has a  positive or negative representation o f that object, which requires metarepresentation
77
(Baron-Cohen, 1989d). Based on this reasoning Baron-Cohen (1991a) suggested a 
developmental account of theory o f mind ability. According to this theory, an 
understanding of attention in normal children develops around the age o f 9 months, then, 
around the age of 4 years, children begin to understand beliefs, then when they are 7-years- 
old children develop an understanding of beliefs about beliefs (second order belief 
attribution). According to Baron-Cohen (1991a)
"Autism may be case o f specific developmental delay in the acquisition o f  a theory o f  mind, 
with different autistic children delayed at different points in this developmental sequence ." 
(p.248). "In terms o f  their theory o f  mind, most autistic children o f  less than four-years- 
old (in producing no joint attention behaviours) m ay be similar to normal six-month-olds. 
After this, some autistic children may develop protodeclarative pointing and pretend play, 
although its late emergence means it remains impoverished. And years later still, some 
autistic children may progress beyond this level and  succeed at understanding beliefs,...." 
(p.249).
5.7.3. Spontaneous mental term production in  autism
Another approach to the origins of a theory of mind, is to investigate children's use of 
mental state terms to refer to their own and other people's mental states in their spontaneous 
speech production. It has been shown that normal children around the age of two start to 
produce mental terms, but they use them in idiomatic or conversational ways, then around 
the age o f three they start to use mental terms to refer to mental states (Bretherton & 
Beeghly, 1982; Bretherton, McNew & Beeghly-Smith, 1981; Shat/ et al., 1983). These 
studies will be reviewed in the next chapter. However if, as has been suggested, children's 
use of mental terms to refer to mental states can be taken as an indicator to their theory of 
mind ability (Wellman, 1990), then investigating autistic children's spontaneous language 
may inform us about their early theory o f mind skills.
Tager-Flusberg (in press) noted the importance o f studying autistic children's language 
acquisition to investigate their understanding o f mind since "unlike experimental tasks
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which are either passed or failed in an all-or-none fashion, data from  naturalistic language 
are more graded or continuous. We are able to investigate degree o f  impairment which 
ultimately must provide a more realistic picture o f  the deficits in this domain o f  functioning 
fo r  autistic children " (p.7).
There is only one study which has investigated autistic children's use of mental terms in 
their speech. In this recent study Tager-Flusberg (1992) compared spontaneous speech 
samples from six autistic children to those of six language and age matched Down's 
Syndrome children. The children's spontaneous speech was recorded while they were 
interacting with their mothers and analyzed according to their reference to the psychological 
states of desire, perception, emotion and cognition. In addition, all the mental state terms 
were then scored for their functional usage given the context. Tager-Flusberg (1992) 
reported that while the autistic children did not differ from the children with Down's 
Syndrome in their spontaneous use o f desire, emotion and perception terms, relation to 
children with Down's Syndrome they produced significantly fewer cognitive mental terms 
such as believe, know, guess, forget etc., to refer to mental states. Tager-Flusberg (1992) 
argued that these data support the experimental findings that autistic children have 
difficulties in their understanding of knowledge, beliefs, pretence, deceit, or in other words 
in their theory of mind ability.
In sum, autistic children seem to be impaired in their ability to differentiate mental from 
physical entities, they appear to be impaired in their understanding and production o f 
protodeclarative pointing which it is proposed requires the understanding of other minds, 
and also they produce significantly fewer cognitive mental terms to refer to their own and to 
other people's mental states in their spontaneous speech. All these abilities, which are 
present prior to a fully developed theory of mind in normal children, appear to be impaired 
in autistic children. This might indicate that a certain mechanism which is responsible for 
the full development of theory of mind ability, is also responsible for the initial theory of 
mind skills. In addition, an absence o f these initial theory o f mind skills might contribute 
to the early diagnosis of autism.
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5.8. F ac to rs co n tribu ting  to  the  au tistic ch ild 's  perform ance on theory  o f  
m ind tasks
The majority of studies show that autistic children seem to lack the ability to attribute mental 
states to themselves and to others, and also that they seem to be impaired on tasks which 
require metarepresentational skills. In addition, autistic children seem to lack the initial 
theory of mind skills. All these findings seem to support the metarepresentational theory of 
autism that autistic children have a deficit in their metareprescntational skills which may 
suggest that the biologically based decoupler mechanism, suggested by Leslie (1987), is 
not functioning in autism. However other findings fail to support this hypothesis. First, it 
has been found that autistic children are unimpaired in their understanding of non-mental 
representational changes (Leckam & Pemer, 1991); second most studies have reported that 
some autistic children pass at least first order mental state attributions. More recent 
findings have led to a shift from the view that autistic children have a specific deficit in their 
theory o f mind to the view that autistic children have a specific delay in the development o f 
their theory of mind ability.
It has been shown that factors such as verbal MA and chronological age, relate to autistic 
children's performance on theory o f mind tasks. For instance. Prior, Dahlstrom and 
Squires (1990) reported that autistic children who pass the knowledge attribution and false 
belief tasks had a minimum chronological age of eight years, and verbal mental age o f six 
years. Leslie & Frith (1988) demonstrated that autistic children who passed the false belief 
task were more likely to be older than those who failed. In addition, Baron-Cohen (1989a) 
reported that autistic children who met the inclusion criteria which was to pass the false 
belief task, had a minimum chronological age of 11 years and higher verbal MAs than those 
who failed. Furthermore Baron-Cohen (1991b) argued that the performances o f children 
with autism and children with Down's Syndrome on the animate-inanimate distinction 
seemed to be related to their CAs and MAs. In addition Eisenmajer and Prior (1991) 
reported that the autistic children who passed the false belief task had significantly higher 
verbal MAs, and comprehension and pragmatic skills than the children who failed.
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However, the passers and failers did not differ in terms of their chronological ages and 
their vocabulary scores. This suggests that certain factors may be more important than 
others.
In sum, it seems that verbal MA is a factor frequently associated with autistic children's 
success on theory of mind tasks. However, studies have also shown that, although there 
was a tendency for the passers to have higher verbal MAs, there were some children who 
had high verbal MAs and still failed the task. This suggests that there are other factors 
effecting their performance. One possibility is the severity o f their autism (Eisenmajer and 
Prior, 1991).
Thus far in this chapter, the studies which investigate the autistic children's theory o f mind 
or their other skills which may underlie their theory o f mind ability (e.g. 
metarepresentational skills) has been reviewed. In the final part of this chapter studies of 
the autistic child's understanding of the expression of emotions will be reviewed.
5.9. U n d ers tan d in g  the expression of em otions in au tism
According to Hobson (1991) (recall chapter 4) children come into the world with an innate 
ability to recognize other people's emotions and feelings from their body movements and 
facial expressions, and to respond to other people in an affective-conative way. Through 
this affective-conative personal relatedness, children develop an understanding of other 
people's mental states. If Hobson's theory is right, one would expect that autistic children 
would be impaired in their understanding of emotions. However, the evidence on autistic 
children's understanding of emotion is inconclusive.
It has been shown that compared to MA matched normal and non-autislic learning disabled 
children, autistic children are impaired in their ability to match expressions of emotion 
(happy, unhappy, angry and afraid). In Hobson's (1986a) study, autistic, normal and 
non-autistic learning disabled children were played a series video sequences, showing, 1) a 
person in different situations which would cause different emotions, 2) a person displaying
81
a series o f gestures, and 3) a person uttering a series of vocalizations. Following each 
video sequences the children were asked to choose either photographed or drawn face to go 
with the person's emotional expression. The autistic children performed significantly less 
well than the MA matched normal and non-autistic learning disabled children in matching 
emotionally expressive photographs and drawn faces to those emotions presented on the 
video. In another study (Hobson, 1986b) children were asked to match drawings of 
gestures to video sequences displaying different emotions either facially or vocally. Similar 
results were obtained from this study, the autistic children performing significantly less 
well than, the CA and non verbal MA matched non-autislic learning disabled children. 
Hobson (1986b) concluded that autistic children are impaired in their recognition of 
emotions expressed facially, vocally and gesturally.
Furthermore autistic children have been found to be insensitive to the facial expressions of 
emotions (Weeks & Hobson, 1987). In this study, children were given pairs of 
photographs of people who could differ in terms of facial expression, age, sex and the type 
of hat they were wearing, and were asked to sort the photographs. While the majority of 
the autistic children sorted the photographs according to the type of hat worn, the non- 
autistic children sorted according to facial expression. The authors suggested that these 
results support the view that autistic children lack “a biologically based attentiveness and 
emotional responsiveness to certain o f  the bodily features o f  others, including features o f  
emotional expression " (p.148). Weeks & Hobson (1987) also argued that autistic 
children's inability to differentiate different expression of emotions may cause an inability 
to comprehend these emotions in others.
A further study indicated that autistic children have qualitatively different emotion 
recognition, in comparison to chronological age and verbal MA matched non-autistic 
children (Hobson et al„ 1988a). In this study, children were asked to sort three sets of 
photographs: one set showed a full face, the other two sets only showed the parts o f a face, 
either a face with the mouth blanked out, or a face with the mouth and forehead blanked 
out. In one task children had to sort the photographs according to emotional expression, in
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the other task according to the identity of the person. The results showed that autistic and 
non-autistic learning disabled subjects' performance on the identity sorting task declined 
comparably from the full-face photograph condition to the blank-mouth-and-forehead 
condition. However, when the children were presented with the same photographs upside 
down the autistic children performed significantly better than the control group both on the 
identity and the emotion sorting tasks. The authors concluded that in face recognition, 
autistic children use different strategies than non-autistic learning disabled subjects.
Furthermore it was found that while autistic children could match non-emotional 
photographs (e.g. a bus, or a vacuum cleaner, or a person walking on a pavement) with the 
relevant sounds, they had difficulties in matching photographs of emotionally expressive 
faces (happy, sad, fear, angry) with corresponding emotional sounds (Hobson et al., 
1988b). However when the autistic children were compared to non-autistic learning 
disabled children matched on the BPVS, their performance did not differ on the emotion 
task.
Similarly, when autistic children were compared with BPVS matched learning disabled 
children, and were asked to name the emotion expressed in the photographs and audiotaped 
sounds, they did not differ from the learning disabled children (Hobson et al., 1989). In 
the same study, children were also asked to name the photographs of the emotion-unrelated 
objects and their corresponding sounds. Across the two task, the autistic children were 
specifically impaired in the emotion naming task. Although this finding supports the 
previous evidence o f the autistic child's impaired ability to understand the expressions of 
emotions, no significant difference could be found between the autistic and BPVS matched 
learning disabled children on the emotion naming task, which casts doubt on the view that 
autistic children have a specific impairment in their understanding of the expression of 
emotions.
Ozonoff et al. (1990) also found that, when autistic children were matched with control 
children for verbal MAs (BPVS), the children did not differ in their ability to sort
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photographs with respect to either facial identity or the emotion displayed. In addition, the 
autistic children did not differ from the control subjects on the crossmodal matching task 
requiring them to match emotionally expressive photographs (of happiness, sadness and 
anger) of different people with the corresponding emotional sounds. However when the 
autistic children were matched with a control group on the basis of non-verbal MAs, group 
differences were found on the identity /  emotion sort task. Ozonoff et al. (1990) concluded 
that "While it appears that there may be some impairment in affect perception abilities in 
autism, the evidence fo r  the primacy o f  this deficit is not convincing " (p.358).
Furthermore, recent research suggests that autistic children have some understanding of 
situational causes o f simple emotions at least. For instance. Tan and Harris (1991) told 
children about two negative situations (e.g. going to bed early) and two positive situations 
(e.g. getting nice things to eat), and asked them whether they would feel "very happy " or 
"not so happy" in these situations. The autistic children did not differ from verbal MA 
matched normal and learning disabled children in the correct number of replies to these 
situations.
Similarly, Baron-Cohen (1991c) demonstrated that autistic children could understand 
situations and desires as the causes of emotions but not beliefs. For instance the autistic 
children were able to identify how a story character felt if she was having a birthday party, 
or if she fell down and cut her knee. The autistic children were not different from verbal 
M A matched learning disabled children in their understanding of desires as the causes of 
simple emotions (e.g. happy and sad). For instance, overall, 57.4% of them were able to 
identify whether a person is happy or sad in situations when that person gets what she 
likes, or when that person gets something she does not like. However, the normal children 
were better than both the group of autistic children and the group of children with Down's 
syndrome in their understanding of desires as the causes of emotions.
In the same study it was found that the autistic children were significantly worse than 
learning disabled and normal children in their understanding of beliefs as the causes of
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emotions. For instance only 17.6% of the autistic children were able to identify how 
another person would feel, (1) when he/she believes he/she has what he/she wants (e.g. a 
girl likes rice crispies and is given a closed rice crispies box (which actually contains coco­
pops) how would she feel) and (II) when another person believes she has something she 
does not want (e.g. a girl does not like coco-pops and, is given a closed box o f coco-pops 
(which actually contains rice crispies) how would she feel). Baron-Cohen (1991c) 
interpreted these results as supporting the metarepresentational theory of autism. He 
concluded that autistic children are able to understand simple situations and desires as the 
causes of emotions since they do not require metarepresentational skills. However, they 
are impaired in their understanding of belief as the causes of emotions since beliefs require 
metarepresentation.
In summary, the evidence from emotion recognition studies seem to suggest that autistic 
children may have some difficulties in understanding the expressions of emotions in other 
people. However the evidence is not sufficient to conclude that autistic children fail to 
understand emotions totally, since some studies were shown that they can understand 
simple emotions: nor it is sufficient to conclude that this impairment is specific to autism 
since some studies have demonstrated that, when autistic children are matched with control 
subjects on the basis o f verbal ability, their performance did not differ from that of the non- 
autistic learning disabled children.
The next chapter will discuss whether the theoretical accounts outlined in chapter 4. can 
explain the evidence on the autistic child's theory of mind.
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6. C H A PT E R  SIX
How do the theoretical accounts explain a lack o f "theory o f mind" in 
Autism?
6.1. Accounts in favour o f theory o f  mind
6.1 .1 . Perner's view
According to Pemer (1991, see chapter 4.) children go through a series of developmental 
stages before they develop a full representational understanding of mind (with the 
acquisition o f metarepresentation skills). In the first year o f life infants have single models 
of the world (primary representations) and during the second year of life they begin to 
create multiple models o f the world (secondary representations). At this stage children can 
compare past with present, real with pretend, and also they begin to understand pictures 
and language "as special kind o f  represented situation ". Pemer describes children at this 
stage "situation theorists". Between the ages o f three and four children develop an explicit 
understanding of representations; with this understanding they begin to differentiate 
appearance from reality, begin to understand knowledge as a mental state and to understand 
misrepresentation in other people (false belief) These all require metarepresentational 
skills.
Although Pemer has carried out some studies with autistic children, unlike Leslie (1987) he 
has not formulated his theory (on the normal children's theory o f mind) in order to explain 
autism. However, like Leslie he has suggested that multiple models are secondary 
representations and they are copied from primary representations, but he has not included a 
biologically based copying mechanism (or, in Leslie's terms, a decoupler). Pemer's 
account also differs from Leslie's in respect to metarepresentation. According to Pemer 
pretend representations are secondary, but they are not metarepresentations. However, 
Leslie (1987) argued that pretend representations are metarepresentations and he suggested
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this as the link between the impaired pretend play and impaired mental state attribution 
observed in autism.
Although Pemer's (1991) theory was not formulated to account for findings in autism, his 
careful analysis o f children's developing understanding of representations and their 
understanding of mind as a representational entity, is very valuable for autism and theory of 
mind research, because the theory clearly states when a metarepresentational skill is 
acquired and in which circumstances it is necessary for a child to have this skill.
From the empirical evidence reported in the previous chapter, it is clear that autistic children 
do mil seem to have a general metarepresentational deficit. First it has been shown that 
autistic children are able to pass non-mental misrepresentation task which require 
metaiepresentalion (Leekam & Pemer, 1991) (using the task originally designed by 
Zaitchik, 1990). Second although Pemer argues that pretend representations are not 
metarepresentations, even if an autistic child shows impaired pretend play this would not 
necessitate that he/she has impaired metarepresentational skills. However, impaired 
pretend play in autism according to Pemer's formulation, may suggest that the child is 
unable to create multiple models or unable to compare the two available models of real and 
pretend. At this point Perner's account becomes similar to Leslie's proposal of an impaired 
decoupler mechanism, and inability to produce or hold two models at the same time.
6.1.2. L eslie 's  account
As described in chapter 4., Leslie (1987, 1988) emphasised the similarities between the 
pretence and mental state attribution. According to him, both pretence and mental state 
attribution require secondary representations which are copied by the "decoupler 
mechanism" from the primary representations. Leslie also argued that pretend 
representations are metarepresentalional as are the mental state attributions such as false 
belief and ignorance. On the basis of evidence from Baron-Cohen et al. (1985 and 1986) 
which demonstrated that autistic children are unable to attribute false belief to others which 
require metarepresentation, and other studies which suggested that autistic children are
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impaired in pretend play, Leslie (1987, 1988) proposed that autistic children have an 
impaired decoupler mechanism. Furthermore, he argued that "malfunction o f  this 
component would lead to specific abnormalities o f  development that might show  
themselves in a characteristic pattern o f  social and communicative behaviour " (Leslie and 
Frith, 1990, p.122), as in the case o f autism.
Recently, as a result of other studies in autism (such as Leslie and Frith (1988) who 
showed that autistic children are also impaired in attributing knowledge to others and 
Pemer et al. (1989) who argued that autistic children are impaired in their attribution of true 
and false belief to others and also in their ability to refer to their own mental state of 
knowledge) Leslie (1991) argued that autistic children "are severely impaired on tasks 
which tap their ToM  " (p.70). Furthermore on the basis o f the fact that some autistic 
children do pass some theory o f mind tasks but fail on the other tasks such as higher-order 
false belief tasks, Leslie (1991) suggested that "high ability autistic children are specifically 
and grossly delayed in their ToM understanding, relative to their own general intellectual 
functioning " (p.71).
6.1.3. W ellm an's account
Wellman (199<), see chapter four) argued that before children fully developed a 
representational understanding of beliefs they have a simple-desire psychology which 
enables them to predict another person’s behaviour on the basis o f that person's simple 
desires. Around the age of three children develop a belief-desire psychology which enables 
them to begin to predict behaviour in relation to a person's belief as well as in relation to a 
person's desire. According to Wellman, at this stage children have an initial theory of 
mind; they can also understand that dreams and ideas are representational. However 
according to Wellman children at this stage do not have a fully developed understanding of 
mental representations, rather they have a copy understanding (or hit-or-miss 
understanding). At this stage children can understand that if a person hits (sees) the target 
he/she holds a true belief about it. However, three-year-old children cannot understand
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false belief, the appearance-reality distinction, nor can they understand that two people may 
have different interpretations o f the same object. This understanding develops between the 
ages o f four and five which Wellman calls interpretive understanding of representations and 
mind.
Like P em er (1991), Wellman’s (1990) account was not developed specifically to explain 
autism. However a part of his formulation has been tested on autistic children by Baron- 
Cohen (1989c). In this study it was found that autistic children have difficulties in 
differentiating mental from physical (e.g. while a character who has a biscuit can eat it, 
another character who is thinking o f a biscuit cannot eat it). Since Wellman argued that the 
ability to differentiate mental from physical required an initial theory o f mind, Baron-Cohen 
(1989c) concluded that autistic children also lack an initial theory o f mind.
6.2. A ccounts against theory o f mind
6.2.1. Harris: Autism as a failure to adjust default settings
Harris (1991) argues against the view that autistic children lack a "theory of mind". Instead 
he claim s that although autistic children are slower than normal children, they have some 
understanding of the way the mind works. According to Harris, autistic children’s 
performance on theory of mind type tasks can be explained on the basis of the adjustment 
of default settings. For instance, in one task in Harris & Muncer, (1988 reported by 
Harris, 1991) autistic children were told what the story character wanted to get e.g. A but 
not B, and then they were asked whether the character would he happy if he gets A (match 
condition), and if he gets B (mismatch condition). In the mismatch condition the autistic 
children were less likely than the normal children to judge that the character would not be 
happy to  get B. However some o f the autistic children made very few errors on this task 
and when Harris & Muncer (1988) followed up this study with higher level autistic 
children "many autistic children ( I I  out o f  20) performed without error " (Harris, 1991 
p.297). Similarly Harris reports that Baron-Cohen (forthcoming) found that when the 
autistic children were asked to judge a character's emotion on the basis of what he wanted
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and what he got - which according to Harris requires a single default adjustment - they 
performed less well than the normal children but their performance was similar to the 
learning disabled children. In a more difficult task, children were asked to judge what the 
character would feel when he was misled about the outcome. For instance when the 
character wanted box A and is given box A, but box A actually contained something 
different from what he wanted. In this task children need to keep in mind what box A 
actually contained but imagine what the character wanted and what he (mistakenly) thinks 
he will get. In this task the autistic children did less well than the normal and learning 
disabled children. Harris (1991) concludes that "autism does not completely block the 
normal development o f  psychological understanding, rather it is a deficit that slows 
development in that domain " (p.298).
6.2.2. Hobson: A utism  as a social affective deficit
Hobson (1989b) based his theory of autism on one o f the characteristic features of autism, 
namely "disturbances o f affective contact", which was described by Kanner (1943). 
According to Hobson (1990c) autistic children lack the biological capacity (in particular the 
sensory-motor-affective capacity) to develop affective-conative interpersonal relations.
This affective relationship involves the recognition of feelings and emotions in other people 
from their bodily expressions, as well as the affective responsiveness to other people. The 
absence of a biological capacity for interpersonal relationships prevents the child from 
developing a concept o f 'self and of 'people' and, from understanding the commonality 
and difference between themselves and others. With the inability to understand people with 
their own subjective attitudes toward the world and toward themselves, autistic children fail 
to develop an understanding of mental states (Hobson, 1990c). In addition autistic 
children's lack of experience of interpersonal relationships also results in them failing to 
develop symbolic thinking and abstraction (Hobson. 1989b).
In sum Hobson (1989b) proposes that: " (1) Autistic children lack such constitutional 
components o f  action a nd reaction as are necessary fo r  the development o f  reciprocal
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personal relations with other people, relations which involve feelings. (2) Such personal 
relations are necessary fo r  the "constitution o f  an own and common world" with others 
(Bosch, 1970, p.115). (3) Autistic children's lack o f  participation in intersubjective social 
experience has two results which are especially important-namely, (a) a relative failure to 
recognize other people as people with their own feelings, thoughts, wishes, intentions, and 
so on; and (b) a severe impairment in the capacity to abstract and to feel and think 
symbolically. (4) The greater part o f  autistic children's characteristic cognitive and language 
disability may be seen to reflect either lower-order deficits that have a specially intimate 
relationship with affective and social development, and/or impairments in the social- 
dependent capacity to symbolize." (Hobson, 1989b, p.23).
The difference between the cognitive "theory of mind" account o f autism and Hobson's 
social-affective account seems to be that the former claims that autistic children lack the 
innate cognitive mechanism which is responsible for metarepresentational ability that is 
required in mental state attribution whereas the latter claims that the primary deficit in 
autism is the affective-connative personal relatedness. In other words, according to the 
theory of mind account, the inability to attribute mental states to other's such as beliefs and 
desires is the underlying reason for autistic children's social communication difficulties, 
whereas according to Hobson's social-affective account autistic children lack this ability 
due to impaired innate biological capacities. Thus, as a result o f an inability to form 
affective personal relationships from the early years of life, autistic children, according to 
Hobson, fail to acquire knowledge o f people with minds and knowledge of mental states. 
However, despite their differences both accounts emphasize some sort of biological 
impairment.
In the last section of this chapter an account which argues the role of both cognitive and 
affective factors in order to explain theory of mind impairment in autism, will be described.
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6.3. Autism as an affective and cognitive disturbance
Mundy & Sigman (1989a, 1989b) have explained the impaired joint attention behaviours 
observed in autism in terms of both affective and cognitive factors. They developed their 
account by assuming that the impaired joint attention behaviours could be regarded as an 
early manifestation of autism. Mundy & Sigman (1989a) point out that the cognitive 
metarepresentational account suggests that "pretend play skills reflect the earliest 
developments o f  this cognitive capacity" (p.176) and these skills emerge between 14-and- 
18 months o f age. However joint attention behaviours are present between 6-and-12 
months o f age in normal children. Thus metarepresentational theory cannot "easily explain 
joint attention deficits in autism " (Mundy & Sigman. 1989b, p.214).
According to Mundy & Sigman (1989b), through experience, children leam that their smile 
has an effect on others especially on their caregivers. "This association plays a role in the 
child's developing sense o f  relatedness to the caregiver and becomes codified in the 
cognitive scheme 11 smile -->  other smilesI  " (p.215). They argue that a child's disturbed 
expression of affect may lead to impaired affective social relationship with the caregiver. 
This impoverished experience, combined with impaired cognitive representational factors, 
may cause disturbances in the child's cognitive scheme development. In other words, they 
suggest that the interaction between the child's impaired social affective responses and 
delayed cognitive systems may lead to "specific cognitive deficits in autism " (p.216).
In sum, Mundy & Sigman (1989b) proposed that "atypical experiences with affect in social 
interaction,., in combination with compromised representational skills, may give rise to 
atypical social-affect scheme formation in the young autistic child To the degree that these 
provide a  foundation fo r  aspects o f  subsequent cognitive development, a new 
developmental path o f  the disorder may emerge. ..since a ffect is an important early source 
o f information about the covert aspects o f  others (e.g. feelings), a disturbance o f  
ontologenically early affect scheme could inhibit the development o f  subsequent complex
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representations about the covert mental states o f others. This process may be related to 
aspects o f  delay in the development o f  a theory o f mind module....” (p.216).
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7. CH A PTER SEVEN
Normal children's understanding o f knowledge and their understanding of  
mental terms
In this thesis, in order to investigate normal and autistic children's ability to attribute mental 
states to themselves and to others, their ability to differentiate mental terms like "know" and 
"guess" have been tested in a series of experiments. This chapter reviews relevant studies 
carried out with normal children. First, studies investigating normal children's 
understanding of mental terms, particularly "know" and "guess", will be reviewed.
Second, the normal child's understanding of "knowledge" will be described.
7.1. Children's production and comprehension o f mental terms
It has been argued that the child's pre-verbal communication with his/her caregiver 
indicates that the child can attribute "an internal state o f  knowing and comprehending to the 
mother as he o r she communicates, and must have what Premack and Woodruff (1978, 
p.515) have called a 'theory o f  mind  '"  (Bretherton et al., 1981, p.225). With the 
acquisition o f language, it becomes easier to study the child's ability to attribute internal 
states to self and to others (Bretherton et al., 1981). According to Bretherton et al. (1981) 
an infant's understanding of self and other as psychological beings, becomes explicit in 
different aspects of language after the first emergence of intentional communication. 
Children begin to refer to others as physical beings, first, naming body parts, later on 
referring to themselves and others by personal names, and then using mental terms to 
attribute mental states to themselves and others.
In the investigation of children’s understanding of mental terms, observational studies have 
focused on the child's production of mental terms to refer to their own and to other 
people's mental states. Experimental studies have investigated the child's comprehension 
of mental terms in various experimental paradigms. These are reviewed below.
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7.1.1. O b se rv a tio n a l s tud ies
Bretherton, McNew & Beeghly-Smith (1981) demonstrated that infants begin to use 
internal state words in their second year of life. While perceptual words (e.g. see, cold, 
hurt, hear), physiological words (e.g. hungry, thirsty, sleepy) and emotional words (e.g. 
happy, funny, love, nice, scary) were used in children's spontaneous speech between the 
ages o f 11 to 20 months, cognitive words (e.g. think, remember, believe, understand, 
pretend) did not appear in the children's speech before the age o f 26 months. The earliest 
used cognitive term was "know" at the age of 15 months. Similarly, Bretherton & Beeghly 
(1982) showed that at 28 months, the most commonly used words in the infants' 
spontaneous speech were volition (e.g. want, can, need), physiological (e.g. thirsty, tired, 
sleep), and perceptual (e.g. see, look, hurt). The least common words in the 28 month old 
infants' speech, accounting for 13% of their speech, were cognitive mental terms (e.g. 
think, remember, forget, understand, pretend and guess). The evidence from both these 
studies seems to suggest that children begin to use several internal state words in their 
second year of life, and start to use cognitive mental terms before the age o f 3.
However, Shatz et al. (1983) have argued that children's spontaneous production o f mental 
terms does not necessarily reflect their ability to infer mental states, since such verbs are 
likely to be used for conversational functions. In order to investigate when children begin 
to use mental terms to refer to mental stales, Shatz et al (1983) examined samples of a 
child's spontaneous speech. Words were coded as mental state words on the basis of 
context and function, and whether or not they were produced to refer to people’s 
knowledge, memories or thoughts. They also examined the use of contrastives which 
strongly indicate the child's ability to discern mental states from the observable reality e.g. 
"Before I  thought this was a crocodile; now I know it's an alligator " (Shatz et al. 1983, 
p.307). Finally they assessed children's competence at producing appropriate linguistic 
forms to infer mental states. Shatz et al. (1983) found that when mental terms first appear 
in the child's speech they are not used to refer to mental states but rather used to direct 
interaction. However, a few months after the first mental terms are produced, children
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begin to use these terms to refer to mental states. The authors concluded that mental 
reference begins to appear in the second half of the third year.
Thus the evidence from observational studies suggests that from the second year onwards 
children start to produce mental terms (Bretherton & Beeghly, 1982; Bretherton et al., 
1981), and by half way through the third year these terms are used to refer to mental states 
(Shatz et al., 1983).
7.1.2. Experimental studies
Various aspects of children's comprehension of mental terms have been studied in 
experimental studies. Some studies have explored when children begin to understand 
mental processes, such as remembering and forgetting, by looking at children's 
comprehension of the mental terms "remember" and "forget” (Wellman & Johnson, 1979), 
while others have demonstrated children's understanding of the semantic difference 
between various mental terms. Further experiments have investigated children's 
understanding of cognitive mental states implied by mental terms, and children's 
understanding of differential degrees of certainty implied by mental terms.
To date the experimental evidence indicates that at around the age o f four to five children 
begin to differentiate mental terms such as know, think, guess, remember, pretend, forget 
etc. this is later than the first appearance o f these mental terms in children's spontaneous 
speech.
Macnarama et al. (1976) demonstrated that four-year-old children understand the 
presuppositions implied by mental terms. For example, "Tom was pretending he was sick” 
(p.62) presupposes that Tom was not sick; “Harry forgot to bring the truck " (p.63) 
presupposes that he was expected to bring the truck; "John said that Mary knows that the 
mouse is dead" (p.62) presupposes that John believes that what he says is true. The 
results of Macnarama et al.'s (1976) study indicated that while four-year-old children could 
understand presuppositions implied by the mental terms "pretend" and "forget", their
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understanding of the presupposition implied by "know" was not as good. However, the 
task used to test the children's understanding of the presupposition implied by "know”, 
appears to be more difficult than the "pretend" and "forget" tasks, which raises questions 
about their conclusion.
Johnson and Maratsos (1977) showed that four-year-old children are able to understand 
that, while knowing presumes the truth, thinking could be mistaken. Children were told 
stories in which there were two characters, one was the hider, the other was the seeker. In 
a story, one character (the hider) hid something in location A and told another character (the 
seeker) that she had hidden the object in location B. The children were then asked several 
questions about the hider and the seeker. Four-year-old children, unlike three-year-olds, 
were able to indicate that the hider knows where the object is (the truth), while the seeker 
thinks they know where the object is. These results indicated that four-year-old children 
are able to understand the presupposition implied by "know", contrary to the results o f 
Macnarama et al.’s  (1976) study. In Macnarama et al.'s study the four-year-old children's 
relatively poor understanding of the presupposition implied by "know" seems likely to have 
been caused by difficulty o f the task.
Johnson and Wellman (1980) found that four-year-old children could differentiate their 
mental states from external stales. In this study, after children had watched the 
experimenter hide an object in one of two boxes, the object's location was changed, 
without the child seeing the change so that when they were asked to point to where the 
object was, they would point to the incorrect location. In other words, the children had 
previous knowledge about the object's location which at the time of pointing, was 
incorrect. Although the four-year-old children saw that their performance was incorrect, 
when they were asked whether they had known, remembered or guessed where the object 
was, the children affirmed that they knew, remembered, and guessed the object's location. 
This finding suggests that 4-year-old children do not always interpret mental terms on the 
basis of external states or the perceived outcome, but that they can interpret mental terms on 
the basis of their mental states.
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In the same study (Johnson and Wellman, 1980) the children carried out two further tasks. 
In one the children saw where the experimenter hid an object (prior knowledge), and in the 
other they did not (no information). In other words the difference between the two tasks 
was that in one the children had prior knowledge, in the other they had no information, and 
in both tasks they did not find out whether their performance was right (no information on 
present performance). They were then asked several questions about whether they knew, 
remembered or guessed where the object was. Preschool children aged between four and 
five tended to give indifferent answers in both conditions indicating that they did not 
understand that while knowing and remembering require a  knowledge base, guessing does 
not Johnson and Wellman (1980) argued that preschool children's affirmative answers - 
saying that they knew, remembered and guessed - in the condition where they neither had 
prior knowledge about the object's location (no prior knowledge) nor found out whether 
their performance was right (no information on present performance), indicates that 
"children are interpreting the terms with respect to their act o f  choosing rather than the 
outcome o f  performance " (p.l MX)). Furthermore, the results on these two tasks showed 
that understanding o f the difference between know, remember and guess on the basis of 
presence or absence of prior knowledge develops from the age of five onwards.
In another set o f tasks in Johnson and Wellman’s (1980) study, the children did not see 
where the experimenter hid the object. In the (guess right) task it was ensured that the 
children found the hidden object (both locations contained an object). In the (guess wrong) 
task it was ensured that the children did not find the hidden object (none of the locations 
contained an object). The difference between the two tasks was whether the children's 
present performance was correct or incorrect. However, in both tasks the children did not 
have any prior knowledge. The four-year-old children were more likely to judge their 
correct performance, but not their incorrect performance, as knowing, remembering and 
guessing, which suggests that they were basing their judgments on their performance. By 
the age o f five, the children ascribed guessing to both tasks whether their performance was 
right or wrong, but still judged remembering and knowing on the basis of their
98
performance. By the age o f six, the children were able to differentiate guess from know 
and remember on the basis of prior knowledge, but not on the basis of their present 
performance.
Johnson and Wellman (1980) concluded that "children first interpret mental terms with 
respect to variable contexts o f  use. From such uses, children gradually acquire a more 
categorical understanding o f  the definitively mental features o f  the terms " (p.l 102).
Similarly, Wellman and Johnson (1979) showed that children's understanding of the 
mental terms "remember" and "forget" progresses from an understanding based on search 
for the correct location (present performance) at around the age o f four, to an understanding 
based on underlying cognitive mental states (previous knowledge) between the ages o f five 
and seven).
Furthermore Miscione et al. (1978) demonstrated that the crucial period for the 
development o f the semantic understanding of "know" and "guess" occurs between the 
ages of four and five and a half. In this study, children either watched the experimenter 
hide shapes in one of three boxes or they did not (they closed their eyes). After the 
experimenter had hidden a shape the child was then asked to choose a box which he/she 
thought the shape was in. Then the child was asked whether he/she knew or guessed the 
location o f the shape. In some conditions the children were asked the questions before they 
found out whether their performance was right or wrong. In other conditions, they were 
asked the questions after they saw whether the box they chose contained the shape. 
Miscione et al. (1978) found that the younger children differentiated "know" and "guess" 
according to external results. While they associate know with correct activity, guess is 
associated with incorrect activity. Gradually children acquire the semantic knowledge for 
both words. From the age o f five and a half the children showed an understanding that 
"know" implies prior knowledge and leads to a successful outcome, while "guess" implies 
a lack the knowledge and leads to different outcomes which may or may not be successful.
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Moore et al. (1989) who looked ai children's ability to differentiate the mental verbs 
"know", "think" and "guess" in terms of differential degrees of certainty. In this study 
children were told they could get help from two puppet monkeys when they were finding a 
hidden sweet. Each puppet made a statement which contrasted with the other puppet's 
statement. For instance, for the know-guess contrast one monkey said "I know it is in the 
blue/red box ” (p. 169) while the other monkey said "/ guess it is in the blue/red box  "
(p. 169). There were three contrasts which were know-guess, know-think and think- 
guess. The results showed that by the age of four years children had some understanding 
o f the distinction between "know" and "guess", 73.25% of their choices being correct, and 
between "know" and "think”, 78.5% of their choices being correct. The understanding that 
"know" gives a better indication of the realibility of a statement over "guess" and over 
"think" appears to be complete by five years o f age. By the age of five, 94.75% o f the 
choices in the know-guess contrast and 91% of the choices in the know-think contrast were 
correct.
In sum, evidence from the experimental studies indicate that children around the age of four 
begin to differentiate mental terms such as "know" and "guess" based on the outcome 
(present performance), and from the age of five based on the underlying cognitive mental 
states.
7.2. Children's understanding o f knowledge as a mental state
The experiments in this thesis focus on children's understanding of the mental state 
"knowing" versus "guessing" or "not knowing" so in this section studies examining the 
normal child's developing understanding of the sources o f knowledge will be reported.
1(M>
7.2.1. U n d erstand ing  p ercep tion  as a source o f know ledge
Wimmer, Hogrefe & Pemer (1988) studied children's understanding o f perception and 
communication as sources o f knowledge. In this study, two children were seated opposite 
each other. On each trial, while one child had informational access to the content of a box 
(either being shown or being told what was in it) whereas the other child did not. Then the 
subject was asked whether the other child knew or did not know what was in the box, and 
also whether the subject himself/herself knew or did not know what was in the box. The 
results indicated that children younger than four-years of age did not understand 
informational access as a source of knowledge. In addition, three-year-old and four-year- 
old children found it easier to assess their own knowledge than to assess the other child's 
knowledge. In a second experiment Wimmer, Hogrefe and Pemer (1988) altered the task, 
so that the subject and the other child had the same informational access. The children's 
responses did not change. Thus, it was concluded that young children tend to neglect 
informational access in their assessment o f another person's knowledge even when they 
know what the other person has access to. However, in a third experiment four-year-old 
children were also asked whether the other child looked into the box (to check knowledge 
o f perceptual access). It was found that the children had no difficulty assessing the other 
child's perceptual access but had difficulty assessing the other child's resulting knowledge. 
Wimmer et al. (1988) concluded that children younger than 4 or 5 have no understanding 
of the origins of knowledge, but that children begin to understand informational access as a 
source of knowledge at around the age o f 4 years.
Similar results were obtained from studies of children's conceptual perspective taking 
ability by Marvin et al. (1976) and Mossier et al. (1976). In these studies children played a 
game with their mother and the experimenter. In Marvin et al.'s study the game involved 
two of them choosing a toy as a secret, while the third one closed his/her eyes. Then 
children were asked who knew and who did not know the secret. The four-year-old 
children were able to identify who knew the secret and who did not, on the basis o f that 
person's visual access (Marvin et al. 1976). Thus they were able to differentiate their own
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conceptual perspective from that of the others' regardless of sharing either the same or a 
different perspective with the others. In Mossier et al.'s study (1976) while their mother 
was in another room the child was shown video clips and told something that the story 
character wanted or somewhere he was going. Then the same video clips were shown to 
the child and his/her mother together with the sound o f video turned down so that it was 
not obvious where the story character was going or what he wanted. The child was then 
asked whether their mother knew where the story character was going or what he wanted, 
and also why their mother knew or did not know. It was found that the four and five year 
old children were able to take their mothers' perspective and say that she did not know 
what the character wanted and where he was going. However, the children's ability to 
justify their mothers’ absence o f knowledge appeared somewhat later between the ages of 
five and six.
These results from Marvin et al. (1976) and Mossier et al. (1976) suggest that, from the 
age o f four children begin to differentiate their own knowledge and the absence o f this 
knowledge in another person on the basis of informational access. From five years 
onwards, children begin to justify the presence or absence of this knowledge in another 
person.
However, other studies have shown that three-year-old children are able to judge whether 
another person or they "know" or " do not know" something on the basis o f perceptual 
information (Pillow, 1989; Pratt & Bryant, 1990). In Pillow's (1989) study, the task 
involved the transfer of either a small plastic dinosaur or a small toy car, from a bag (which 
contained different coloured items) to a plastic opaque container out of sight o f to the child 
and a puppet who acted as another person. Then, either the child or the puppet looked into 
the container. On each trial the children were asked whether the child knew the colour of 
the dinosaur or the car in the container, whether the puppet knew the colour of the dinosaur 
or the car in the container, whether the child saw the dinosaur or the car in the container and 
whether the puppet saw the dinosaur or the car in the container. The results showed that 
both three-year-old and four-year-old children could attribute knowledge or ignorance to
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themselves and to the puppet on the basis of visual access. They were also able to judge 
whether or not the puppet or themselves had seen the object in the container. Pillow (1989) 
concluded that by the age of three to four children are able to understand perceptual 
experience as a source of knowledge.
This conclusion contrasts with the findings from other studies (W immeret al., 1988; 
Mossier et al., 1976; Marvin et al., 1976) which have suggested that children younger than 
four-years of age are not able to understand that seeing leads to knowing. However, 
Pillow's study differed from the others in three ways: 1) the children were tested 
individually; 2) puppets rather than real people (an adult or another child) were used as the 
other person; and perhaps the most important of all, 3) the children were asked about the 
colour of the hidden object which is a perceptual quality which may have helped children in 
their performance.
Similarly, Pratt and Bryant (1990) also found that if simpler questions are asked, children 
as young as three-years-old are able to attribute knowledge or ignorance to a person on the 
basis o f that person's visual access. In this study there were two assistant children. On 
each trial while the subject watched, one o f assistants looked into a box which contained an 
object and the other assistant lifted the box up without looking into i t . The subject was 
then asked, depending on the condition, either "Who knows what is in the box - John or 
Fiona (the assistants' names)?" or "Who can tell what is in the box - John or Fiona?". The 
results indicated that three-to-four year old children can understand the role of visual access 
in knowledge formation. In another experiment investigating the role o f  test questions on 
children's performance, Pratt and Bryant (1990) directly compared simple with complex 
questions. In this task, one child looked into a box while the other child did not. In one 
condition children were then asked simple single-barrelled questions (e.g. "Emma, does 
Lucy know what is in the box?" and "Do you know what is in the box?"). In the other 
condition double-barrelled questions were asked as in W immeret al. (1988), (e.g. "Emma 
does Lucy know what is in the box, or does she not know what is in the box?" and "Do 
you know what is in the box, or do you not know what is in the box?"). The results
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showed that both the three and four-year-old children found the single-barrelled questions 
easier than the double-barreled questions and the four-year-olds were better than the three- 
year-olds in responding correctly to both types of questions. This evidence seems to 
suggest that in W immer et al.’s (1988) study, three-year-old children's inability to 
understand the role o f informational access in knowledge formation was due to complex 
test questions.
In sum, while some studies have shown that children around the age o f four begin to 
understand the role o f  perceptual access in knowledge formation, recent studies used 
different tasks and simpler experimental questions. These studies have shown that three- 
year-old children are able understand the role o f perceptual access in knowledge formation.
7.3. Chapter sum m ary
From the second year onwards, children start to produce mental terms and by half way 
through the third year, they start to use them to refer to mental states. However, it is not 
before the age of five that children begin to differentiate cognitive mental terms on the basis 
of the mental states they refer to.
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8. C H A PT ER  E IG H T
Experiment 1
Normal children's ability to differentiate "know" and "guess" with 
reference to se lf  and others
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8.1. In tro d u c tio n
The main aim of this thesis was to explore the "theory of mind" explanation o f autism by 
examining children's understanding of "knowledge" as a mental state.
In investigations of children's "theory of mind" reported in the literature have employed 
tasks which have involved the use of various scenarios either with real people or with 
puppets, and children have been asked questions involving the use o f mental terms (eg. 
believe, know, think). In addition, other studies have investigated children's use of these 
mental terms to refer to mental states in their spontaneous speech, and suggested that use of 
mental terms indicates the child's implicit theory of mind ability. Other researchers have 
studied children's comprehension of mental terms and proposed that "the acquisition o f 
mental terms may be taken as indicating an understanding o f mental state and therefore 
reflects the development o f  the concept o f  mind in children (Johnson, 1982) " (Moore et al. 
1989. p.167).
The main aim of the first experiment was to investigate the age at which normal children 
can differentiate the mental terms "know" and "guess", and in so doing to establish a 
baseline for subsequent experiments. Children's ability to differentiate these mental terms 
can be taken as a marker of their understanding of the related mental states, "knowing" and 
"guessing". While knowing requires an evidential basis (informational access) and 
presumes the truth, guessing lacks such a base and could be wrong. There is evidence that 
by the age of 4 children begin to understand that "know" gives better index of realibility 
than "guess” (Moore et al., 1989) and that from five-years onwards children begin to 
differentiate "know" from "guess" on the basis o f prior knowledge but not on present 
performance (Miscione et al., 1978; Johnson & Wellman, 1980).
Furthermore, evidence from studies investigating children's understanding o f sources of 
knowledge, indicates that children around the ages of 4 and 5 acquire an understanding that
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perceptual access is the crucial factor in knowledge formation (Wimmeret al., 1988;
Marvin et al., 1976; M ossier et al., 1976 and Hogrefe et al., 1986).
According to Pemer (1991) (see chapter 4) children's ability to judge a person's knowledge 
on the basis of informational access (eg. whether or not that person had seen the 
experimenter hide an object) rather than success (eg. whether or not that person found the 
hidden object) indicates that a child has developed an understanding of knowledge as a 
mental representation.
In order therefore to ensure that the child is basing her/his judgement on the person's 
mental state rather than the successful outcome, it is necessary to ask the experimental 
question before the child has seen the outcome (i.e. whether the box to which they pointed 
contained the hidden object). This procedure was adopted in experiment 1.
The second aim of the experiment 1 was to investigate whether children's ability to 
differentiate "know" and "guess" differs when they are referring to their own mental states 
and when they are referring to another person's mental states. Observational studies such 
as Bretherton & Beeghly (1982) and Bretherton, McNew & Beeghly-Smith (1981) have 
shown that children tend to refer to their own mental states earlier than they do to others'. 
However a subsequent observational study as demonstrated that the lag between the 
production of mental terms used with reference to self and with reference to others was 
minimal (Shalz et al., 1983). In this study once a child had started to produce mental terms 
she/he did not seem to restrict their use to refer to themselves for very long.
Contrary to this last study experimental studies have suggested that children seem to find it 
easier to refer to themselves than to others. For instance, in Wimmer et al.'s (1988) study 
three and four year-old children found it easier to judge their own knowledge than to the 
another child's knowledge. In this task either the subject child (self) or the helping child 
(another) had seen or been told the content of a box and the subject child had to judge 
his/her own knowledge and another child's knowledge about the content of the box.
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Given this lack of consensus it is perhaps not surprising that studies o f the children's 
understanding of their own false belief and false belief of others' have produced conflicting 
results. While some investigations have suggested that children can recognize false belief 
in themselves before they can recognize it in others (Pemer et al., 1987; Hogrefe et al., 
1986), other studies seemed to indicate that the understanding of one's own previous false 
belief and the ability to understand another's false belief emerged simultaneously (Wimmer 
& Hard, 1991; Gopnik & Slaughter, 1991 and Sullivan & Winner, 1991).
Thus in summary, the evidence appears to be inconclusive as to whether children's ability 
to attribute mental states to themselves and to others emerge simultaneously or whether one 
follows the other. Theoretically, if Harris's (1991) view of mental simulation, which is 
based on imaginations and analogy from the child's own states to others, is right, then 
children should find it easier to refer to their mental states than to refer to others. However 
if Pemer (1991) is correct in that children around the age of four acquire a representational 
theory of mind in which they understand the representational function o f mental states, then 
children should become able to understand their own and other people's minds at the same 
time.
Experiment 1 examined whether or not children start to attribute mental states to themselves 
and to others at the same time by comparing the child's ability to judge his/her own mental 
state (attribution o f knowing and guessing to self) and another person's mental state 
(attribution of knowing and guessing to another person).
The third aim of the experiment 1 was to investigate whether there was an age trend in the 
differentiation o f "know" from "guess", children with the mean ages of 4;9, 5;9 and 6;9 
were tested.
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8.2. M ethod
8.2.1. S u b je c ts
A total of 121 children between the ages of 4;05 and 7;08 recruited from two local primary 
schools were included in this experiment. They were divided into three age groups as 
follows: the youngest group (n=54) had a mean age of 4;09 (4;05-5;05) and the middle 
group (n=43) with a mean age of 5;09 (5;06-6;05) and the oldest group (n=24) with a mean 
age of 6;09 (6;06-7;08).
8.2.2. M ater ia l
Two wooden boxes ( 16 x 11 x 7 cm), and a yellow coloured wooden cube ( 3 x 3 x 3  cm) 
(For a photograph of the materials see appendix 1.).
8.2.3. Procedure
All the children were tested in a quiet area outside their classroom in their school. The 
experimenter began the task with two children, one being the subject and the other being 
the helping child. When the first subject had finished the task he/she was asked to stay for 
two more turns (to be a helping child) with the next child. The children were told that they 
were going to play a game in which they would have to find a cube hidden in one of two 
boxes. They were also told that they would take turns, sometimes they would be asked to 
close their eyes, sometimes they would be allowed to see where the experimenter hid the 
object. There were two conditions "own" and "other". For administrative reasons all the 
subjects were tested in both conditions in the order "own", "other". However a more 
adequate procedure has been reported in section 9.2.3.1.
8.2.3. ! . 'Own" condition
In this condition each child was given two trials. On one trial the children saw the 
experimenter hide the object ("know" trial) and on the other trial they were asked to close 
their eyes while the experimenter hid the object ("guess" trial). After the experimenter had
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hidden the object she asked the child the following questions "Did you see where I put the 
cube?" "Can you point to the box that contains the hidden object?", "Do you know it is 
there or do you guess it is there?”. If the child had seen the experimenter hiding the cube 
the correct answer was KNOW, whereas if the child had his/her eyes closed while the 
experimenter hid the object the correct answer was GUESS. The order o f the know and 
guess trials and the order o f "know” and "guess" in the experimental question were 
counterbalanced.
8.2.3.2. "Other" condition
In this condition the helping child (other) was given two trials: a "know" trial in which the 
helping child watched the experimenter hide the object and a "guess" trial in which the 
helping child had his/her eyes closed while the experimenter hide the object. The subject 
had his/her eyes open during both trials. After the experimenter had hidden the object she 
asked the helping child first "Did you see where I put the cube?" and "Can you point to the 
box that contains the hidden object?", while the helping child was pointing to one o f the 
two boxes, the experimenter turned to the subject and asked "Does she/he know it is there 
or does she/he guess it is there?" Clearly, if the helping child had seen the experimenter 
hiding the cube the correct answer was KNOW, whereas if the helping child had his/her 
eyes closed while the experimenter hid the object the correct answer was GUESS. Table
8.1. summarises the conditions, trials and experimental questions in the "hidden object 
task".
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Table 8.1. The hidden object task: Conditions, trials and questions.
'O W N 1 CONDITION
QUESTIONS
Did you see where I put the cube? (control Q. to the subject) 
Can you point to the box that contains the hidden object?
(to the subject)
Do you know it is there or do you guess it is there?
(experimental Q. to the subject)
Did you see where I put the cube? (control Q. to the subject) 
Can you point to the box that contains the hidden object?
(to the subject)
Do you know it is there or do you guess it is there?
(experimental Q. to the subject)
■ OTHER" CONDITION
TRIALS QUESTIONS
KNOW Did you see where I put the cube?
(other child sees) (control Q. to the helping child)
Can you point to the box that contains the hidden object?
(to the helping child)
Does she/he know it is there or does she/he guess it is there?
(experimental Q. to the subject)
Did you see where I put the cube?
(control Q. to the helping child) 
Can you point to the box that contains the hidden object?
(to the helping child)
Does she/he know it is there or does she/he guess it is there?
(experimental Q. to the subject)
GUESS
(other child does not see)
TRIALS
KNOW
(subject sees)
GUESS
(subject does not see)
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8.2.4. S c o r in g
The children's responses were scored independently for the two conditions of own and 
other. In each condition the children were scored as passing if they got both know and 
guess trials right, that is they differentiated know and guess successfully. If they got one 
trial or both trials wrong they were scored as failing.
8.3. Results
All the children answered the initial questions correctly that is they were able to say whether 
or not they had seen where the experimenter had hidden the object. This indicates that all 
three groups o f children had no difficulty in perceptual perspective taking for themselves.
The first aim of experiment 1 was to investigate the age at which age children can 
differentiate the mental terms "know" and "guess”. Clearly, in the experiment there were 
four possible response patterns:
a "know” on know trial, "know" on guess trial;
b "know" on know trial, "guess" on guess trial;
c "guess" on know trial, "know" on guess trial;
d "guess" on know trial, "guess" on guess trial.
Response pattern b was scored as a pass the other patterns were scored as fails. With 
these four possible patterns o f responding, it might seem that the chance level o f passing 
the task was 25%. However, this ignores the likelihood of inter-dependence between the 
two trials for each child. For example, it seems likely that a child who was not fully 
competent at performing the task might be biased towards know (responding with "know" 
on both trials), or towards guess (responding with "guess" on both trials). The possibility 
of such biases makes it difficult to calculate chance rates o f passing the test, and likely that 
a chance level o f 25% is not a reliable estimate.
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An alternative strategy is to test whether the frequency of responding with "know" in the 
"know" trial is greater than responding with "know" in the "guess" trial. With repeated 
measures across trials and a dichotomous outcome, McNemar's test is the appropriate 
statistical procedure, and two-tailed probabilities from the exact (binomial) version o f this 
test are reported below. It should be noted that although we are comparing the frequency 
of "know" responses across the two conditions, this is simply the mirror image of the 
corresponding comparison focusing on the alternative response of "guess".
For all the three age groups the difference between the "know" responses in the "know" 
trial and "know" responses in the "guess" trial was significantly different for both 
conditions of "own" and "other" (pc.OOl for all the calculations, excluding the youngest 
group for the "own" condition p<.01). These results are detailed in appendix 2. This 
suggests that even the youngest children with a mean age of 4;09 did successfully 
differentiate "know” from "guess" when referring to their mental states and to the mental 
states o f others. However, only a  minority o f the youngest children got both of these right 
and some o f the youngest children got both wrong.
The data were further analyzed for the effects of conditions and age independently.
8.3.1. Comparison of "own" and "other" conditions
A second aim of experiment 1 was to investigate whether children's ability to refer to their 
own mental states is different from their ability to refer to another person's mental states. A 
separate McNemar test (exact binominal procedure) for each age group was performed to 
compare "own" and "other" conditions. None of the differences were significant. 
Inspection of the percentages supports the overall interpretation of no differences between 
the conditions age by age, or in terms of trends across age. Table 8.2. and Figure 8.1. 
show the percentages of children's correct responses for "own" and "other” conditions.
Table 8.2. The percentages o f  the children's correct responses in the "own" 
and "other" conditions for the different age groups.
N AGE (range) MEAN (age) OWN OTHER
54 4;05 - 5;05 4;09 35.1 % 44.4%
43 5;06 - 6;05 5;09 62.7 % 62.8 %
24 6;06 - 7;08 6;09 75% 66.6 %
Figure 8.1. The percentages o f  the subjects' correct responses in the "own" 
and "other" conditions.
8.3.2. Age effects
The third aim of the experiment 1 was to investigate whether there was an age trend in the 
differentiation o f "know" from "guess". There was a  significant difference in percentage of 
correct responses across the three age groups in the "own" condition [x2 (2) =13.194, 
p<.(X)l] but not in the "other" condition (x2 (2)=4.8()6, p<.090] (see table 8.2. for the 
percentages of children's correct responses for "own" and "other" conditions). Tukey-type 
pairwise comparisons at p=.05 indicated that, for the "own” condition, the youngest age 
group was significantly different from each of the older groups. Thus the five-year-old and 
six-year-old children were significantly better than the four-year-old children in their ability
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to differentiate "know" from "guess" in referring to their own mental states. The two older 
groups were not significantly different from one another. Tukey-type tests across ages on 
the "other" condition revealed that the difference was not significant for any pair-wise 
comparison.
8.4 . D iscussion
The main aim of experiment 1 was to establish a baseline for the subsequent experiments. 
Thus the first question was. at what age can children differentiate "know" from "guess" in 
reference to mental states. Several studies have shown that children at first start to 
differentiate mental terms on the basis o f outcome (e.g. whether the person found the 
hidden object), then later they start to base their judgements on that person's mental state 
(Johnson & Wellman. 1980; Wellman & Johnson, 1979; Miscione et al., 1978). Because 
the object of the present experiment was to examine children's understanding o f the 
underlying mental states implied by the mental terms "know" and "guess", in each trial the 
experimental question had been asked before the child found out about the outcome 
whether the box pointed at actually contained the hidden object. The first analysis showed 
that all the children gave significantly more "know" answers in the "know" trials then 
"know" answers in the "guess" trials indicating that children between four and a half and 
seven and a half are able to differentiate these mental terms on the basis of relevant mental 
states "knowing" and "guessing". Furthermore, children's ability to differentiate "know" 
from "guess" was getting better as the children got older; while 35 % to 44 % of the 4;09 
year-old children differentiated "know" from "guess" in reference to self and other 
respectively, the percentages of correct differentiation rose to 62 % and 62 % by 5;09 years 
and 75 % and 66 % by 6;09 years for self and other respectively.
These results are comparable with previous evidence from two different bodies of research 
- research on children's ability to differentiate mental terms on the basis of mental states and 
research on children's understanding of the role of informational access in knowledge 
formation. These studies have shown that children around the age o f four-years begin to
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understand the role of visual access in knowledge formation and they start attributing 
knowledge to people (Wimmer et al., 1988; Marvin et al., 1976; Mossier et al., 1976 and 
Hogrefe et al., 1986). For instance, in W immer et al.'s (1988) study, 93% o f the four- 
year-old and all of the five-year-old children were able to attribute knowledge to 
themselves, and 56% of the four-year-old and all of the five-years-old children were able to 
attribute knowledge to another person. The children’s performance in Wimmer et al.'s 
(1988) study is better than that of the children in the present experiment. However the 
present experiment used stricter criteria requiring the children to pass both "know" and 
"guess" questions.
Similarly, previous research on children's ability to differentiate mental terms with 
reference to mental states has demonstrated that from the age of five-years children begin to 
differentiate "know" from "guess” on the basis o f prior knowledge rather than present 
performance (Johnson & Wellman, 1980; Miscione et al., 1978). Miscione et al.'s (1978) 
study involved two conditions somewhat similar to the present experiment In one 
condition the children had visual access to hiding a shape, whereas in another condition 
they did not. After the children had pointed to the box which they thought contained the 
hidden shape, they were asked whether they knew or guessed that the shape was in the 
box. The main difference between Miscione et al.'s study and the present experiment were 
that in the former the children only referred to their own mental states and trials were 
repeated five times. Miscione et al.'s (1978) results showed that the children aged between 
four and a half and five and a half gave correct "know" answers 4.1 times out o f five trials 
and correct "guess" answers 3.1 times out o f five trials; the children aged between five and 
a half and six and a half gave correct "know" answers 4.8 times out of five trials and 
correct "guess" answers 4.4 times out of five trials. In comparison to these results, the 
children taking part in the present study seemed less able to attribute "know" and "guess". 
However, again this is more likely to be a consequence of the strict criteria adopted which 
required the children to pass both the "know" and the "guess" questions.
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The second aim o f experiment 1 was to investigate whether children's ability to differentiate 
"know" and "guess” differs when they are referring to their own mental states and when 
they are referring to another person's mental states. The results indicate that there was no 
difference between the conditions. This suggests that children's ability to judge their own 
knowledge (knowing) and the absence of this knowledge (guessing) and their ability to 
judge another person's knowledge and the absence o f this knowledge in another person, 
may emerge simultaneously. This finding fail to support evidence from some observational 
studies which have indicated that children use mental terms first to refer to themselves and 
only later to refer to others. However the children in the present study were a lot older than 
the children included in the observational studies, and one would expect them to be at the 
level where they can use mental terms to refer to other people. Furthermore, Shatz et al. 
(1983) argued that the lag between children's ability to use mental terms to refer to their 
own mental states and to other people's, is fairly small.
Furthermore the present results have failed to support the findings o f Wimmer et al. (1988) 
which showed that children find it more difficult to attribute knowledge to other people than 
to themselves. However the absence of any difference between self and other reference in 
experiment 1 accords with other studies which found that children's ability to attribute the 
mental state of false belief to themselves and to other people emerges simultaneously 
(Wimmer & Haiti, 1991; Gopnik & Slaughter, 1991; Sullivan & Winner, 1991).
Theoretically, if children use analogy to their own mind to make predictions about other 
people’s mental states, as Harris (1991) argues, then children should find it easier to refer 
to their mental states than to refer to others'. The present results failed to support this 
view. However if  Pemer (1991) is right that with the acquisition o f a representational 
theory of mind at around the age of four, children start to understand the representational 
function of mental states, then children should become able to understand their own and 
other people's m inds at the same time (Astington & Gopnik, 1991b). The present results 
are in line with Pem er's view (1991). In the present experiment children were asked the 
experimental question "Do you know it is there or do you guess it is there?" or "Does (the
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other child) know it is there or does (the other child) guess it is there?" before they looked 
into the box to see whether it contained the hidden object (found out the outcome). This 
ensured that the children based their judgement on their or another child's mental state, 
depending on the condition. The child 's correct performance on this task, according to 
Pemer (1991), indicates his/her understanding of knowledge as a mental state. Even the 
youngest group in this experiment differentiated "know" and "guess" with reference to their 
own and to another child's mental state which suggests that the children were able to 
understand knowledge as a mental state.
Furthermore, Pemer (1991) argued that representing someone else's representation 
requires metarepresentational skills, which are acquired around the age of four.
In experiment 1 when the children were asked to judge their own knowledge by answering 
the question "Do you know it is there or do you guess it is there?" all they needed to do 
was to check their mental representation of where the hidden object was which should not 
require metarepresentation skills. This is illustrated in figure 8.2. If the child saw the 
experimenter hiding the object in one of the two boxes, he/she should have a representation 
of the location of the object, and by referring to this representation, the child could give the 
correct answer which is "I know". If the child did not see the experimenter hiding the 
object, the child could not have formed a representation o f the location o f the hidden object 
and, on the absence o f this knowledge he/she could give the correct answer "I guess". So 
one would expect the ability to refer to one's own knowledge state to be within the four- 
years-old child's ability range in term s of representational skills. This was confirmed in 
this experiment.
However, when the children were asked to judge another child's knowledge by answering 
the question "Does he/she know it is there or does he/she guess it is there?, they had to 
refer to the other person's mental state which does require metarepresentational skills (see 
figure 8.2.). All the children in the present experiment were above four and a half or older 
and therefore it is reasonable that they would have no difficulties on the "other" condition.
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since children around the age of 4 years acquire the necessary metarepresentational skills 
(Pemer, 1991). All three groups of children were able to attribute "know" and "guess" to 
another person which again supports Perner's (1991) argument. In addition, this also 
explain why the children's ability to refer to themselves and to others did not differ in this 
experiment. If the children were able to pass the "other" condition, they would be expected 
to pass the "own" condition which did not require metarepresentational skills (see appendix 
2 Cross tabulation tables which show that majority of children who passed the "other" 
condition also passed the "own" condition).
Furthermore, as can be seen from Figure 8.1, as children get older they seem to be getting 
better at differentiating "know" and "guess" in both conditions. There was a significant age 
effect in the "own" condition, the older children were better than the younger children at 
differentiating "know" from "guess". There is no good evidence that the age trend was 
different for the two conditions, that is, there is little evidence o f an conditions x age 
interaction, even though this is difficult to test with such data. Nonetheless in the "other" 
condition there was no significant difference between the age groups. One possible 
explanation for this is that in this experiment the "own" condition was always presented 
before the "other" condition. It is possible that this may have facilitated performance in the 
"other" condition, especially in the youngest group. Thus in the following experiments it 
was decided to counterbalance the order of the conditions.
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Figure 8.2. T he rep resen ta tiona l skills requ ired  in ex p e rim e n t 1.
" O th trr" ro u d l llBD child representing
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9.1. Introduction
Recently, a number of studies have suggested that autistic children are specifically impaired 
in their ability to attribute mental states to themselves and to others (e.g. Frith, 1989). 
Several aspects of mental state attribution in autism have been investigated. Research in 
this area was initiated by studies examining the autistic child's ability to attribute false belief 
to others which demonstrated that autistic children are impaired in this ability (Baron- 
Cohen, Leslie & Frith 1985 and 1986). It has also been shown that autistic children are 
impaired in their ability to attribute knowledge to themselves and to others (Leslie & Frith, 
1988; Pemer, Frith, Leslie & Leekam, 1989), and are impaired in engaging deception 
(Russell, Mauthner, Sharpe and Tidswell, 1991). All these tasks are believed to require 
metarepresentational skills, that is the ability to represent someone else's representation 
(Pemer. 1991).
In most o f the studies, autistic children's performance has been compared to either verbal 
MA matched children with Down's syndrome or children with specific language 
impairment. These studies have demonstrated that children with Down’s syndrome and 
children with specific language impairments are able to attribute mental states to themselves 
and others. This finding has led researchers to suggest that the impairment is specific to 
autism and is independent of any other mental handicap or language impairment
Furthermore, it has been suggested that autistic children's inability to attribute mental states 
to themselves and others (the theory of mind impairment) might be an underlying factor for 
their social communication difficulties (Baron-Cohen et al. 1985, 1986). The theory of 
mind account of autism proposes that if a child is unable to understand other people's 
mental states (e.g., what they know, think, believe etc.), he/she will not be able to predict 
other people's behaviour. This could make life very confusing and may result in the 
person withdrawing from it (Baron-Cohen, 1990b).
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Theoretically, it has been argued that metarepresentation (which is required by mental state 
attribution) requires the use o f secondary representations (Pemer, 1991; Leslie, 1988). 
According to Leslie (1987, 1988) a decoupler mechanism is responsible for the production 
o f these secondary representations. Thus, an impaired decoupler mechanism could be the 
underlying factor in autism and could explain the inability of the autistic child to attribute 
mental states to him or herself and to others, and could lead to the autistic child's social 
communication difficulties.
Understanding of knowledge is a mental state attribution, and it is important because 
people's knowledge state is a strong underlying factor of their behaviours. Thus it is 
important to investigate whether autistic children are able to attribute mental state of 
knowledge to other people. Primarily, the present experiment aimed to investigate autistic 
children's and adolescents' ability to attribute knowledge, and ignorance to people. The 
two studies in the literature have investigated autistic children's ability to attribute 
knowledge to themselves and to others (Leslie & Frith, 1988; Pemer, Frith, Leslie & 
Leekam, 1989; for an account of these see chapter 5). In one of Leslie and Frith's (1988) 
tasks the child and the second experimenter watched the first experimenter hide a red 
counter in one of three possible locations and then the second experimenter left the room. 
While he was out of the room, the first experimenter produced another red counter and 
asked the child to hide it somewhere different. The child was then asked several questions: 
where the second experimenter saw the first experimenter hide the counter; whether the 
second experimenter knew the location o f the second counter that the child had hidden, and 
where the second experimenter would look for the counter when he came back. Leslie and 
Frith (1988) reported that 11 of the 18 autistic children successfully answered the knowing 
question of whether the second experimenter knew there was a counter in the second 
location (where the child had hidden the second counter). However Leslie and Frith (1988) 
adopted a strict criterion, according to which the child had to pass not only the knowing 
question, but also the prediction question, in order to pass the knowledge attribution task. 
Only 8 of the 18 autistic children passed both questions. Therefore Leslie and Frith (1988)
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concluded that autistic children fail to attribute knowledge to other people. The prediction 
question required the child to judge where the second experimenter would look for the 
counter and it seems possible that this was especially difficult, since to succeed the child 
had to predict a  person's behaviour on the basis o f that person's knowledge state (this issue 
will be taken up in chapter 11).
One of the limitations of Leslie and Frith's (1988) study was that they did not report the 
performance of the control group on this particular task. However, given that studies of 
normal children's ability to attribute knowledge to others have demonstrated that four-year- 
old children are able to do this (e.g. Wimmer et al., 1988) and given that the control group 
children had a mean verbal MA of 6;()9, it seems likely that the control children would have 
passed the knowledge task. Nevertheless this needs to be tested.
Similarly, Pemer, Frith, Leslie & Leekam (1989) reported that autistic children had 
difficulties in attributing knowledge to people. In one o f the tasks in their study the first 
experimenter transferred one o f several objects from a box to a cup out o f view of both the 
child and a second experimenter. Then either the child (self knows) or the second 
experimenter (other knows) looked into the cup. The child was then asked several 
questions: whether the child had looked into the cup; whether the second experimenter had 
looked into the cup, whether the child knew which object was in the cup, and whether the 
second experimenter knew which object the first experimenter put into the cup. The results 
showed that only 43% of the autistic children could attribute knowledge to the other person 
although 56% o f them could attribute knowledge to themselves. Again, in this study 
Pemer et al. (1989) did not report the performance of the language impaired control group 
children on the knowledge attribution task. In addition, this study involved some autistic 
children with verbal MAs as low as 3 years 1 month who would be expected to fail the 
knowledge attribution task given that this ability has been shown to develop around the age 
of 4 in normal children (e.g. Wimmer et al. 1988).
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Although Leslie & Frith (1988) and Pemer et al. (1989) have not reported the performance 
of the control groups, their results seem to suggest that autistic children have difficulties in 
attributing knowledge to themselves and to others.
Further evidence from another body of research has demonstrated that, in comparison to 
children with Down's syndrome, autistic children produce significantly fewer cognitive 
mental state terms such as know, think and remember in their spontaneous speech (Tager- 
Flusberg, 1992). As reported previously (see chapter 7) it has been argued that children's 
use o f mental terms to refer to mental states such as knowing, thinking or believing, can be 
taken as one o f the early manifestations of their theory of mind ability (e.g. Bretherton et 
al., 1981; Bretherton & Beeghly, 1982; Shatz et al., 1983). Following these studies, 
Tager-Flusherg (1992) compared autistic children's spontaneous speech samples with that 
of children with Down's syndrome who were matched according to their chronological age 
and mean length of utterance. A functional analysis of the psychological state terms 
showed that the autistic children produced significantly fewer terms referring to cognitive 
mental states (including knowing) than the children with Down's syndrome. Tager- 
Flusberg (1992) reported that whereas the children with Down's syndrome produced 41 
examples of mental state attribution, only 4 examples were produced by the autistic 
children. Although Tager-Flusberg (1992) did not report the frequency of the particular 
mental term "know", used to refer to the mental state of knowing, overall these results 
support the evidence from experimental studies that autistic children are specifically 
impaired in their ability to attribute cognitive mental states.
The first aim of experiment 2 therefore was to compare autistic children's and adolescents' 
ability to differentiate the mental terms "know" and "guess" on the basis of relevant mental 
states (i.e. having specific knowledge about something and lacking that specific 
knowledge), to that of children with Down's syndrome and normal children. Since 
previous evidence has suggested that children's ability to attribute knowledge develops 
from four-years onwards, the inclusion criterion for experiment 2 was that children had to
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have language scores at the four-years level and above on a t least two of the three language 
tests administered.
Although a number of studies have suggested that autistic children are impaired in their 
ability to attribute mental states to others, a proportion o f autistic children do pass the 
theory of mind tests in most of the studies. Autistic children who are able to attribute 
mental states are tend to be older and have higher verbal MAs. For instance. Prior, 
Dahlstrom and Squires (1990) reported that autistic children who could attribute knowledge 
and false beliefs to others had a minimum chronological age o f 8, and a minimum verbal 
mental age o f 6. Furthermore, Baron-Cohen (1989a) reported that autistic children who 
passed the first order false belief task had higher verbal MAs and they were over 11 years 
of age.
Therefore, the second aim of experiment 2 was to investigate whether children's language 
level is an important factor for their success on the experimental task. In other words the 
second aim was to investigate whether performance on the task improved with higher 
language level. In order to test this question, the autistic children were divided into two 
groups, one o f low verbal ability, and the other of higher verbal ability. Similarly, two 
groups o f normal children were included, namely four-year-olds and five-year-olds. For 
the learning impaired control group this was not possible, since none of the children with 
Down's syndrome performed high enough to form a high verbal ability group. Therefore 
there was only one learning impaired control group which was comparable to the low 
verbal ability autistic children and the four-year-old normal children.
In addition to the high/low language level factor it has also been suggested that while some 
language skills are strongly related to the autistic child's ability to attribute mental states, 
other language skills are not (Eisenmajer & Prior, 1991). In this study autistic children 
who passed the false belief task had higher verbal MAs (PPVT scores), better 
comprehension and pragmatic skills than the children who failed. But the autistic children 
who passed and who failed the false belief task did not differ in terms of vocabulary scores
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and chronological age (Eisenmajer & Prior, 1991). Therefore a third aim of experiment 2 
was to investigate the relationship between the autistic children’s ability to attribute 
knowledge and different aspects of language.
The fourth and final aim of the experiment 2 was to investigate whether referring to the 
child's own mental state was easier than referring to another person’s mental state. Tager- 
Flusberg (1992) found that both autistic children and children with Down's syndrome were 
more likely to refer to their own cognitive mental states than those o f other people's. In 
addition, in Pemer et al.'s (1989) study although the autistic children's ability to refer to 
their mental state and to refer to other people's mental state was not significantly different, 
13 of the 23 autistic children successfully attributed knowledge to themselves, but only 10 
of the 23 attributed knowledge to another person.
The method of experiment 2 differed from that of experiment 1 in two ways. First, a 
second experimenter acted as another person rather than a second child acting as the other 
person. This was done in order to overcome possible difficulties o f maintaining the 
cooperation and attention o f two children with learning difficulties or with autism.
Although it was possible with normal children, it was assumed that this would be difficult 
with autistic children. Second, children were asked about the colour of the hidden object 
rather than the location of that object, since Pillow (1989) has suggested that asking about 
the colour of an object, which is an perceptual quality, highlights the perceptual experience 
and may facilitate the child's performance.
9.2. Method
9.2.1. S u b je c ts
Five groups of children were included in this study: two groups o f autistic children, one 
with low language scores on the British Picture Vocabulary Scale (N=14) and one with 
higher language ability (N= 14); two groups o f normal children, four-year-olds (N=I7) and
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five year-olds (N=22) and one group of children with Down's syndrome (N=17). The 
autistic children were attending to special education schools or to units for autism in 
Birmingham, Oxford, Evesham, Milton Keynes, Temple Balsall and Stoke-on-Trent, and 
they all met the diagnostic criteria for autism (DSM-III-R, 1987). The children with 
Down's syndrome were attending to special education schools in Coventry, Leamington, 
Warwick, Rugby and Coleshill. Normal children were attending to a primary school in 
Warwick. All the subjects were recruited by contacting the school they were attending.
All five groups of children were administered the British Picture Vocabulary Scale (Dunn, 
Dunn, Whetton, and Pintilie, 1982), and the Renfrew Action Picture Test (Renfrew,
1988). In addition the autistic children and the children with Down's syndrome were given 
the Test of Reception o f Grammar (Bishop, 1982).
The inclusion criteria for this experiment were:
Autistic children and children with Down's syndrome with language levels above four 
years, on two of the three language tests administered (BPVS, TROG and RENFREW 
Action Picture Test), were selected. Forty autistic children were sampled initially, five 
children who failed to meet the inclusion criteria and were excluded from the study. Then 
autistic children were divided into two groups on the basis of their BPVS scores. The 
autistic children with BPVS scores between 4;06 and 5;06 were assigned to the low 
language level group, and the autistic children with BPVS scores above 5;06 were assigned 
to the high language level group. Further seven autistic children who either was 
uncooperative or moved from the area, were excluded from the study.
For the learning disabled control group twenty four children with Down's syndrome were 
sampled. Seven of these children failed to meet the inclusion criteria and were excluded 
from the study.
For the normal control groups the inclusion criteria was to have four years above language 
level on the BPVS. Thirty one four-year-old children and twenty six five-year-old children
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were sampled. Eleven of the four-year-olds and three of the five-year-olds failed to meet 
the inclusion criteria and these children were excluded from the study. Further three o f the 
four-year-olds and one of the five-year-olds children who failed to complete the 
experimental task were excluded from the study. Table 9.1. shows the details of the five 
groups.
9 .2 .2 . M ateria ls
The materials consisted of three small tubular shape plastic food containers (coloured 
green, red and blue respectively) each containing marbles of the same colour as the 
container, and four small match-boxes wrapped as present (gift) boxes (see appendix 3.)
9.2.3. Procedure
The children were always seen individually outside their classroom in a quiet area o f their 
school. On the first visit all the children were given the British Picture Vocabulary Scale 
and the Renfrew Action Picture Test. This helped to ensure that the main experimenter was 
equally familiar to all of the children. On the second visit the experimental task was 
administered. The autistic children and the children with Down's syndrome were seen on a 
third occasion when the Test of Reception o f  Grammar was administered.
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Table 9.1. Means and ranges for chronological age and language ages of the five groups of subjects
AGE REN REW * 
Grammar
TROG BPVS
AUTISM
LOW
n=14
mean
range
10;08
(7;07-14)
6:06-6:11
(4;06-8;05)
4:00-4:05
(3;06-7;ll)
5;09
(4;03-8)
4:ll
(3:08-5:06)
AUTISM
HIGH
n=14
mean
range
13;00
(7:02-18:07)
7:00-7:05
(4:00-8:05+)
5:11-6:02
(3:06-8:05+)
7:03
(4:03-11+)
9:06
(6:04-15:11)
DOWN'S
n=17
mean
range
11:08
(8:05-18:02)
5:06-5:11
(3:06-8:05)
3:06-3:11
(-3:06-6:11)
4:11
(4;<X)-5:09)
5:05
(4:00-7:05)
4 YEARS 
n=17
mean
range
4;06
(4;02-4;ll)
6:06-6:11
(4:06-8:05)
4;ll-5;00
(3:06-8:00)
not
administers
4:11
(4:02-6:03)
5 YEARS 
_0=22____
mean
range
5:09
(5;02-6;02)
7:00-7:05
(5:00-8:05)
5:11-6:00
(4;00-8;00)
not
administeret
6;03
(4:11-9:00)
* For the Renfrew Action Picture Test the mean raw scores were calculated and converted to the age equivalent.
9.2.3.1 T a s k
The experimental task involved two experimenters. The first experimenter, who was 
familiar to the children, began by asking the child whether she/he would like to play a  game 
called "Which is the present?" The child was then introduced to the second experimenter 
and told that she was going to take turns with him/her. Then the first experimenter gave the 
following instruction: "Look I have three boxes of marbles, look this is a blue box full o f 
blue marbles and this is a green box full of green marbles and look the other is a red box 
full of red marbles. I am going to give a marble to each of my friends as a present. This is 
a box to put the marble in (selecting one of the four gift boxes). When I have decided what 
colour marble I will give to my friend I am going to put it in this box. When it is your turn 
sometimes I will ask you to close your eyes; on other occasions I will let you see what 
colour marble I choose as a present. Then I will ask you whether you know or you guess 
the colour of the marble I chose. W hen it is (second experimenter's [name]) turn, you need 
to watch very carefully because I will ask you whether she knows or she guesses the 
colour of the marble I chose. Now could you show me the box with the blue marbles ? 
Could you show me the box with the red marbles ? Could you show me the box with the 
green marbles ?" Provided that the child could correctly identify the three colours the 
experiment began.
There were two conditions, "own" and "other", and in each condition there were two trials 
(a "know" trial and a "guess" trial). In the "own" condition the child either watched the 
experimenter choose a marble and put it in one of the gift boxes "know" trial) or closed 
his/her eyes while the first experimenter choose a marble and put it in a gift box ("guess" 
trial). The child was then asked two questions: "Did you see me choosing the marble?" 
(control question) and "Do you know or do you guess what colour marble I chose?” 
(experimental question).
In the "other" condition each child w as reminded to watch carefully because the first 
experimenter was going to ask them whether the second experimenter knew or guessed the
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colour of the marble chosen. The second experimenter then either watched the first 
experimenter choose a marble and put it in one of the gift boxes ("know" trial) or closed her 
eyes while the experimenter choose a marble and put it in a  gift box ("guess" trial). The 
child was then asked two questions: "Did (the second experimenter's name) see me 
choosing the marble?" (control question); "Does (the second experimenter’s name) know 
or does she guess what colour marble I chose?" (experimental question). Table 9.2. 
summarizes the conditions, trials and questions in "Which is  the present?” task.
Table 9.2. "Which is the present?" task: C on ditions, trials and questions 
"OWN" CONDITION
TRIALS 
KNOW 
(subject sees)
QUESTIONS
"Did you see me choosing the marble?" (control question) 
"Do you know or do you guess w hat colour marble I chose?"
(experimental question)
GUESS
(subject does not see)
"Did you see me choosing the marble?" (control question) 
"Do you know or do you guess w hat colour marble I chose?"
(experimental question)
"OTHER" CONDITION
TRIALS
KNOW
QUESTIONS
"Did (the second experimenter's name) see me choosing the
(second experimenter marble?' (control question)
sees "Does (the second experimenter’s  name) know or does she 
guess what colour marble I chose?" (experimental question)
GUESS
(second experimenter 
does not see)
"Did (the second experimenter's name) see me choosing the
marble?" (control question)
"Does (the second experimenter's name) know or does she 
guess what colour marble I chose?" (experimental question)
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The order o f the conditions (own and other), trials within each condition (know and guess) 
and questions (either know before guess or vice versa) were counterbalanced. T he colour 
of the marble chosen was random.
9.2.4. S c o r in g
The children's responses were scored separately for the two conditions of own and other. 
In each condition the children were scored as pass if they answered both the know and the 
guess trials correctly (i.e. answered with know to the question on the know trial, and with 
guess on the guess trial). If they responded incorrectly on one trial or both trials they were 
scored as fail.
9.3. Results
All the children answered the control questions correctly, that is whether the child or the 
second experimenter had seen the experimenter hide the object. This suggests that all the 
children included in this study had no difficulty with perceptual perspective taking for 
themselves or for another person.
The first aim of experiment 2 was to compare autistic children's ability to differentiate 
"know" from "guess" on the basis of corresponding mental states (having specific 
knowledge about something or lacking that knowledge), to that of normal children and 
children with Down's syndrome. As in experiment 1, given that there are four possible 
ways o f responding to the experimental questions it might be thought that a child  could 
pass 25% o f the time by chance. However it is possible that if the child was not able to 
differentiate "know" and "guess" in reference to their own and to another person's mental 
state, he/she might use either a know bias (tending to respond with "know" on  both trials), 
or with a guess bias (tending to respond with "guess” on both trials). Thus, comparing 
actual performance with chance levels appears to be problematic. For this reason 
McNemar's tests were calculated to test whether the frequency of responding with "know” 
in the know trial was greater than responding with "know" in the "guess” trial. This is the
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same analysis as carried out in experiment 1. For a more detailed explanation of the 
reasoning behind the use o f this method see section 8.3.
For the five-year-old mainstream children the difference between the "know" responses in 
the know trial and "know" responses in the guess trial was significantly different for both 
conditions of "own" (p<.(XX)5) and "other" (pc.0005). Similarly, the high language level 
autistic children gave significantly different "know" responses to the know and guess trials 
for both conditions o f "own" (p<.05) and "other" (p<.()01). In contrast, the "know" 
responses of the low language level autistic children, the children with Down's syndrome 
and the four-year-old mainstream children were not significantly different between "know” 
and "guess" trials for either condition - "own" or "other" (see appendix 4). In sum, these 
findings suggest that the high language level autistic children are similar to the five-year-old 
mainstream children in their performance on the differentiation o f "know" from "guess". 
These two groups successfully differentiated "know" from "guess" when referring to their 
mental states and to the mental states of others.
In order to examine the effect o f  language level on the ability to differentiate the mental 
terms "know" and "guess" the performance of the autistic children was compared to that of 
the control groups o f normal children and children with Down's syndrome. Therefore, the 
data were analysed for the effect o f group and condition independently. Table 9.3. and 
figure 9.1. show the percentages of children in each group passing the "own" and "other" 
conditions. In the comparison o f  the five experimental groups there was a significant 
overall difference both in the "own" condition [x2 (df 4) = 12.70, p<.()13] and in the 
"other" condition [x2 (df4) = 19.46, p<.(X)l], Tukey-type pairwise comparisons were 
performed for both conditions.
In the "own" condition, in which the subject attributes "knowing" or "guessing" to 
himself/herself, the five-year-old mainstream school children were significantly better at 
differentiating "know” from "guess” than both the children with Down's Syndrome 
[q=4.194, p=.02] and the low language level autistic children |q=4.511, p=.01J. In
addition, the high language level autistic children were better (but not quite significantly so) 
than the low language level autistic children [q=3.742, p=.06].
In the "other" condition, in which the subject attributes "knowing" and "guessing" to the 
other person, the higher language level autistic children were better at differentiating 
"know" from "guess" than the children with Down's syndrome (q=6.008, p=.0002], the 
low language level autistic children [q=4.335, p=.01 ] and the four-year-old mainstream 
school children [q=4.466, p=.01J. In addition the five-year-old main stream school 
children were better (but not quite significantly so) than the children with Down's 
Syndrome [q=5.268, p=.(X)l] and the four-year-old mainstream school children [q=3.690,
p=.06].
These results appear to support previous research indicating that verbal mental age plays an 
important role in autistic children's performance on theory of mind tasks requiring the 
ability to attribute mental states to oneself and others (Prior et al., 1990; Baron-Cohen, 
1989a; Eisenmajer & Prior. 1991).
Table 9.3. Correct differentiation o f "know" and "guess" in the own and 
other conditions in percentages and the number o f children who passed and 
fa iled
AUTISM
(4 :1 1 )
AUTISM
( 9 :0 6 )
4 YEARS 5 YEARS DOW N'S
N 14 14 17 22 17
OWN
p ass
Tail
2
12
14.2 %
8
6
57.14 %
6
11
35.29 %
13
9
59.09 %
3
14
17.64 %
OTHER
p ass
fail
% pass___
4
10
28.57 %
11
3
78.57. %
5
12
__ 29.41 %
15
7
68.18 %
3
14
17 64 %
Figure 9.1. The percentages o f  correct differentiation o f  "know" and 
"guess" in the "own" and "other" conditions for the five groups: low 
language level autistic children, high language level autistic children, four- 
year-old and five-year-old normal children, and children with Down's
syndrom e.
"own"
concilium
low high years years syndrome 
lang. lang.
GROUPS
"other"
condition
autism autism four five down's 
low high years years syndrome 
lang. lang.
GROUPS
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The third aim of this experiment was to test the relationship between the autistic children's 
ability to attribute knowledge and different aspects of their language proficiency. To test 
whether different aspects of language competence were equally likely to predict the 
children's performance on the differentiation of "know" from "guess” for self and others, 
point biserial correlation coefficients were calculated between each of the language scores 
and the pass/fail dichotomy for the "own" and "other" conditions. For this analysis, the 
two autistic groups were combined into a single group, as were the two normal groups, so 
that the full range of language skills could be considered.
Table 9.4. Point Biserial correlations between the different language scores 
and the pass/fail dichotomy for own and other conditions for the groups of 
autistic, normal and Down's syndrome children. (TROG scores were not 
available for the normal children).
"OWN" Condition
A u tistic Normal Down's syndrome
Inform ation1 .345 .009 .207
Grammar1 .629*** .131 .510*
B PV S .604*** .396* .116
TROG .559** •• .200
"OTHER" Condition
A u tistic Normal Down's syndrome
Inform ation1 .144 .257 .047
Grammar1 .504** .214 .160
B PV S .447** .249 .075
TROG .475* - .182
*** p<0.002 **p<0.01 *p<0.05
1. Renfrew Action Picture Test
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As can be seen from table 9.4, the Renfrew Action Picture Test grammar scores, the BPVS 
scores and the TROG scores predicted the Autistic children's performance on the 
differentiation of "know" and "guess" for both conditions. However a very different 
picture emerged for the normal and Down's Syndrome groups. For the normal children a 
significant correlation was obtained between the BPVS scores and performance in the own 
condition, and for Down's Syndrome children significant correlation was obtained between 
the Renfrew Grammar scores and performance in the own condition. There were no 
significant correlations for either of these groups in the other condition.
In order to examine what the various language tests were measuring, further correlation 
coefficients were calculated between each of the language tests for the groups of autistic, 
Down's syndrome and normal children. These are shown in table 9.5.
Table 9.5. Pearson correlation coefficients between BPVS, TROG and 
RENFREW INFORMATION and GRAMMAR scores for the groups of 
autistic, normal and Down's syndrome children. (TROG scores were not 
available for the normal children).
A u tistic Normal D o w n 's
Inform .- Gram. .659*** .140 .232
B PV S - Gram. .638*** .423** .237
TROG - Gram. .663*** - .136
Inform.- BPVS .398* .222 .498*
TROG - BPVS .687*** - .667**
Inform.- TROG .430* •• .484*
*** p<0.002 ••pcO.OI •p<0.05
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The results show that for the autistic children all the correlations between the different 
language tests are highly significant. In contrast, for the normal children, the only 
significant correlation was between the Renfrew Grammar scores and BPVS scores. For 
the Down's syndrome children the Renfrew Information scores were significantly 
correlated with the BPVS scores and TROG scores and the BPVS scores were correlated 
with the TROG scores.
The fact that it was only in the autistic group that highly significant correlations were found 
between the different language scores and the pass/fail dichotomy for the "own" and 
"other" conditions, and between the different language tests seems to indicate that these 
language tests were perhaps measuring a general language competence for the autistic 
group but not for the normal children. The pattern of correlations among the Down's 
Syndrome children is more difficult to interpret. They seem to be intermediate between the 
autistic and the normal groups, but the analysis is based on a smaller sample size.
There was a significant difference in differentiating "know" and "guess" in both conditions 
of "own" and "other" between the high and low language ability autistic children. The two 
groups o f autistic children were set up on the basis of their performance on the British 
Picture Vocabulary Scale which tests the child's receptive vocabulary. Since the BPVS is 
highly correlated with the TROG and the two scores from the Renfrew test, any of these 
language scores can predict the autistic children’s performance on the differentiation of 
"know" from "guess".
Why were the language tests less successful at predicting the four-year-old and five-year- 
old normal children's performance on the task? We looked at two possible reasons for 
this. First, Hobson & Lee (1989) claimed that autistic adolescents were significantly worse 
on the emotional items than the non emotional items of the BPVS when compared to 
adolescents with learning difficulties. It is therefore possible that the emotional items in the 
language tests which were the predicting factor for the autistic children's performance on 
differentiating "know" and "guess" in the present study. Second, we investigated whether
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the high correlations found in the autistic group were due to the wider range of BPVS 
scores for this group.
9.3.1. Hobson - Lee Effect
To investigate whether the emotional items in the BPVS were the predicting factor for the 
autistic children's ability to differentiate "know" and "guess", partial correlations were 
calculated between the BPVS scores and pass/fail dichotomy for each condition of "own" 
and "other", partialling out the effect o f emotional items. Following Hobson and Lee, the 
following were taken to he emotional items: horror, delighted, disagreement, surprise, 
greeting, snarling, embracing and tranquil. The children received a score out o f eight, for 
this subset of items, and this was used as the partialling variable. The partial correlation 
coefficients between the BPVS scores and the pass/fail dichotomy were significant for the 
"own” condition [partial r=0.393, p=0.(K)l] and for the "other" condition [partial 
r=0.2871, p=0.01). Therefore we can conclude that it is not just the performance on the 
emotional items that predict autistic children's performance on the "know" /"guess" task.
Furthermore, to test whether we could replicate Hobson and Lee (1989) finding with these 
data, a retrospective analysis was carried out on the BPVS items, comparing performance 
on the emotional versus the non-emotional items of the autistic children with that of the 
mainstream school children. Hobson and Lee's (1989) method was used in this further 
analysis. Children were scored pass or fail on the eight emotional items (horror, delighted, 
disagreement, surprise, greeting, snarling, embracing and tranquil). For a contrasting set 
o f non-emotional items, usually the two items previous to each emotional item and two 
after it were scored as pass and fail. The scores were divided by 4 to give a maximum 
score o f 8 for the non-emotional items comparable to the score for the emotional items. 
Table 9.6. shows the means and adjusted means for the emotional and non-emotional items 
for the groups o f autistic and normal children.
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Table 9.6. Means for the emotional and non-emotional items passed for 
normal and autistic children, with means adjusted for the effects of  
covariates.
Emotional Non-emotional
(maximum &)_____ (maximum 8)
Autism mean 4.036 4.125
adjusted mean 3.743 3.920
Normal mean 3.000 3.378
adjusted mean 3.210 3.526
Table 9.7. A two way repeated measures analysis o f  variance table
SS DF MS F P
Group 6.754 1 6.754 6.107 .016
Error 69.678 63 1.106
emotion vs nonemotion 4.681 1 4.681 7.159 .009
Interaction 0.152 1 0.152 0.233 .631
41.196 63 0.654
Covariates
emotional attempted 5.506 1 5.506 4.979 .029
non-emotional attempted 9.290 1 9.290 8.400 .005
69.678 63 1 106
em. vs non-em. x em. attempted
3.208 1 3.208 4.906 .03
em. vs non-em. xnon-em. attempted
1.580 1 1.580 2.416 .0125
4 U S Ü — 63 0 6 5 4
A two way analysis o f variance was carried out, groups (normal versus autistic) by items 
(emotional versus non-emotional). with repeated measures on the second factor. The 
numbers of emotional and non-emotional items attempted varied between the subjects since 
the number of items attempted reflects the general level a child reaches on the test e.g. the
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number of words presented to a child before stopping the test. Therefore these two 
variables (the number of items attempted and the number of items passed) were entered into 
the analysis as covariates (see table 9.7). The main effect o f group was significant 
[F(l,63)=6.107, p=0.016] with the autistic children scoring significandy higher than the 
normals. The subset o f items examined emotional and non-emotional, thus seems to be 
easier for the autistic children, even though the total number of items passed has been 
partialed out. The main effect of items (emotional versus non-emotional) was also 
significant [F(l,63)=7.159, p=0.009] with the scores being higher on the non-emotional 
items.
The interaction between items (the emotional versus non-emotional passed) and group was 
not significant [F(l,63)=0.233, p=0.631]. Thus there was no evidence to support the 
hypothesis that the autistic children had particular difficulty with the emotional items. One 
of the covariates, the number of emotional words attempted, interacted with emotional 
versus non-emotional items passed [F(l,63)=4.9()6, p=0.030]. This means that the 
number of emotional items attempted was positively correlated with the difference between 
the emotional items passed and non-emotional items passed. This suggests that the more 
emotional items children attempt, the higher up they get on the test and the more likely they 
are to pass the emotional items. These results therefore failed to support Hobson & Lee's 
(1989) findings that autistic children have specific difficulty with the emotional items in the 
British Picture Vocabulary Scale.
9.3.2. Possible effect o f  the range o f  BPVS scores on the correlations
The higher correlations involving language scores for the autistic children might be 
explained by the normal children having a narrower range of language scores than the 
autistic children. A s can be seen from the first and third columns of figures in table 9.8 
ranges and SD's tend to be higher in the autistic group. This is also evident from a 
comparison of figures 9.2. and 9.3. which show the distributions o f BPVS scores in 
autistic and normal children respectively, according to whether they passed or failed on the
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know/guess task. To examine the possibility that it was the restricted range of scores in the 
normal sample which was responsible for the differences in the patterns o f correlations, the 
autism sample was trimmed by removing the children with the five highest BPVS scores. 
The effect o f  this on ranges and SD's is evident in the second coloumn of figures in table 
9.8., and its influence on the distributions can be seen in figure 9.4.
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Table 9.8. Maximum, m inim um , mean, range and standard deviations o f the 
language test scores for the normal, Down's syndrom e children and for the 
autistic children before and after the exclusion o f  five children who had 
very high scores on the BPVS.
AUTISM AUTISM NORM AL DOW N’S
high range low range SYNDROM E
(before trimming) (after trimming)
IN F O 1, m ax. 40 37 38 36
m in. 27 27 28.5 22
mean 34. 33.5 34.2 32.3
range 13 10 9.5 14
S D . 2.7 2.5 2.2 3.4
G R A M 1, m ax. 33 30 30 27
m in. 12 12 15 8
mean 22.2 20.7 23.2 14.5
range 21 18 15 19
S D . 6.1 5.6 4.2 4.7
B P V S2 m ax. IS; 11 8,-09 9;00 7;05
m in. 3;08 3;08 4;00 3;10
mean 7;()2 5;10 5;08 5;05
range 12;03 5;00 5;00 3;95
S D . 3.2 1.4 1.2 1.3
TROG2 m ax. moo 11 ;<K) . . 5;09
m in. 4,03 4;03 - 4;00
mean 6;06 5;11 - 4; 11
range 6;97 6;97 -- 1,09
S D . 2.1 1.7 - .5
1 Renfrew Information and grammar raw scores are reported
2 BPVS and TROG age equivalents are reported
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F igure  9.2. Plot o f  BPVS age equ iva lencies in m onths Tor au tism  group for
the conditions o f  "ow n" and " o th e r" .
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Figure 9.4. P lot o f BPVS age equivalencies in months for the autistic  
group for the conditions o f "own" and "other" after excluding five children  
with the highest BPVS scores
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Further point biserial correlation coefficients were calculated between each of the language 
tests and the pass/fail dichotomy for the own and other conditions for the autistic group 
using the trimmed range of BPVS scores. Table 9.9. shows the correlations between the 
language tests and pass/fail dichotomy for the own and other conditions for the autistic 
group with the low and high range, and for the normal and Down's syndrome children. As 
can be seen from the table 9.9. reducing the range of the BPVS scores for the autistic group 
had little effect on the correlations. The ranges and SD's o f language scores in the 
"trimmed" autism group are still not precisely the same as in the normal group, but it is 
quite clear from figure 9.4. that the worst effects of extreme values have been removed.
(To trim away more of the autistic group would mean that the point biserial correlations 
could not meaningfully be calculated.)
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Table 9.9. Point biserial correlations between the different language scores 
and the pass/fail dichotomy for the own and other conditions for the 
autistic, normal and Down's syndrome groups before and after excluding  
five children from the autistic sample who had very high scores on the
B P V S .
"OWN" Condition
Autism Autism Norm al Down's syndrom e
high range
(before trimming)
low range
(after trimming)
Inform ation1 .345 .207 .009 .207
Grammar1 .629*** .558** .131 .510*
BPVS .604*** .572** .396* .116
TROG .559** .504** • • .200
"OTHER" Condition
Autism Autism Norm al Down's Syndrom e
high range low range
Inform ation1 .144 .036 .257 .047
Grammar1 .504** .476* .214 .160
B PV S .447** .534** .249 .075
TROG .475* .499** • • .182
*** p<0.002 **p<0.01 *p<0.05
1 Renfrew Action Picture Test
Further correlation coefficients were calculated between the different language tests for the 
autistic group using the low range on the BPVS scores. Table 9.10. shows the correlations 
between the different language tests for the groups o f normal, Down's syndrome children 
and for the autistic group with the high and low range.
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Table 9.10. Pearson correlation coefficients between BPVS, TROG  and 
RENFREW  INFORMATION and GRAMMAR scores before and after 
excluding five children from the autistic sample who had very high scores 
on the BPVS.
Autism Autism Normal D o w n 's
high range low range
Inform.* Gram. .659*** .589** .140 .232
B P V S  - Gram. .638*** .529** .423** .237
TROG - Gram. .663*** .541** - .136
Inform .- BPVS .398* .237 .222 .498*
TROG - BPVS .687*** .367 - .667**
Inform .- TROG .430* .256 - .484*
*** p<().(K)2 **p<0.01 *p<0.05
After trimming the sample o f autistic children for very high BPVS scores, the correlations 
between Renfrew Information and BPVS. Renfrew information and TROG, and between 
BPVS and TROG scores ceased to be significant. Not surprisingly, the correlations 
involving BPVS scores show the biggest effect o f removing the extreme BPVS scores, but 
the effect on the correlations involving TROG scores is also quite marked - presumably 
because the standard deviations of the TROG scores (relative to the means) was quite 
markedly affected by the trimming procedure (see table 9.8.). The correlation showing the 
biggest change is that between TROG and BPVS scores. These effects are just what would 
be expected for reducing the range of scores. They contrast with the general lack of an 
effect of the trimming procedure on the point biserial correlations between the language 
scores and the performance on the experimental task. These latter correlations therefore do 
not seem to be due to a statistical artefact.
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Finally, to establish whether the "own" and "other" conditions differed in difficulty (the 
fourth aim of the experiment), McNemar's test (exact binominal procedure) was performed 
for each group to compare "own" and "other" conditions. None of these differences 
reached significance. Nor was the comparison significant when the data were pooled 
across groups.
9.4. D iscussion
The first aim of experiment 2 was to investigate whether autistic children can differentiate 
the cognitive mental terms "know" and "guess" in reference to their and to another person's 
mental states. In experiment 2 as in experiment 1, on each trial children were asked the 
experimental question before they found out the outcome (i.e. by looking into the gift box 
to see what colour marble was in it). This ensured that the child was basing his/her 
judgement (whether he/she or the second experimenter knew or guessed the colour of the 
marble the first experimenter had chosen) on either his/her or another person's mental state. 
Thus, a successful differentiation of these mental terms, in reference to corresponding 
mental states, can be taken as evidence that the child is able to understand the underlying 
mental states of having specific knowledge and lacking that knowledge.
The first sets of analysis (McNemar tests) showed that while high language level autistic 
children and five-year-old normal children were able to differentiate know and guess in 
reference to their own and another person's mental states, low language level autistic, four- 
year-old normal children and children with Down's syndrome were not. This finding 
suggests, first that mental state attribution is not absent completely in all autistic children, 
since the high language level autistic children successfully differentiated know and guess 
on the basis o f relevant mental states. Second, it seems that the children's ability to pass 
the present task was related to their language levels. This was supported with further 
analysis. In comparing the groups, high language level autistic children (with mean BPVS 
score age equivalent o f  9;06 and TROG age equivalent of 7;03) were superior (approaching
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significance p=.06) than low language level autistic children (with mean BPVS age 
equivalent of 4;11 and TROG age equivalent o f 5;()9) in their ability to differentiate know 
from guess in reference to their own mental states. In addition, the five-year-old normal 
children (BPVS age equivalent o f 6;03) were significantly better than the low language 
level autistic children and children with Down's syndrome (BPVS age equivalent of 5;05 
and TROG age equivalent of 4; 11 ) in their ability to differentiate know from guess in 
reference to their own mental states.
In reference to another person's mental states, the high language level autistic children were 
significantly better than the other three groups with lower language scores, namely low 
language level autistic children, children with Down's syndrome and four-year-old normal 
children, in their ability to differentiate know from guess. The five-year-old normal 
children were significantly better than 4-year-old normal children and children with Down's 
syndrome.
These findings indicate that autistic children are able to attribute knowledge (know) and the 
lack o f that knowledge (guess) to themselves and others, depending on their language 
level. These findings extend what is known from the previous studies in the literature. 
Pemer et al.’s  (1989) study was sim ilar to the present experiment in that the child was to 
judge either his/her or the second experimenter's knowledge on the basis of whether the 
person had visual access to the critical information. Pemer et al.'s results showed that 56 
% o f  the autistic children were able to attribute knowledge to themselves and 43 % to 
another person. As can be seen from table 9.11. the autistic children's language level in 
their study fell between the levels o f  the two autistic groups included in the present study, 
and one would therefore expect them to perform at the level between the two groups in the 
present study. The performance of the subjects in Pemer et al.'s study was intermediate 
between that of the two groups in the present study, although it was closer to that of the 
high language level autistic children in the present study. This could be explained by the 
different criteria adopted in the two studies for passing the own and other conditions. In 
Pem er et al.'s study, the child was scored as passed if he/she answered one knowing
question for self ("Do you know which object I put into the cup?") and one for the other 
person ("Does the [name of the second experimenter] know which thing I put into the 
cup?"). In the present experiment a child had to pass both know and guess questions in 
order to be scored as pass for self.
Table 9.11. A com parison o f the results o f  experim ent 2 with those of  
previous studies
Self Other
Pem eret al. (1989) (mcan=6;02 [3;<)1 -12;«8J) 56% 43%
Leslie & Frith (1988) (mean=7;02 [4;«5-12;()8]) nol applicable 61%
Experiment 2 (mean=4;l 1 [3;08-5;06]) 14.2% 28.57%
(mean=9;06 [6;04-15;l 1]) 57.14% 78.57%
In one o f the tasks in Leslie and Frith's (1988) study, the child and the second 
experimenter watched the first experimenter hide a red counter in one of three locations and 
then the second experimenter left the room. In the absence of the second experimenter the 
child was asked to hide a  second red counter in a different location. The child was then 
asked whether the second experimenter knew the location o f the second counter that the 
child had just hidden, and where the second experimenter would look for the counter when 
she came back. 61% of the autistic children were able to answer the knowing question, but 
only 44% were able to answer both the knowing and the prediction questions. Although 
Leslie and Frith (1988) adopted a strict criterion in which the child had to answer both 
questions correctly to be scored as pass for knowledge attribution, in table 9.11. only the 
percentage o f children who passed the knowing question is included. Since it seems likely 
that the prediction question is harder than the knowing question. The prediction question 
requires a child to predict the person's behaviour on the basis of that person's knowledge 
state rather than directly testing the child's ability to understand whether the person has 
specific knowledge.
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In considering only the pass rate for the knowing question in Leslie and Frith's (1988) 
study (61% ), the autistic children's performance seems to be comparable to the results of 
the present study. In Leslie & Frith's study the autistic children had a mean language level 
of 7;02 years and in experiment 2 the high language level autistic children had a mean 
language level o f 9;06, and 61 % and 78.5 % of children were able to make knowledge 
attribution in their and in the present study respectively (see table 9.11.).
Furthermore, correlations between the children's ability to differentiate "know" from 
"guess" in reference to their and to another person's mental states, and their performance 
on the different language tests was highly significant for the autistic children but not for the 
normal children and the children with Down's syndrome. This difference between the 
groups could not be explained as a statistical artifact such as a restriction in the range of 
scores in the normal group, since when the range in the autistic group was reduced, the 
picture was largely unchanged. In addition, following Hobson & Lee's (1989) finding that 
autistic adolescents have specific difficulties on the emotional items of the BPVS, further 
correlations were calculated by partialling out the effect of the emotional items. The 
relationship between the children's performance on both conditions of "own" and "other" 
in the present experiment and their BPVS scores remained to be significant Thus, it 
appears that the relation between the autistic children's language level and their performance 
on the task is strong and cannot be explained by other factors.
This finding supports and strengthens the previous studies which suggested that the higher 
the autistic child's verbal mental age the more likely that she/he will succeed on theory of 
mind task (e.g. Leslie & Frith, 1988; Baron-Cohen, 1989a; Eisenmajer & Prior, 1991; 
Prior, Dahlstrom &  Squires, 1990).
In experiment 2 when the children were asked to judge their own knowledge with "Do you 
know or do you guess what colour marble I chose?" all they need to do was to check their 
mental representation of the colour of the marble in the gift box (see figure 9.5), which 
does not requite metarepresentational skills. If the child saw what colour marble the
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experimenter choose and put in the gift box, he/she should have a representation o f the 
colour of the marble in the gift box and, by referring to this representation, the child could 
give the correct answer which is HI know". If the child did not see the experimenter chose 
a marble, the child could not have formed a representation of the colour of the marble in the 
gift box and, on the absence of this knowledge, he/she should give the correct answer "I 
guess".
In contrast, when children were asked to  judge the second experimenter's knowledge with 
"Does she know or does she guess w hat colour marble I chose?", they needed to refer to 
other person's mental state. This requires metarepresentational skills (see figure 9.6).
High language level autistic and five-year-old normal children were able to answer these 
questions which indicates that they had the required metarepresentational skills, that is the 
ability to represent someone else's representation.
The findings o f experiment 2 have important implications for the theory o f mind account of 
autism which suggests that autistic children lack these metarepresentational skills. In this 
experiment, while low language level autistic children were unable to refer to their own or 
to another person's mental states, high language level autistic children were able to do so. 
Furthermore, the strong relation between their performance and their language levels seems 
strongly to suggest that the metarepresentational deficit is not a primary one, and also not 
specific to autism since the children with Down's syndrome performed at a similar level to 
the low language level autistic children. This finding conflicts with the findings of 
previous studies where children with Down's syndrome have been shown to be able to 
attribute mental states to others (Baron-Cohen et. al., 1985 and 1986). For instance, in 
Baron-Cohen et. al.'s (1985) study, 85%  of the Down's syndrome control group, who had 
a mean verbal mental age on the BPVS o f 2;11 (range 1;08-4;00), passed the false belief 
task which required metarepresentational skills. It seems difficult to explain the high 
performance of the children with Down's syndrome in their study, since 
metarepresentational skills are normally acquired around the age of four. Similarly, in 
Baron-Cohen (1989a) the children with Down's syndrome had mean verbal MA of 4;07,
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and 60% of them were able to make second order belief attribution which has been shown 
to developed around the age o f 7 in normal children. Somewhat differently, in Baron- 
Cohen et. al.'s (1986) study the Down's syndrome children with a mean BPVS verbal 
mental age of 2;09 (range 1 ;08-4;00), performed less well than normal 4;05 year-old 
children on a task testing their ability to attribute a false belief to a story character. This 
result is consistent with their verbal MA level. However, returning to the performance of 
the children with Down's syndrome in the present experiment (BPVS age equivalent 4;00 
to 7;05), their performance on the task was comparable to that of the four-year-old normal 
children who also failed to pass the task.
Finally, the results o f experiment 2 have indicated that children’s ability to differentiate 
"know" and "guess" in reference to their own mental states was similar to their 
differentiation of these mental terms in reference to another person's mental states (for all 
five groups included in this experiment). Following the results of experiment 1, children 
who are able to attribute mental states to another person should be able to attribute mental 
states to themselves, since it seems that referring to one's own mental states is easier since 
it does not require metarepresentational skill (see figure 9.5). This could explain the 
absence of any difference in the high language level autistic and five-year-old normal 
children's performance in the own and other conditions. However, for the four-year-old 
normal children, children with Down's syndrome and the low language level autistic 
children, one might expect them to be able to refer to their own mental states since this does 
not seem to require metarepresentational skills. In other words even if they have not 
reached the stage of being able to attribute mental slates to others (which requires 
metarepresentational skills according to Pemer, 1991) they should be able to refer to their 
own mental states.
It is clear that this task, both the own and the other conditions, was hard for the four-year- 
old normal children but it was within the five-year-old children's ability range. There may 
be a number of reasons for this. First, the question form m ay have made the task harder 
for the younger children. For instance, Pratt and Bryant (1990) demonstrated that double­
157
barrelled questions are harder than single-barrelled questions. In experiment 2 the 
experimental questions were double barrelled e.g. "Do you know or do you guess what 
colour marble I chose?". Therefore in experiment 3 single-barrelled experimental questions 
were used.
Another possible explanation could be that adopting a strict criterion in which the child had 
to pass both know and guess questions influenced the results. In the next experiment each 
experimental question was repeated twice and the data analysed in two ways, according to 
the strict criterion and by considering each of the correct responses for each experimental 
question.
Finally, a num ber of studies investigating children's understanding of the difference 
between "know" and "guess" as mental terms (e.g.Johnson & Wellman, 1980; Miscione et 
al., 1978 and Moore et al., 1989) have considered that "know" implies the existence of 
specific knowledge while "guess" implies the lack o f that specific knowledge. In other 
words, while "know" presumes the truth, "guess" can either be true or false. Although it 
was ensured that children answered the experimental questions before they found out about 
the outcome (i.e. the colour of the marble in the gift box), it is possible that "guess" was 
not the m ost appropriate word to refer to the mental state of lacking a specific knowledge. 
Therefore, in experiment 4 children were made to refer to their own and to another person's 
mental states using "know" and "does not know" questions. Perner (1991) argued that the 
best way to test the child's understanding of knowledge as a mental state is the lucky guess 
task. In this task a child is asked to find a hidden object even if she/he did not have visual 
access to the hiding of that ob ject and is asked whether she/he knew or guessed that the 
object was in that specific location. This method ensures that the child basis her/his 
judgment on his/her mental state rather than on the outcome. However, it seems that 
asking the experimental question before letting the child find out about the outcome, is a 
perfectly adequate way to ensure that the child is basing her/his judgement on the relevant 
mental state rather than on the outcome.
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F igure 9.5. The rep re se n ta tio n a l skills req u ired  in the  own condition  of
experim en t 2.
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F igure 9.6. The representational sk ills  req u ired  in  the o th e r  condition  o f
experim en t 2.
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Experimenter hides a blue 
marble in the gift box.
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10.1. Introduction
The results of experiment 2 indicated that autistic children are able to attribute the mental 
state of knowledge to themselves and to others. This finding suggests that not all autistic 
children have a metarepresentational deficit, which contradicts the theory of mind account 
of autism. In order to examine whether the results of experiment 2 were task specific, 
another paradigm was designed. Thus, the first aim of experiment 3 was to replicate the 
findings of experiment 2 using a different task. The present task differed from the previous 
one in three ways. First, a simpler single-barrelled experimental question was used to test 
whether this would result in an improvement in the children's ability to differentiate 
"know" and "guess". Second, the main experimenter took the part o f the "other" person to 
overcome the practical difficulty of finding a second experimenter. Third, each test 
question was repeated twice to enable the use of a 2x2 analysis of variance to examine 
condition effects ("own" versus "other" responses), group effects and the interaction 
effects. In addition a practice trial was included to ensure that children understood the task.
10.2. Method
10.2.1. S u b je c ts
Five groups of children were included in this experiment: two groups of autistic children, 
one of children with low language scores on the British Picture Vocabulary Scale (N=13) 
and one o f children with higher language scores (N=12); two groups of normal children, 
four-year-olds (N=25) and five-year-olds (N=18) and one group of children with Down's 
syndrome (N=17).
Apart from one child with autism and one child with Down's Syndrome, all the children 
had previously participated in experiment 2. Since the time lag was less than three months 
between the two experiments, the language tests (British Picture Vocabulary Scale, 
Renfrew Action Picture Test and Test of Reception o f Grammar) were not repeated. The 
inclusion criteria for experiment 3 were the same as experiment 2. Autistic children and
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children with Down's syndrome who had language levels o f four years and above on two 
of the three language tests were included in experiment 3. Then autistic children were 
divided into two groups on the basis of their BPVS scores. The autistic children with 
BPVS scores between 4;G6 and 5;06 were assigned to the low language level group, and 
the autistic children with BPVS scores above 5;06 were assigned to the low language level 
group. Table 10.1. shows the details o f the five groups.
10.2.2. M ateria l
The materials consisted o f a wooden box (16x11x7cm), a bag made of red opaque material 
and five small plastic animals (cow, duck, pig, horse, sheep) (see appendix 5.).
10.2.3. Procedure
The children were seen individually outside their classrooms in a quiet area of their school. 
Each child was asked whether she/he would like to play an animal hiding game. The task 
began by telling the child she/he was going to take turns with the experimenter to hide an 
animal in the box. The child was then shown all the animals and asked to name each 
animal to check that she/he could identify them. Then the child was told that, when it was 
his/her turn, the experimenter would close her eyes and the child would choose one animal 
from the bag and hide it in the box and tell the researcher to open her eyes. When it was 
the experimenter's turn she would choose one animal from the bag and hide it in the box 
while the child closed his/her eyes.
All the children were given a practice trial to ensure that they understood the procedure and 
could cope with the structure of the question. In the practice trial the experimenter always 
closed her eyes while the child choose an animal from the bag. Then, the child was asked 
"Who chose the animal, you or me ?" and "Who closed their eyes, you or me?" Provided 
that the child passed the practice trial she or he was told that they would start the game.
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Table 10.1. Means and ranges of chronological ages and the language scores of children 
with autism and children with Down's Syndrome on BPVS, RENFREW and TROG.
Chronologies
A G E
REN FREW * TROG BPVS
AUTISM
LOW
n=12
mean
range
10;06 
(6;08-14)
6;06-6;ll
(6;00-7;ll)
4;00-4;05
(3;06-7;ll)
5;10
(4;06-9;(K))
5 )^1
(4;06-5;06)
AUTISM
HIGH
n=13
mean
range
13;04
(7;04-19;02)
7;00-7;05
(5;00-8;05+)
5;06-5;ll
(3;06-8;05+)
7;05
(4;03-ll+)
9;06
(6;04-15;ll)
DOW N'S
n=17
mean
range
11;07
(8;05-18;02)
5;09-6;02
(3;06-8;05)
3;06-3;ll
(-3;06-6;ll)
4;10
(4;00-5;03)
5;03
(4;00-7;02)
4 YEARS 
n=25
mean
range
4;04
(3;10-4;09)
5 YEARS 
n=18
mean
range
5;00
(4;10-5;03)
♦ For Renfrew Action Picture Test the mean raw scores were calculated and the mean raw score 
converted to the age equivalent
The children were given four trials in which either the experimenter (2 trials) or the child (2 
trials) was the hider, i.e. either the experimenter or the child knew which animal was in the 
box while the other person guessed which animal was in the box. After an animal had been 
hidden the child was asked "Who knows which animal is in the box, you or me?" and 
"Who guesses which animal is in the box, you or me?" To avoid problems caused by 
children with personal pronoun reversal (there were three such children in the autistic 
sample) the experimenter either pointed to the child and said "you", or pointed at herself 
and said "me", this encouraged children to point to the person while they said "you" or 
"me".
The order o f the trials (child hides or the experimenter hides), questions (who knows-who 
guesses), and the order of person (you or me) was counterbalanced across the groups. 
Table 10.2. shows one possible order of the trials and the questions.
T able  10.2. Anim al hiding task : tria ls  and  questions.
TRIALS QUESTIONS
Practice "Who chose the animal, you or me ?"
"Who closed their eyes, you or me?"
1. Child hides
"Who knows which animal is in the box, you or me ?" (self-knows) 
"Who guesses which animal is in the box, you or me ?" (other-guesses)
2. Experimenter hides
"Who knows which animal is in the box, you or me ?" (other-knows) 
"Who guesses which animal is in the box, you or me ?" (self-guesses)
3. Child hides
"Who knows which animal is in the box, you or me ?" (self-knows) 
"Who guesses which animal is in the box, you or me ?" (other-guesses)
4. Experimenter hides
"Who knows which animal is in the box, you or me ?” (other-knows) 
"Who guesses which animal is in the box, you or me ?" (self-guesses)
10.2.3. S c o r in g
Each correct answer to each of the eight experimental questions was given a score o f 1. 
The correct answers for the trials shown in Table 10.2 were: self knows (me trials 1 and 3; 
know questions); self guesses (me trials 2 and 4; guess questions); other knows (you trials 
2 and 4; know questions); other guesses (you trials 1 and 3; guess questions).
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10.3. Results
All the children passed the practice trial indicating that they understood the task and they 
had no difficulty with the question structure particularly the phrase "you" o r "me". Two 
different types of analysis were carried out.
In order to test whether the results o f experiment 2 were replicable, scores of self knows, 
self guesses, other knows and other guesses were combined to give a  score for "own" 
(whether they could differentiate know from guess when referring to their own mental 
states) and a score for "other" (whether they could differentiate know from guess when 
referring to another person's mental states). The following criteria were used. If a child 
passed the questions of self knows and self guesses on both relevant trials she/he was 
given the score of 1; if she/he failed both questions o f self knows and self guesses she/he 
was given the score o f 0; if a child passed both self knows and only one o f the self 
guesses questions or if a child passed both of the self guesses and only one o f the self 
knows questions he/she was given the score o f 0 for own. Identical criteria applied to the 
"other" responses.
The data were analysed for the effect o f  group and condition independently. When the five 
experimental groups were compared there was a significant overall difference for "own” 
1^2(4)-13_369, p=.01] and for "other" responses [%2(4)= 15.227, p=.()04]. Table 10.3. 
and Figure 10.1. show the numbers and percentages o f children in each group passing the 
"own" and "other" responses. Tukey-type pairwise comparisons were performed for both 
"own" and "other" responses.
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Table 10.3. Number o f children, and percentage o f  each group, who 
correctly differentiated "know" and "guess" in th e  own and other 
co n d itio n s.
A U TISM
low lang. 
level
A U TISM  
high lang. 
level
4 YEARS 5  YEARS D O W N ’S
N 12 13 25 18 17
OW N
p a s s 5 11 8 9 4
fail 7 2 17 9 13
41.66% 84.61 % 32% 50 % 23.52 %
O T H ER
p a s s 3 9 5 10 3
fa il 9 4 2« 8 14
%  pass 22.2 :______ «>,23 %___ 2»  % 22.22 %  . _17,64..%—
The post hoc tests showed that for "own" responses, in which the subject attributes 
"knowing" and "guessing" to herself/himself, the high language level autistic children were 
significantly better at differentiating "know" from "guess" than both the children with 
Down's syndrome [q=6.019, p=.()002] and the four-year-old mainstream school children 
[q=5.437, p=.(K)l]. No other pairwise differences were significant.
A similar pattern o f results was obtained for "other" responses, in which the subject 
attributes "knowing" and "guessing" to another person. The high language level autistic 
children were significantly better at differentiating "know" from "guess" than both the 
children with Down's syndrome [q-4.620, p=.(H)9) and the four-year-old mainstream 
school children (q=4.612, p=.(K)9]. No other pairwise differences were significant.
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Figure 10.1. The percentage o f correct difTerentiation o f "know" and  
"guess" for the own and other responses for five groups: low language  
level autistic children, high language level autistic children, four-year-old  
and five-year-old normal children, and children with Down's syndrom e.
"other"
condition
low high years years syndrome 
lang. lang.
GROUPS
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10.3.2. Comparison of performance for "own" and "other" responses with
chance  levels
There were four questions which referred to the child's own mental state and four 
questions which referred to the other person's mental state. Since there was a  forced 
choice answer of "me" or "you", by chance the children would pass two o f the four 
experimental questions, when referring to self and similarly two questions when referring 
to the other person. In addition, if the child had a response bias such as to give "me" 
answers throughout the task he/she would pass all the questions which referred to self, and 
if the child had a response bias to give "you" answers throughout the task he/she would 
pass all the questions which referred to the other. Inspection o f the data showed that none 
o f the children had such biases in this experiment. However there were two other bias 
types which some children adopted. One bias type was to say the hider "knows" which 
animal is in the box, and the hider "guesses" which animal is in the box (type 1); and the 
other was to say that the person who was not the hider "knows" and "guesses" (type 2) 
Table 10.4 shows the number o f children in each group who demonstrated these biases. 
With a bias type 1, a child would get know questions right, and with bias type 2, a child 
would get the guess questions right. Thus the child who showed one of these biases 
would pass 2 o f the 4 questions referring to self, and 2 of the 4 questions referring to the 
other person . This is the same as passing these self and other reference questions by 
chance.
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Table 10.4. The number of children who showed two the types o f response 
bias in each group
TYPE 1 BIAS TYPE 2 BIAS
GROUP PERSON WHO IS THE HIDER PERSON WHO IS NOT THE HIDER
"knows" and "guesses" "knows” and "guesses"
4-year-olds 4 3
5-year-olds 1 3
Down's syndrome 5 3
High language level autistic 0 1
Low language level autistic 0 0
To investigate whether the children's performance exceeded chance levels, paired t tests 
were carried out for each group and for each response type (in reference to self and in 
reference to another person) separately, using the number of correct responses versus the 
number o f  correct answers expected by chance (2).
When referring to the child's own mental state, the high language level autistic children 
[t(12)=8.12, p<.0005] performed better than chance, as did the children with Down's 
syndrome (t (16)=2.04, p<.()5], the four-year-old normal children [t (24)=2.97, p<.007] 
and the five-year-old normal children [t (17)=5.35, p<.(XK)5]. The performance of the low 
language level autistic children approached significance [t (11)=2.01, p<.06]. This 
indicates that except for the low language level autistic children, all the children were able to 
attribute knowing and guessing to themselves better than chance level.
When referring to another person's mental states, the high language level autistic children 
performed better than chance level ft (12)=4.18, pc.OOl], as did the four-year-old normal 
children [t (24)=3.05, p<.CK)5] and the five-year-old normal children [t (17)=5.5, pc.0005] 
This indicates that those children were able to attribute knowing and guessing to another 
person better than chance level.
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To compare whether the passing rate for the "own" and "other" responses differed 
McNemar's tests (exact binominal procedure) were performed for each group. None of 
these comparisons reached significance. Nor was the comparison significant when the data 
were pooled across the groups. This result is also consistent with the finding from the 
experiment 2 that there is no evidence to support the view that differentiating "know" from 
"guess" when referring to the child's own mental states is easier than when referring to 
another person's mental states.
10.3.3. Analysis of variance
It should be noted that the strict criteria for passing "own" and "other” questions may 
underestimate the children's performance since those who failed only one of the two know 
or one o f the two guess questions for either own or other were given a score o f 0  for the 
own or other responses respectively. For instance, a child who passed both the self knows 
questions, but only one o f the self guesses questions, was given a score o f 0  for own 
responses.
For a more fine-grained analysis, scores for self knows, and self guesses were summed. 
This would give the total score o f  "own" responses ranging from 0  to 4. Similarly the 
scores of other knows and other guesses were summed to give the total score o f "other" 
responses ranging from 0  to 4. Table 10.5. shows the mean scores o f  "own" and "other" 
responses calculated in this way for five groups of children.
A two-way analysis o f variance, groups x own versus other with repeated measures on the 
second factor, was performed. This showed that there was a significant difference between 
the groups [F(4,80)=5.039, p=.(X)lJ, but that the difference between the response types of 
"own" and'other" was not significant [F( 1,80)= 1.79, p=.185J. The interaction was also 
non-significant [F(4,80)=.301, p=.877]. These results confirm that there is no difference 
in the children's ability to differentiate "know" from "guess" with reference to their own 
mental states and to another person's mental states.
172
Table 10.5. Mean scores for the own and other responses for five groups 
o f children (maximum score is 4).
AU TISM
low lang, 
level
AU TISM
high lang, 
level
4 YEARS 5 YEARS D O W N 'S
N 12 13 25 18 17
OW N 2.75 3.69 2.64 3.16 2.52
O T H ER 2.41 3.38 2.56 3.22 2.29
g ro u p
means
2.58 3.53 2.6 3.19 2.40
Tukey post hoc tests showed that the high language level autistic children were significantly 
better at differentiating "knowing" from "guessing” with respect to their own and to 
another's mental states than the low language level autistic children [q=4.03, p=.04], the 
four-year-old mainstream children [q=4.62, p=.01] and the children with Down's 
syndrome [q=5.21, p=.004]. In addition the five-year-old mainstream children were better 
than the children with Down's syndrome [q=3.97, p=.()4] at this differentiation. These 
results support the previous findings that higher verbal mental age has an important role in 
determining children's performance on theory mind type of tasks which require the ability 
to attribute mental states to oneself and others.
Interestingly, giving each child a score between 0  and 4  based on the number of questions 
correctly answered, seems to be more sensitive to subtle differences between the 
performances of the different groups.
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10.4. D iscussion
The main aim of experiment 3 was to replicate the results o f experiment 2 by using a 
different task. The main difference was that in experiment 3. the children were asked 
single-barrelled questions which it has been suggested are easier than double-barrelled 
questions (Pratt and Bryant. 1990). Thus, it was predicted that overall all the groups in 
this experiment might perform better than in experiment 2. Although the children did seem 
to find the question type easier in experiment 3 than in experiment 2 it was not possible to 
examine this statistically because of other differences in procedure between the two 
experiments, and because some but not all of the subjects took part in both experiments.
Group comparisons showed that the high language level autistic children were significantly 
better than the low language level autistic children, the children with Down's syndrome and 
the four-years-old normal children in the ability to attribute knowing and guessing to 
themselves and to another person. In addition the five-year-old normal children were 
significantly better than the children with Down's syndrome in their ability to attribute 
knowing and guessing to themselves and to another person. These groups differences are 
similar to the findings of experiment 2, and support the conclusion that the child's verbal 
abilities are an important determinant of their performance on theory of mind type tasks. 
This experiment also showed that autistic children, depending on their verbal MAs are able 
to attribute mental states to themselves and to another person. Although in this experiment 
the relations between the language scores and the children's performance on the task have 
not been calculated, the differences between the high and low language level autistic 
children, between the high language level autistic children and the children with Down's 
syndrome, between the high language level autistic children and the four-year-old normal 
children, between the five-year-old normal children and the children with Down's 
syndrome support the findings of experiment 2 that children's language ability appears to 
be important factor for their performance on tasks requiring mental state attribution.
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Thus overall, the results of this experiment support the results of experiment 2 and suggest 
that the findings are not confined to a particular task.
However there appear to be some problems with the task used in experiment 3. One of the 
possible shortcomings of this study was giving both questions of "who knows" and "who 
guesses" on each trial. This may have led children to give the opposite answer to the 
second questions without the child realising that this was necessarily the correct answer. 
For instance, if  a child answered the "who knows" question with "me" he/she may answer 
the second question "who guesses" with "you". This was remedied in the next experiment 
when the children were asked only one question per trial.
Furthermore, the question type in experiment 3 may have required higher level 
representational skills. For instance, in order to answer the experimental question "Who 
knows which animal is in the box you or me?" the child needs to choose the person who 
had the relevant knowledge (has the relevant mental stale) which might have required a 
comparison of his/her mental state with that of the experimenter's mental state (see figure 
10.2). Thus, in both cases where the correct answer referred either to the child's own 
mental state (e.g. child knows) or the experimenter's mental state (e.g. experimenter 
knows), the child needed to have metarepresentational skills to pass the task. Therefore the 
questions referring to the child's own mental states should be as difficult as the questions 
referring to the experimenter's mental states. In other words one would not expect a 
difference between own and other responses. The results confirmed this, showing that the 
children's ability to refer to their own mental states did not differ from their ability to refer 
to another person's mental states.
A second shortcoming of this task was that the child may answer the experimental 
questions not on the basis of her/his or the experimenter's mental state but by associating 
knowing with hiding and guessing with not hiding. For instance, in a  trial where the child 
chose one animal from the hag and hid it in the box, the child could answer the "who 
knows" question correctly simply by basing his/her answer on who physically hid the
175
animal rather than basing his/her judgement on that person’s mental state which is formed 
because hider has seen the action and (so the hider knows). It not possible to test whether 
the children did base their answers on the hiding activity, or on the person's mental state. 
Thus, in experiment 4 a second experimenter acted as the other person and either the child 
or the second experimenter watched the first experimenter hide a coin in one of two boxes.
Figure 10.2. Representational skills required in experiment 3. 
Child Hides
(self knows]
[o ther guesses]
The child chases an 
animal from the hag 
and hides it in the box.
Experimenter asks
"Who knows which animal is in the box you or me?"
"Who guesses which animal is in the box you or me?"
ch ild  representing
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Experimenter
Hides
[other knows]
(seir guesses)
The experimenter choses an 
animal from the bag and 
hides it in the box.
Experimenter asks
"Who knows which animal is i
"Who guesses which aimal is ii
i the box you or me?" 
the box you or me?"
child representing
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11. C H A PT ER  ELEVEN
Experiment 4.
Is it more difficult for autistic and normal children to refer to one's mental 
state if  th e  experimental question involves a mental term?
178
11.1. Introduction
The previous experiments were designed to investigate whether autistic children can 
differentiate "know" and "guess" when referring to their own and to other people's mental 
states. It was argued that children's ability to differentiate these mental terms can be taken 
as a marker of their ability to differentiate the related mental states of "knowing" and 
"guessing". In the previous experiments understanding of the difference between "know" 
and "guess" was tested in tasks in which if a person had visual access to a hidden object 
that person was acknowledged as the person who knew where or what the object was. If 
the person did not have visual access to the hidden object that person was acknowledged as 
the person who must guess where or what the object was. As was argued in the discussion 
section o f experiment 2 (see 9.4), while "know" presumes the truth, "guess" can either be 
true or false. In other words, while "know" implies the existence of specific knowledge 
and leads to correct performance, "guess" implies a lack of specific knowledge, but still 
could lead to correct performance. Although in the previous experiments the children were 
asked the experimental questions before they found out the outcome to ensure that they 
based their judgements either on their own or on another person’s mental state, it is 
possible that "guess" is not the most appropriate way to refer to the mental state of lacking 
specific knowledge. Therefore, in experiment 4 "guess" was replaced with "does not 
know”. Thus the comparison of mental states was between "knowing" and "not 
knowing”.
The first aim of experiment 4 was to investigate whether the children's understanding of the 
mental states of "knowing" and "not knowing" is easier than naming these mental states 
with mental terms such as "know" or "does not know". In other words, the first aim of 
this experiment was to test whether normal and autistic children's ability to refer to their 
own and to another person's mental state of having or lacking specific knowledge is more 
difficult when the experimental question involves the cognitive mental term "know". Two 
tasks were designed to test this question.
In both tasks the first experimenter hid a coin in one of the two boxes while either the 
subject or the second experimenter watched her. Thus, in both tasks a  person's knowledge 
depended on whether or not that person had visual access to the hiding o f a coin. In the 
"know" task the experimental question involved the use of a cognitive mental term "know" 
in order to elicit the existence of specific knowledge "Who really knows where the coin is, 
you or Allan [name of the second experimenter]?", and "does not know” to elicit the 
absence o f specific knowledge "Who does not really know where the coin is, you or 
Allan?". In the "help" task another character, a teddy bear was introduced. The teddy who 
liked collecting coins, did not have visual access to the hiding o f a coin throughout the 
trials. In the "help" task "know" replaced with "help" in the experimental question "Who 
could really help teddy find the coin, you or Allan?" or "Who could not really help teddy 
find the coin, you or Allan?".
The second aim of experiment 4 was to compare the performance of autistic children with 
that of normal children on these tasks. In experiments 2 and 3 a group o f children with 
Down's syndrome was included in order to control for the effect of general mental ability 
on the children's performance on the experimental tasks. In the literature, studies have 
demonstrated that children with Down’s syndrome, matched for verbal MAs with autistic 
children, are able to attribute mental states to others while the autistic children fail to do so 
(e.g. Baron-Cohen e t al., 1985 and 1986). This led researchers to conclude that the theory 
of mind impairment is independent o f mental handicap and specific to autism. However, in 
experiment 2 and 3 the performance of the low language level autistic children, the children 
with Down's syndrome and the four-year-old children were similar. Therefore, in 
experiment 4, children with Down's syndrome were not included as controls.
The third aim of experiment 4 was to compare the attribution o f mental states to self and to 
others. Finally, the results of experiment 2 showed that autistic children's language level 
was a strong predictor of their performance on the experimental task which required mental 
state attribution. Thus the final aim of experiment 4, was to investigate whether the
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children's performance on these two tasks was related their nonverbal ability, to their 
performance on a classic false belief task as well as to their verbal ability.
The task in this experiment differed from that used in experiment 3 in two ways: first, on 
each trial only one experimental question was asked; second, while the first experimenter 
hid a coin either the child or the second experimenter watched, rather than either the child or 
the experimenter hiding the object (the difference between the knowledge and non­
knowledge depended on visual access rather than the hiding action itself).
11.2. Method
11.2.1. S u b je c ts
Four groups of children were included in this study: two groups o f autistic children, one o f 
children with low language scores on the British Picture Vocabulary Scale (N=9) and one 
of children with higher language scores (N=13); two groups o f normal children, four-year- 
olds (N=13) and five-year-olds (N=20).
The inclusion criteria for this experiment were as follows.
Autistic children with language levels below four years on the British Picture Vocabulary 
Scale (Dunn, Whetton, and Pintilie, 1982) and on the Test of Reception o f Grammar 
(Bishop, 1982) were excluded from this study. Then the autistic children were divided into 
two groups on the basis of their BPVS scores. The autistic children with BPVS scores 
between 4;00 and 6;02 were assigned to the low language level group, and the autistic 
children with BPVS scores above 6;02 were assigned to the high language level group.
For the low language level control group, four-year-old normal children with language 
levels above four years on both the BPVS and TROG, and below five years five months 
on the BPVS were selected. For the high language level control group, five-year-old
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normal children with language levels above five years on both the BPVS and TROG were 
selected.
For the control groups, 27 four-year-old reception class children and 26 five-year-old first 
year children were sampled. Twelve o f the four-year-olds and, six of the five-year-olds 
failed to meet the inclusion criteria and these children were excluded from the study. 
Further 2 autistic children and 2 four-year-old normal children who failed the negative 
control question for any tasks (see table 11.2. and table 11.3.) were excluded from the 
study. Furthermore all the children were given RAVEN’S progressive matrices (Raven, 
Court and Raven, 1990) to assess a non-verbal ability. Table 11.1. gives the mean 
chronological ages, language MAs and non verbal ability scores the four groups of 
children.
Table 11.1. Means and ranges o f  chronological age, verbal MAs and 
nonverbal scores for the four groups.
chronological
A G E
TROG BPVS RAVEN*
AU TISM
LOW
n=9
mean
range
10;06
(7;00-14;07)
5;01
(4;06-6;00)
5;00
(4.00-602)
17.33
(9-25)
AU TISM
H IG H
n=13
mean
range
12;06
(8;00-16;l 1)
7,03
(5 ;06-ll+ )
9 0 4
(6 0 7 -1 5 ;ll)
27.84
(19-33)
4 YEARS 
n=13
mean
range
4;07
(4;04-5;01)
5;02
(4;03-6;00)
4 0 8
(4,00-505)
14.15
(7-18)
5 YEARS 
— 11=211___
mean
range
5; 10
(5;05-6;04)
7 0 4
(500-11+)
6 0 6
(503-9,09)
19.01
(14-32)
* The means and the ranges of the Raven raw scores are reported.
182
11.2.2. M a ter ia ls
The materials consisted o f two wooden boxes (16x11x7), four toy plastic 50p coins, a 
teddy bear and an individual portion box of Kellogg's Com Flakes Filled with smarties (see 
appendix 6).
11.2.3. P ro ced u re
The children were always seen outside their classroom in a quiet area o f the school. On the 
first visit all the children were administered the BPVS, and the TROG. On the second visit 
each child was seen by the first and the second experimenters and the false belief task and 
either the "know" or the "help" task was administered. The order of these two tasks was 
balanced across children in order to eliminate possible order effects. On the third visit the 
child was given the second of the two tasks mentioned above followed by the Raven's 
Coloured Progressive Matrices.
11.2.4. T a sk s
11.2.4.1. False belief task
The one-portion Kellogg's Corn Flakes box full of smarties was used in this task. The 
first experimenter, who was familiar to the children, asked each child whether she/he 
would like to play some games with the experimenter and her friend. Then the child was 
introduced to the second experimenter and told that he and the child were going to take 
turns at the game. To start the game the child was told that the second experimenter (Allan) 
would go out of the room for a minute while they began the game. When the second 
experimenter had left the room, the first experimenter took the closed Com Flakes box 
from her bag and showed it to the child and asked "what is in here?" Answers such as 
"com flakes", "cereal", "breakfast" were accepted as correct. Then the first experimenter 
opened the box and showed it to the child, and said "no there are smarties". She then 
closed the box and asked again "what is in here?". This question was asked to check that 
the child could remember the content of the box. Then the child was asked "when I first
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asked you, what did you say was in the box?" (own belief). Next, the child was told that 
Allan (the second experimenter) had not seen this box and that when he came in, the first 
experimenter would show him the box and ask "what is in the box?" The child was asked 
"what will Allan say?" (other's false belief).
11.2.4.2. The "know" task attributing know ledge and ignorance
This task involved the use o f the two wooden boxes and a plastic coin. To start the game 
each child was told that they were going to play a hiding game and that she/he would take 
turns with the second experimenter (Allan). The child was shown the two boxes and a coin 
and told that the first experimenter was going to hide the coin in one of the two boxes, and 
that sometimes the child and sometimes the second experimenter were going to close their 
eyes.
There were four trials in this task. On two trials the child, and on two trials the second 
experimenter, saw in which box the coin was hidden. There were two types of 
experimental questions. One o f these was in a positive form "Who really knows where the 
coin is, you or Allan ?" and one was in a negative form "Who does not really know where 
the coin is you or Allan?" On each trial the child was asked one experimental question.
The order in which the four trials were presented to each child was determined by a random 
selection from a 4 by 4  latin square.
The task began by the first experimenter giving the following instruction (either to the child 
or to the second experimenter) "Now it is your turn to close your eyes while I hide the 
coin, then I will ask you to show me where the coin is". When the coin had been hidden, 
the child was asked three control questions. The first was to check whether she/he had any 
difficulty with negative questions. This question was only asked on the first trial and it 
was designed to be as close as possible to the negative experimental question. The negative 
control question was modified for each child according to their clothing and the clothing of 
the second experimenter, and took the form "Who does not have a red (blue, white) jumper 
(shirt, t-shirt) on, you or Allan?" Then two further control questions were asked to test
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whether the child understood visual access "Did you see where I put the coin?” "Did Allan 
see where I put the coin?" Finally, one o f the experimental questions w as asked, either 
"Who really knows where the coin is, you or Allan?" or "Who does not really know where 
the coin is, you or Allan ?" Table 11.2 summarises the details of the trials and questions.
Table 11.2. Trials, control and experimental questions for the "know" task
Self sees tria l 1 (Child watches)
(control negative) "Who does not have a red jumper on you, or Allan (second 
experimenter)?"
(control question) "Did you see where I put the coin?"
(control question) "Did Allan see where I put the coin?"
(experimental quest.) "Who really knows where the coin is, you or Allan?"
Other sees trial 1 
(control question) 
(control question) 
(experimental quest.)
(Child has eyes closed)
"Did you see where I put the coin?"
"Did Allan see where I put the coin?"
"Who really knows where the coin is, you or Allan?"
Self sees trial 2 
(control question) 
(control question) 
(experimental quest.)
(Child watches)
"Did you see where I put the coin?"
"Did Allan see where I put the coin?"
"Who does not really know where the coin is, you or Allan?"
Other sees trial 2 
(control question) 
(control question) 
(experimental quest.)
(Child has eyes closed)
"Did you see where I put the coin?"
"Did Allan see where I put the coin?"
"Who does not really know where the coin is, you or Allan?"
11.2.4.3. The "h e lp "  task  -using  "could  h e lp "  instead  o f "know "
This task differed from the "know” task by having another character - a teddy bear. It also 
differed in the question structure. Those children who were given the "help” task after the 
"know" task were told that they were going to play a game very similar to the one they 
played on the previous visit, however this time teddy would be playing with them as well. 
Children given the "help" task before the "know" task were told that they were going to 
play a hiding game and she/he and a second experimenter would take turns. The child was 
shown the teddy and told that teddy liked collecting coins and he wanted to get as many 
coins as he could during the game. When they were playing the game teddy was going to 
stay under the table so that he could not see them. Then the child was shown the two 
boxes and a coin and told that the first experimenter was going to hide the coin in one of 
two boxes and that sometimes the child was going to close his/her eyes and other times the 
second experimenter was going to close his eyes. Then teddy was going to come up and 
join them and he was going to ask for help to find the coin either from the child or from 
Allan (second experimenter).
There were four trials in this task: on two trials the child, but not the second experimenter, 
saw in which box the first experimenter hid the coin and on the other two trials the second 
experimenter, but not the child saw  in which box the first experimenter hid the coin. There 
were two types of experimental question, a positive question "Who could really help teddy 
find the coin, you or Allan ?", and a negative question "Who could not really help teddy 
find the coin, you or Allan?" On each trial the child was asked one o f the experimental 
questions. The order in which the four trials were presented to a child was determined by 
a random selection from a 4 by 4  latin square.
The task began by the main experimenter giving the following instruction "Now we are 
starting the game, teddy goes under the table and stays there. Now it is your turn (to the 
child or to the second experimenter) to close your eyes while I hide the coin". When the 
coin had been hidden, the child was asked four control questions. One was to check
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whether she/he had any difficulty with negative questions "Who could not really see where 
I put the coin, you or Allan (second experimenter)?" Then three further control questions 
were asked to test whether the child understood visual access: "Did you see where I put the 
coin?", "Did Allan see where I put the coin?", "Did teddy see where I put the coin?" 
Finally, the child was asked one of the experimental questions, either "When teddy comes 
up , who could really help teddy find the coin, you or Allan?" or "Who could not really 
help teddy find the coin, you or Allan?” Table 11.3. summarises the details of the trials 
and questions.
T ab le  11.3. T ria ls , con tro l and experim ental questions fo r  th e  "help" task
S elf sees trial 1
(control negative)
(control question) 
(control question) 
(control question) 
(experimental quest.)
O ther sees trial 1 
(control question) 
(control question) 
(control question) 
(experimental ques.)
S e lf  sees trial 2
(control question) 
(control question) 
(control question) 
(experimental quest.)
O ther sees trial 2
(control question) 
(control question) 
(control question) 
(experimental quest.)
(Child watches)
"Who could not really see where I put the coin, you or Allan 
(second experimenter)?"
"Did you see where I put the coin?”
"Did Allan (second experimenter) see where I put the coin?"
"Did teddy see where I put the coin?"
"When teddy comes up, who could really help teddy find the coin, 
you or Allan?”
(Child has eyes closed)
"Did you see where I put the coin?"
"Did Allan see where I put the coin?"
"Did teddy see where I put the coin?"
"When teddy comes up, who could really help teddy find the coin, 
you or Allan?"
(Child watches)
"Did you see where 1 put the coin?"
"Did Allan (second experimenter) see where I put the coin?"
"Did teddy see where I put the coin?"
"When teddy comes up, who could not really help teddy find the 
coin, you or Allan?"
(Child has eyes closed)
"Did you see where I put the coin?"
"Did Allan see where I put the coin?"
"Did teddy see where I put the coin?"
"When teddy comes up, who could not really help teddy find the 
coin, you or Allan?"
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11.3. R esu lts
11.3.1. Performance on the "help" task versus performance on the "know" 
task
The first aim of this experiment was to test whether normal and autistic children's ability to 
refer to their own and to another person's mental state o f having specific knowledge or 
lacking that specific knowledge is more difficult when the experimental question involves 
the cognitive mental term "know" or "does not know" than it does not. In the "know” task 
the experimental questions involved the mental term "know" or "does not know", w hereas 
in the "help" task the mental terms in the experimental questions were replaced by "could 
help" or "could not help". For both tasks there were four experimental questions (see 
tables 11.2 and 11.3) and the children were given a score o f 1 for each correct answer. 
Thus each child could get a score of between () to 4 for each of the two tasks. Table 11.4. 
gives the mean scores for the both tasks for four groups of children.
The second aim of this experiment was to compare the performances on the tasks o f low 
language level autistic children, high language level autistic children, four-year-old and 
five-year-old normal children.
A two way groups x task analysis of variance, with repeated measures on the task factor, 
showed that there was a  significant main effect of task [F(l,51)=28.987, p<0.0005]; 
across the groups the children were better at the "know" task than the "help" task. There 
was also a significant difference between the groups [F(3,51)=6.878, p<0.001], however 
the interaction between the task and group was not significant [F(3,56)=.603, p=0.616].
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Table 11.4. M ean scores for the "know" task and for the "help" task for the 
four groups o f  children
A U T ISM
low lang, 
level
A U TISM
high lang, 
level
4  YEARS 5 YEARS overall
task
N 9 13 13 20
KNOW
TASK
2.889 3.846 3.538 3.900 3.636
H E LP
TASK
2.222 2.615 2.154 3.300 2.691
overall
group 2.555 3.230 2.846 3.6
Figure 11.1. Bar chart of the mean scores for the "know" and "help" tasks 
for four groups o f  children
m
e
a
n
s
c
o
r
e
low high normal norm al
lang. lang. children children
Tukey post hoc tests were calculated for pairwise comparisons among the overall group 
means. These confirmed that five-year-old normal children were better at the two tasks 
than both the low language level autistic children |q=5.764, df=51, p<0.0011 and the four- 
year-old normal children (q=4.7, df=51. p<0.009). In addition the difference between the
high and low language level autistic children was approaching significance [q=3.455, 
df=51, p<0.08].
11.3.2. Performance on the "know" and "help" tasks compared with chance 
lev e ls
In each task there were four experimental questions with a forced choice answer o f "me" or 
"Allan”, and therefore by chance children could pass two of the experimental questions 
(0.5x4=2). Further, even if there was a response bias such as always giving either the 
answer "me" or the answer "Allan" across the four questions, the children would pass two 
of the questions. Therefore to investigate whether the children's performance exceeded 
chance levels, paired t tests were carried out for each group and for each task separately, on 
the number o f  correct versus the number o f  correct answers by chance (2).
On the "know" task, all four groups of children performed better than chance: low language 
level autistic children [t (8) =3.411, p<.(X)9]; high language level autistic children [t (12)
= 17.725, (X.0005); four-year-old normal children (t (12) =8.402, p<.0005]; five-year-old 
normal children (t (19) =27.606, p<.(XX)5]. This indicates that all four groups o f children 
were able attribute the mental states of "knowing” and "not knowing" to themselves and to 
the other people (see figure 11.2).
Figure 11.2. Bar chart of the mean scores for the "know" task compared 
with chance level
Figure 11.3. Bar chart of the mean scores for the "help" task compared 
with chance level.
chance level
However on the "help" task, only the five-year-old normal children performed significantly 
better than chance, [t (19) =4.951, p<.(KK)5J (see figure 11.3.).
The different pattern of results for the "know" and "help" tasks reflects the significant main 
effect of task revealed by the ANOVA. Overall, the children were better at the "know" task
than the "help" task. In the "know" task all four groups of children performed above 
chance level. However in the "help" task only the five-year-old normal children performed 
above chance level.
11.3.3. Com parison o f reference to self versus reference to the other
The third aim of this experiment was to investigate the question o f whether attributing 
mental states to oneself is easier than attributing mental states to other people. Each of the 
two tasks, the "know" task and the "help" task, involved four experimental questions, two 
required the child to refer to his/her own mental state, and two required the child to refer to 
another person's (second experimenter) mental states. Thus in total across the two tasks 
four questions referred to self, four referred to another. Table 11.5 and figure 11.4 show 
the mean numbers of questions passed with reference to self and other. A two-way 
analysis of variance was performed comparing the self and other scores across the four 
groups self versus other was a repeated measures factor. The main effect o f self versus 
other was not significant (F(l,51)=.404, p<.528], nor was the interaction between the 
group and self/other [F(3.51)=.363. p<().78]. The main effect of group was significant 
[F(3,51)=6.878, p<0.001]. But this is the same effect as previously reported in the group 
x task analysis (in the section comparing the "know" and "help"tasks).
than the "help" task. In the "know" task all four groups o f children performed above 
chance level. However in the "help" task only the five-year-old normal children performed 
above chance level.
11.3.3. Comparison o f reference to se lf versus reference to the other
The third aim of this experiment was to investigate the question o f whether attributing 
mental states to oneself is easier than attributing mental states to other people. Each of the 
two tasks, the "know" task and the "help" task, involved four experimental questions, two 
required the child to refer to his/her own mental state, and two required the child to refer to 
another person's (second experimenter) mental states. Thus in total across the two tasks 
four questions referred to self, four referred to another. Table 11.5 and figure 11.4 show 
the mean numbers of questions passed with reference to self and other. A two-way 
analysis o f variance was performed comparing the self and other scores across the four 
groups self versus other was a repeated measures factor. The main effect o f  self versus 
other was not significant [F(l,51)=.4()4, p<.528], nor was the interaction between the 
group and self/other [F(3,51)=.363, p<0.78]. The main effect o f group was significant 
[F(3,51)=6.878, p<0.001). But this is the same effect as previously reported in the group 
x task analysis (in the section comparing the "know” and "help"tasks).
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Table 11.5. Mean numbers o f  questions passed with reference to se lf  and 
others for four groups o f children
AUTISM
low lang.
A U TISM
high lang, 
level
4 YEARS 5 YEARS overa ll
m eans
N 9 13 13 20
OW N 2.444 3.077 2.846 3.65 3.127
O T H ER 2.667 3.385 2.846 3.55 3.200
overall
m eans 2.555 3.230 2.846 3.6
Figure 11.4 Bar chart of the mean numbers o f  questions passed with 
reference to self and other by the four groups o f  children (max=4).
Autism Autism 
low high
lang. lang.
4 -years  5 -years 
normal normal 
children children
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11.3.4. A comparison o f  positive versus negative questions
Each task included a control question which involved a negative and children who failed the 
negative control question were excluded from the study. However it could be argued that it 
is harder for children to answer negative questions than positive questions. Within the two 
tasks there were four positive and four negative questions. Therefore each child could 
score between 0  and 4 for correct answers to the negative and to the positive questions. 
Table 11.6 shows the mean numbers o f the correct answers to both question types for the 
four groups of children. To investigate whether the negative questions were more difficult 
than the positive questions, a two way analysis of variance was carried out groups x 
negative versus positive with repeated measures on the second factor. The main effect of 
question type (positive/negative) was not significant [F(l,51)=.661, p<0.42], nor was the 
interaction between group and question type [F(3,51)= 1.095, p<0.36J. The main effect of 
group [F(3, 51)=6.878, p<().<K) 1 ] is the same effect as previously reported.
Table 11.6. Mean numbers correct answers to the positive and negative 
questions by the four groups o f children.
AUTISM
low lana-
AUTISM  
high lang.
4 YEARS 5 YEARS overall
m eans
N 9 13 13 20
POSITIVE 2.556 3.154 3.077 3.65 3.109
NEGATIV E 2.556 3.308 2.615 3.55 3.218
overall
means 2.556 3.231 2.846 3.6
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Figure 11.5 Bar chart of the mean numbers o f correct answers to the 
positive and negative questions for the four groups o f children
□  p o s itiv e  
■  n eg a tiv e
Autism Autism 4 -years 5 -years
low high normal normal
lang. lang. children children
Belief Task
When the ability o f the four experimental groups to attribute a false belief to another was
compared, a significant difference was found [x2= 12.471, df=3, p<.006]. For pairwise
comparisons, Fisher Exact tests were calculated with significance levels adjusted according
to the Bonferroni procedure. With 6 pairwise comparisons the criterion for significance
was set at p<»Q5=.008.
6
The five-year-old normal children were significantly better than the low language level 
autistic children in their ability to attribute false belief to another p<.002. None of the other 
comparisons reached the .008 level. Table 11.7 shows the number and percentages of 
children passing the false belief task for the four groups.
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Table 11.7. Num bers and percentages o f  children passing the false belief 
task, for the four groups
N
FALSE BELIEF
AUTISM LOW 9 2 22.22 %
AUTISM HIGH 13 7 53.85 %
4-YEARS 13 10 76.92 %
5-YEARS 20 17 85.00%
11.3.6. Are the norm al and the autistic children'^ pcrformance on  the 
'know' and help' tasks related to their verbal ability, their non-verbal 
ability, and to their performance on the false belief_lask2
The final aim of this experiment was to investigate whether the children's performance on 
the "know” and "help" tasks was related to their verbal ability, their nonverbal ability and to 
their performance on the classic false belief task. To test whether different aspects of 
language competence and non-verbal ability predicted the children's performance on the 
"know" and "help" tasks, Pearson correlation coefficients were calculated between the 
BPVS scores, the TROG scores, the Raven's scores and the children's performance on the 
"know" and "help" tasks. For these analyses in order to encompass the whole range of 
language ability, the tw o autistic groups were combined into a single group, as were the 
two normal groups. Table 11.8 shows the pearson correlation coefficients between BPVS, 
TROG and RAVEN scores and "know" and "help" tasks for the autistic and the normal 
children. From this table it can be seen that the BPVS, TROG and Raven scores were 
related to the autistic children's performance, but not the normal children's performance, on 
the "know" task which required the attribution o f "knowledge" and "ignorance" to people. 
However, none of the language and non-verbal scores were related to the "help" task in 
either group.
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Table 11.8 Pearson correlation coefficients between BPVS, TROG and 
RAVEN scores and the "know" and "help" tasks for the autistic and normal
children
AUTISM  NORMAL
__________R A V E N _______
"Know" task .485** .157
"Help" task -.062 .249
________ B P V S ________
"Know" task .490* .234
"Help" task .247 .264
________ T R O G _______
"Know" task .510** .237
"Help" task .114 .331
**p<0.01 *p<0.05
In order to compare performance on the "know" and "help" tasks with performance on the 
false belief task point biserial correlations were calculated between the pass/fail dichotomy 
on the false belief task and on the "know" and "help" tasks. Table 11.9 shows point 
biserial correlations between the pass/fail dichotomy on the false belief task and "know" 
and "help" tasks for the normal and the autistic children. None of these correlations were 
significant
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Table 11.9 Point Biserial correlations between the pass/ fail dichotom y on 
the false belief task and the "know" and "help" tasks for the norm al and the 
autistic children
AUTISTIC NO RM A L
____ FALSE BELIEF___
"Know" task .373 -.231
"Help" task -.006 .074
Autistic children were divided into the groups of low language level and high language 
level, on the basis o f their performance on the BPVS which tests the child's receptive 
vocabulary. In order to examine whether the results o f this study would have been 
different, if the autistic children were divided into two groups on the basis of their scores 
on TROG or on the RAVEN's progressive matricises, Pearson correlation coefficients 
were calculated between the BPVS, TROG and Raven scores. Table 11.10 shows the 
correlation coefficients between the BPVS, TROG and RAVEN scores for the normal and 
the autistic groups. The correlations between the BPVS and TROG, the RAVEN and 
BPVS and between the RAVEN and TROG scores w ere highly significant for both groups 
o f children.
Table 11.10 Pearson correlation coefficients betw een BPVS, TROG  and 
RAVEN scores for the groups o f autistic and norm al children
A U T IS T IC N O R M A L
RAVEN - BPVS .711*+* .750**+
RAVEN - TROG .622*** .849*++
B P V S- TROG .817++* .919**+
*** p<().(K)2 **p<0.01 *p<0.05
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11.3.7. Children's understanding of visual access
In both the "know” and "help" tasks the children were asked control questions to check 
whether they understood visual access (see Tables 11.2 and 11.3). In the  previous 
experiments (2 and 3) all the children passed the visual access questions. However, in 
experiment 4 some children failed these questions. Most o f these children were in the low 
language level groups: either low language level autistic children or four-year-old normal 
children. In the literature it has been suggested that there is a strong relationship between 
the pass rate for seeing questions and children’s performance on knowledge questions 
(Pemer et al., 1989). In experiment 4, both in the "know” and in the "help” tasks high 
language level autistic children, four-year-old and five-year-old normal children 
successfully judged whether they had seen the first experimenter hid a co in  (table 11.11). 
However only 44 % (in the "know” task ) and 56 % (in the ”help"task) o f  the low language 
level autistic children were able to judge whether they had seen the first experimenter hide a 
coin. This pass rate is lower than in Pemer et al.’s study in which 69 %  o f  the autistic 
children were able to judge their own visual access. However, closer inspection of the 
children's language levels reveals that this difference is likely to be due to  differences in the 
language levels of the children in the two studies. Since while the low language level 
autistic children in the present studies had a mean verbal MA equivalent o f  five years, in 
Pemer et al.'s study the autistic children had a mean verbal MA equivalent o f six years and 
two months.
In the "know" task all the high language level autistic children, 95% o f the five-year-old 
and 84% of the four-year-old normal children were successful in judging whether the 
second experimenter had seen the first experimenter hide the coin. In the "help" task all the 
four and five-year-old normal children and 92% of the high language level autistic children 
were successful in judging whether the second experimenter had seen the first experimenter 
hide the coin (see Table 11.11). However in both tasks, only 56%< o f the low language 
level autistic children were able to judge whether the second experimenter had seen the first 
experimenter hide the coin. In Pemer et al.'s study, 73%- of the autistic children were able
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to judge another person's visual access. This difference again can be explained by the 
difference in the children's language levels between the two studies.
Table 11.11 Num bers and percentages o f  children in each group passin g  the 
visual access and the experimental questions in the 'know' and 'help' tasks
AUTISM LOW AUTISM HIGH 4-Y EARS 5 -Y E A R S
N 9 13 13 20
"KNOW" TASK
Self sees 4 44.44 % 13 100% 13 100% 20 100%
Other sees 5 55.56 % 13 1(H) % 11 84.62 % 19 95 %
task passed 2 22.22 % 11 84.62 % 8 61.54 % 18 90%
"HELP" TASK
Self sees 5 55.56 % 13 100% 13 100% 20 100%
Other sees 5 55.56 % 12 92.31 % 13 100% 20 100%
task passed 1 11.11% 6 46.15% 1 7.69% 13 65%
As can be seen from Table 11.11. in all groups more children passed the visual access 
questions than passed the task. This is similar to the results o f Pemer et al.'s (1989).
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1.4. D iscussion
The first aim of experiment 4 was to investigate whether children find it more difficult to 
refer to their own and to another person's mental states of having specific knowledge or 
lacking that knowledge when the experimental question involves the cognitive mental term 
"know". In order to test this question, two tasks were designed. In the "know" task either 
the child or the second experimenter watched the first experimenter hide a coin in one of 
two boxes, and the children were asked either "Who really knows where the coin is, you or 
Allan (second experimenter)?" or "Who does not really know where the coin is, you or 
Allan?" In the "help" task there was an additional character (teddy) who liked collecting 
coins. As in to the "know" task, either the child or the second experimenter watched the 
first experimenter hide a coin in one of two boxes, and the children were then asked either 
"Who could really help teddy find the coin, you or Allan?" or "Who could not really help 
teddy find the coin, you or Allan?" It was assumed that if a child is able to judge her/his 
and another person's knowledge state, he/she should be able to identify the person with 
knowledge of where the coin was hidden, as the person who could help teddy. However, 
the results showed that relative to the "know" task, children found it more difficult to 
identify the knowledgeable person as the helper. While all four groups of children were 
able to attribute knowledge to themselves and to another person on the basis of that 
person’s mental state, only the five-year-old normal children were able to identify the 
knowledgeable person (who had visual access to the hiding) as the helper.
One of the differences between the two tasks is that, in the "help” task, the experimental 
question involved the modal term "could" which may have affected the children's 
performance. However, in the investigation o f certainty implied by mental terms or modal 
terms Moore et al. (1990) found highly significant correlations between these terms. They 
argued that children's developing understanding of mental states of relative certainty is 
independent of whether the experimental question involves mental terms or modal terms.
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This suggests that the children's difficulty with the "help" task was perhaps not due to the 
modal term "could" in the experimental question.
A second possible explanation for the children's difficulty with "help" task could be that, 
while both tasks required metarepresentational skills (see figure 11.6), in addition the 
"help” task required the child to make a prediction about behaviour on the basis of mental 
state. In other words, while in the "know" task the child needed to identify the person who 
had visual access to the hiding of the coin as the person who knew where the coin was, and 
identify the person who did not have visual access to the hiding o f the coin as the person 
who did not know where the coin was. However, in the "help” task the child needed to 
identify the person who had visual access to the hiding of a coin, as the person who could 
help teddy (who did not have visual access to the hiding) find the coin, and identify the 
person who did not have visual access to the hiding of the coin as the person who could not 
help teddy find the coin. It is possible that the "help" task was more difficult because to 
identify the person as the person who could help teddy find the coin, required an additional 
step in children's mental state attributions:
rather than in the "know" task
and in the "help" task
he has seen > he knows 
(visual access) (knowledge attribution)
he has seen > he could help teddy 
(visual access) (knowledge usage)
in the "help" task
a s  he saw > he knows >
(visual access) (knowledge attribution)
he could help teddy 
(knowledge usage)
The present results suggest that although four-year-old and five-year-old normal children 
and both high and low language level autistic children are able to attribute knowledge to the
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person who had visual access, only five-year-old normal children are able to infer that this 
knowledge could he used to help teddy.
It seems that if the children's difficulty is to infer another person's behaviour from their 
own mental slate (e.g. in this experiment that a person could help if he/she has the 
knowledge), children would find similar tasks difficult. One such task could be the classic 
false belief task in which the child needs to predict a character's behaviour on the basis of 
that person's knowledge or ignorance. It has been shown that 4-year-old normal children 
are able to pass these tasks while autistic children fail (Baron-Cohen et al., 1985; Leslie & 
Frith, 1988; Pemer et al., 1989; Baron-Cohen, 1989a). In experiment 4, all the children 
were also given false belief task. Correlations between the children's performance on the 
false belief task and the "help" task were not significant. Furthermore, inspection of the 
percentages of children passing the "help" and false belief tasks does not seem to suggest a 
clear relation between the tasks in terms o f difficulty (see Table 11.12). The low language 
level autistic children performed poorly on both tasks, and although the high language level 
autistic children performed well on the "know” task (84.6%), they performed less well on 
the "help" and false belief tasks (46.1% and 53.85%) respectively. However, the "help" 
task seems to be more difficult than the other two tasks, even for the five-year-old normal 
children.
Table 11.12 Percentages o f children passing the false belief task, the 
'know' and 'help' tasks
AUTISM LOW AUTISM HIGH 4-Y EARS 5-Y EA R S
N 9 13 13 20
False B elief 2 22.22 % 7 53.85 % 10 76.92 % 17 85%
"Know" Task 2 22.22 % 11 84.62 % 8 61.54 % 18 90%
"Help" Task 1 11.11% 6 46.15% 1 7.69% 13 65%
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Furthermore, in Pillow's (1989) study, one task involved the use of two puppets where 
only one o f them had visual access to the container after the transfer of a small dinosaur or 
a toy car. In this task, three-year-old children were asked who could tell them what the 
colour o f the dinosaur was - whether John (puppet's name) could tell or Bob (puppet's 
name) could tell them. The results indicated that three-year-old children could identify the 
knowledgeable puppet, on the basis o f perceptual access at above chance level but that their 
performance was less good than in a task in which they had to attribute knowledge either to 
themselves or to the puppet on the basis of perceptual access. In comparison to the "help" 
task in the present experiment, in Pillow's study the question type seems similar, as does 
the likely difficulty of the tasks; in other words, both require the child to infer a person's 
behaviour from a person's mental state. However, whereas in Pillow's study three and 
four-year-old children were successful, in experiment 4 only five-year-old normal children 
were able to identify the knowledgeable person as the helper.
The only difference seems to be that in experiment 4, the experimental question involved 
the word "help" ("who could help" rather than "who could tell") and this may have made 
extra demands on the children. The autistic children's inability to pass the "help" task 
could be explained in terms of Baron-Cohen's (1991b) argument that "more complex forms 
o f  social reciprocity (eg. sharing, helping) are likely to entail mental state attribution, and 
these would be expected to be impaired in autism " (p.308). However, the author has not 
come a cross any study in the literature investigating this question in normal children. It 
would be interesting to examine the age at which normal children acquire an understanding 
that a person who can help needs to be knowledgeable in different experimental tasks.
The second aim of experiment 4 was to examine autistic children's ability to attribute 
knowledge to themselves and to others, compared to language level matched normal 
children. The results indicated that all four groups o f children were able to attribute 
knowledge and ignorance to themselves and to others on the basis of each person's mental 
state. The "know" task required the child to compare his/her mental state with the second 
experimenter's mental state in order to identify that person as the one who knows or who
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does not know where the coin was. Referring to another person's mental state requires 
metarepresentation. Both groups of autistic children, whether of high language level or 
low language level, performed better than chance on the "know" task. This indicates that 
they have metarepresentational skills which contradicts the findings of previous studies 
(e.g. Baron-Cohen et al„ 1985 and 1986; Leslie & Frith 1988; Pemer et al„ 1989). 
However, this finding supports Leekam & Perner's (1991) conclusion that autistic 
children's difficulty with theory of mind tasks cannot be due to a general 
metarepresentalional deficit. In their study, Leekam &  Pemer adopted Zaitchik's (1990) 
task in which children took a picture of a doll in a red dress with a polaroid camera and 
while the photograph was developing the doll's dress was changed to a green one. The 
children were then asked what colour the doll's dress would be in the photograph. The 
autistic children passed this task, again demonstrating metarepresentation skills. For 
further details o f this study see chapter 5.
In the present study the results showed that the five-year-old normal children performed 
significantly better than the four-year-old children and the low language level autistic 
children on both tasks. In addition, the difference between the two autistic groups 
approached significance. This picture is similar to the results from experiment 2 where the 
group's language level seemed to be an important predictor o f  their performance on the 
task.
The fourth aim of experiment 4 was to test whether children's performance on the 
experimental tasks was related to their verbal and nonverbal skills and to their performance 
on a false belief task. The results showed that the autistic children's receptive vocabulary 
level (measured by the BPVS), their receptive grammar level (measured by the TROG), 
and their nonverbal abilities (measured by the Raven Progressive Matrices) were 
significantly correlated with their performance on the "know" task. This finding supports 
the results of experiment 2, which indicated a strong relation between the autistic children’s 
language level and their performance on the experimental task. On the basis of the results 
of experiment 2, it was suggested that autistic children's performance on theory of mind
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type of tasks is related to their general language skills. In addition to language tests, in 
experiment 4 children were also given non verbal ability test; results indicated that 
children's performance on the "know" task was related to their nonverbal abilities too. 
Thus, it seems that autistic children are able to attribute knowledge and ignorance to 
themselves and to others provided that they have a certain level of language and non-verbal 
skills. It seems that this relationship is not specific to the particular task employed in 
experiment 4, since similar results were obtained in experiment 2 when a different 
experimental task was used. However none of the correlations between the children's 
performance on the "help" task and their verbal and nonverbal skills were significant. This 
finding suggests that the strong relationship between the autistic child's verbal and 
nonverbal abilities, and the attribution of knowledge and ignorance to people, perhaps 
cannot be generalized to other theory of mind tasks. However there may be two possible 
explanations for these results. One is that the task in experiment 2 and the "know" task in 
experiment 4 included the cognitive mental term "know" in the experimental question while 
the "help” task in experiment 4 included the word "help". The strong correlations with 
performance on the "know" task may therefore have been due to the inclusion of the 
cognitive mental term "know". The second likely explanation is that it seems that referring 
to a mental state is easier than predicting behaviour on the basis of that mental state. It may 
be that the more able the autistic child is, the more likely that the child can refer to people's 
mental states, but he/she is still not able to make predictions on the basis o f  those mental 
states.
Furthermore, highly significant correlations were obtained between the TROG, BPVS and 
Raven scores for both the autistic and the normal children. In experiment 4, the autistic 
children were assigned to two groups of high language and low language level on the basis 
of their BPVS scores but if the autistic group had been divided into two groups on the basis 
of TROG or Raven scores, results from this study would not have been very different.
Finally, the third aim of experiment 4, was to test whether referring to one's own mental 
state is easier than referring to another person's mental states. The results indicated that
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self reference was not different from referring to another. This is not surprising since, in 
this experiment in order for a child to answer any self reference question and any other 
reference question, he/she needed to compare his/her own mental state with the other 
person's mental state. Thus both self and other reference required metarepresentational 
skills (see figure 11.6). The lack of any difference between the attribution o f mental states 
to oneself and to others supports the findings from experiment 1, 2 and 3.
Figure 11.6 Representational skills required in experim ent 4.
"KNOW " TASK
Subject watches
die second experimenter 
closes his eyes and the first 
experimenter hides a coin in 
one of the two boxes.
Then the experimenter asks
"Who really knows where the coin is you or Allan?"
OR
"Who does not really know where the coin is you or Allan?'
box 1. box 2.
child representing
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"K N O W " TA SK
The second experim enter watches
The second experimenter 
watches while the subject 
closes his/her eyes and the first 
experimenter hides a coin in 
one of the two boxes.
Then the experimenter asks
"Who really knows where the coin is you or Allan?"
OR
"Who does not really know where the coin is you or Allan?"
box 1. box 2.
child representing
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"H E L P " TASK 
Sub ject watches
the second experimenter closes his eyes and the first 
experimenter hides a coin in one of the two boxes. 
(Teddy stays under the table)
Then the experimenter asks
"When Teddy comes up. who could really help tedy find the coin, 
you or Allan?"
OR
"When Teddy comes up. who could not really help tedy find the
coin, you or Allan?"
child representing
Me Allan
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"HELP" TA SK
The second experim enter watches
The second experimenter watches while the subject closes his/her 
eyes and the first experimenter hides a coin in one of the two boxes. 
(Teddy stays under the table)
□ □Then the experimenter asks"When teddy comes up, who could really help teddy find the coin, you or Allan?"OR"When teddy comes up. who could not really help teddy find the coin 
you or Allan?"
child  representing
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12. C H A PT ER  TW ELV E
G eneral d iscussion
The primary aim of this thesis was to investigate one aspect of theory o f mind ability in 
autistic children, namely understanding o f knowledge as a mental state. As has been 
pointed out a number of times throughout the thesis, the theory of mind account of autism 
proposes a cognitive deficit as a primary cause for the social communication difficulties in 
autism. Empirical evidence suggests that autistic children are impaired both in their ability 
to attribute mental states to themselves and others, and in their pretend play skills (Baron- 
Cohen et al., 1985, 1986; Baron-Cohen, 1987). Leslie (1987) has accounted for these 
findings by arguing that both mental state attributions and pretend play require second- 
order representations which are copied from primary representations by a mechanism 
which he called a "decoupler". On the basis of evidence from autism research, Leslie 
(1987, 1988) proposed that autistic children have an impaired decoupler mechanism, or in 
other words a metarepresentational deficit. This account opened a new perspective for 
autism research and a number of studies, including those reported in this thesis, have been 
conducted to test this theory.
12. 1. Can the theory o f mind account explain autism?
If an impaired theory of mind ability in autism is the primary underlying factor for autistic 
people's social communication difficulties, this explanation should be able to account for 
the behaviour of all children who are diagnosed as autistic. More specifically, if the 
impaired decoupler mechanism in autism underlies autistic characteristics, all autistic people 
should show a metarepresentational deficit. However, the evidence does not support this 
view since in all studies with autistic children, some o f the children are able to attribute 
mental states to others, an ability which requires metarepresentation. For instance, 20% of 
the autistic children in Baron-Cohen et al.'s (1985) study were able to attribute false belief 
to a story character; 43% of the autistic children in Pemer et al.'s (1989) study and 44% in 
Leslie & Frith's (1988) study were able to attribute knowledge to other people; 18% of the
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autistic children in Russell et al.’s (1991) study were able to lead another person to have a 
false belief; 35% of the autistic children in Baron-Cohen's (1989c) study were able to 
differentiate what something looks like from what it really is (the appearance-reality 
distinction); 95% of the autistic children in Leekam & Pemer’s (1991) study were able to 
pass a non-mental representation task (Zaitchik's, 1990) which all require 
metarepresentation.
Furthermore, the results of the present thesis showed that autistic children are able to 
attribute mental states to another person and that this depends on their language ability. For 
instance, in experiment 2, 28.5 % o f the low language level autistic children with a mean 
verbal age equivalent measured by the British Picture Vocabulary Scale o f four years 11 
months and 78.5 % of the high language level autistic children with a mean verbal age of 
nine years six months, were able to differentiate "know" from "guess" when referring to 
another person's mental state. This requires metarepresentalion. In addition, in experiment 
3, 25 % of the low language level autistic children with a mean verbal age o f five years one 
month, and 69 % of the high language level autistic children with a mean verbal age o f nine 
years and six months were able to attribute knowing and guessing to another person. 
Finally in experiment 4, 22 % of the low language level autistic children with a mean 
verbal age five years, and 84 % of the high language level autistic children with a mean 
verbal age of nine years and six months were able to attribute knowledge to themselves and 
another person. Thus, the theory o f mind account cannot explain the performance of all 
people with autism since there are some autistic children who show metarepresentational 
skills. Moreover, children who passed these metarepresentational tasks tend to have higher 
verbal mental ages, as has been shown in the literature with other theory o f mind tasks 
(Prior et al., 1990; Leslie & Frith, 1988; Baron-Cohen, 1989a).
12. 2. Investigating the role o f  language ability
In the present thesis, two approaches have been adopted in order to investigate the 
relationship between the autistic children's verbal MA level (or language level) and their
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ability to understand knowledge as a mental state. One was to have two groups o f autistic 
children, one of low language level and the other of higher language level, and to compare 
the performance of these two groups in each experiment. The second approach was to 
administer a variety of standardized language and non-verbal ability measures to obtain a 
more detailed picture o f the relationship between certain aspects of language and the 
performance of the autistic children on the experimental tasks.
Formal contrasts between high and low language groups of autistic children were not 
always statistically significant, but the overall picture is quite consistent. The results o f 
experiment 2 showed that the high language level autistic children were significantly more 
able than the low language level autistic children to differentiate "know" from "guess" 
when referring to another person's mental state. In addition, the difference between the 
high and low language level autistic children's ability to differentiate "know” from "guess" 
when referring to their own mental states approached to significance. Similarly, in 
experiment 3, the high language level autistic children were significantly superior to the low 
language level autistic children in their ability to differentiate "know” from "guess" with 
respect to their own and to another person's mental state. In experiment 4. the difference 
between the high and low language level autistic children's ability to attribute mental states 
of knowledge and ignorance to themselves and to another was not significant, but it did 
approach significance. The non significant results in experiment 4 may have been due to 
the higher performance o f the low language level autistic children in this experiment 
compared with the previous experiments. This may he a consequence of the easier 
question type used in experiment 4.
In addition to the significant differences between the high language level and low language 
level autistic children's performances, the correlations between the different language tests 
and the autistic children's pass rate for the tasks were highly significant. In experiment 2, 
the autistic children's receptive vocabulary level, as measured by the BPVS, their receptive 
grammar level as measured by TRCXj  and their use of grammar as measured by the 
Renfrew Action Picture test were all significantly correlated with performance on the
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experimental task or, in other words, with their ability to differentiate "know" from "guess” 
when referring to their own and to another person's mental states (see chapter 9).
These findings were supported by those o f experiment 4. Here autistic children’s receptive 
vocabulary level measured by BPVS, their receptive grammar level measured by TROG 
and their non-verbal ability level measured by the Raven Coloured Progressive Matrices 
were significantly correlated with their ability to attribute knowledge and ignorance to 
themselves and to another person. However, neither the language scores nor the non­
verbal ability scores were correlated with the autistic children's ability to identify the 
knowledgeable person as the helper, or to identify the unknowledgeable person as the 
person who could not help. As was discussed in chapter 11 (see 11.4), the experimental 
questions used in the knowledge attribution tasks involved cognitive mental terms such as 
"know" and "guess" (in experiment 2) and "know" (in experiment 4). It may therefore be 
that the high correlations reflected the relationship between the different language skills and 
the ability to understand cognitive mental terms as linguistic entities. However, this cannot 
explain the significant correlation between the autistic children's performance on the 
"know” task and their non-verbal ability level in experiment 4.
It is also necessary to account for the low correlations between the autistic children's 
language abilities and their performance on the help task in experiment 4. One possibility is 
that the use of the word "help" in the experimental question tapped something different than 
the ability to refer to a mental state, such as the ability to understand a complex form of 
social reciprocity.
In addition the autistic children's inferior performance on the "help" task in comparison to 
the "know" task is perhaps that the "help" task was more difficult than the "know" task, 
because it required the child to make an additional inference from a person’s mental state. 
While the "know" task only required the child to identify whether a person had specific 
knowledge about something (the existence or non-existence o f knowledge as a mental 
state), the "help" task required the child to identify a person as the helper on the basis of
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that person's mental state (inferring behaviour from a mental state). If this inference was a 
problem for the autistic children in the "help" task, they should find similar tasks which 
require the prediction of a behaviour on the basis of mental states equally difficult. For 
instance, their performance should be poor on the false belief task, which required the child 
to predict another person's behaviour on the basis of that person's mental states. In chapter 
11 this was argued to be a weak explanation on the basis o f the performance of normal 
children. The percentage of normal children who passed the help task was lower than the 
children who passed the false belief task. While 76.92% o f the four-year-old children and 
85% o f the five-year-old children passed the false belief task, only 7.69% of the four-year- 
old and 65% of the five-year-old children passed the help task. However, when only 
autistic children's performance is considered it seems to be a  plausible explanation. In 
experiment 4, whereas 84.62% o f the high language level autistic children passed the 
knowledge attribution task, 53.8% passed the false belief task, and 46.15% passed the help 
task. Thus, it seems that the autistic children found the false belief and help tasks equally 
difficult.
In sum, the first conclusion to be drawn from the studies reported in the present thesis is 
that some autistic children do show metarepresentational skills in that they are able to refer 
to their own and to another person's mental states. This appears to contradict the theory of 
mind account of autism which argues that autistic children have a metarepresentational 
deficit. The second conclusion is that autistic children's language abilities (verbal MAs) 
seem to be a strong predictive factor of their performance on theory of mind tasks. This 
finding supports previous studies which suggested that autistic children who pass theory of 
mind tasks tend to have higher verbal MAs than those who fail.
Furthermore, while the theory o f mind account of autism focuses on the autistic child's 
ability to attribute mental states to themselves and others, namely their metarepresentational 
skills, it seems that some o f the theory o f mind tasks require other cognitive skills in 
addition to metarepresentation. For instance, some of the theory o f mind tasks, such as the 
various false belief tasks used by Baron-Cohen et al. (1985), Leslie & Frith (1988),
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Pemer et.al. (1989) and Baron-Cohen (1989a), and also ihe help task in experiment 4, 
seem to involve an additional inference about behaviour on the basis o f a person's mental 
state. Thus, in order to clarify whether this specific aspect of some of the theory o f mind 
tasks is effecting the performance of the autistic people, and also to clarify if they find these 
tasks more difficult, whether their difficulty is a general inference problem or one which is 
specific to predicting behaviour on the basis o f mental states, in future research, studies 
should include a control task to test the role of an additional inference in theory o f mind 
type o f tasks.
If it is the case that autistic children's difficulty is not a general inference problem but one 
which is specific to predicting behaviours from mental states, this would retain a part of the 
explanation which has been put forward by the theory o f mind account o f autism. This is 
that a difficulty in predicting someone's behaviour on the basis of their mental state may be 
the underlying factor in autistic people's social communication difficulties.
A further question raised by the findings is whether the difference between the autistic 
children who pass and those who fail the theory o f mind tasks is quantitative or qualitative. 
In other words, are the autistic people who fail the theory o f mind tasks delayed in their 
development o f theory o f mind, or do the autistic people who pass the theory o f mind tasks 
belong to a subgroup of autism e.g. Asperger's Syndrome. It was reported in chapter 2 
that Ozonoff, Rogers and Pennington (1991) found that high functioning autistic people 
differed from individuals with Asperger's Syndrome on theory o f mind tasks. People with 
Asperger's Syndrome were more likely to pass on the theory o f mind tasks than high 
functioning autistic people. However, Ozonoff, Rogers and Pennington (1991) concluded 
that perhaps people with Asperger's Syndrome were using different strategies to solve 
theory of mind tasks and that more sensitive tests should be developed to examine whether 
the absence o f theory o f mind ability differentiates high functioning autistic people from 
people with Asperger's Syndrome. Ozonoff el al.'s study seems to suggest a possible 
qualitative difference between the two groups, but further studies are needed in order to 
clarify whether the difference is qualitative. In addition, as was discussed in detail in
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chapter 2 (see 2.2) a number o f authors seem to agree that Asperger's Syndrome is a 
quantitatively distinguished subgroup of autism which falls at the top end of the autism 
continuum and includes more able autistic people. Thus, given the available evidence, it is 
not possible to conclude that autistic people who pass theory of mind tasks form a 
qualitatively different group from those who fail.
12. 3. Cognitive dysfunction and social impairment
If the theory of mind account of autism is correct, and an inability to understand other 
people's mental states underlies the social communication difficulties, then autistic people 
who pass theory o f mind tasks should show better social communication skills, or milder 
autistic features. Although the available evidence does not indicate a very strong 
relationship between autistic people's ability to pass theory of mind tasks and their social 
adaptation or social communication skills, there is some evidence which suggests the 
existence o f such a relationship.
For instance. Einsmajer & Prior (1991) demonstrated in their study that the autistic children 
who passed the false belief task were more likely to show a better developed understanding 
of social interpersonal relations than those who failed. In addition, Dawson and Femald 
(1987) found significant relationships between the severity of autism (measured with the 
Childhood Autism Rating Scale) and both conceptual role-taking skills (not specifically 
tested with one o f the theory of mind tasks) and social behaviour (measured by the 
Vineland Social Maturity .Scale). Furthermore, Oswald and Ollendick (1989) reported 
significant correlations between autistic children's performance on a false belief task and a 
social competence scale, and also between the autistic children's performance on a 
recursive thinking task ("to think about what another is thinking about what I  am thinking " 
p.121) and two social competence scales (Vineland Adaptive Behaviour Scales and the 
Social Performance Survey Schedule). However, correlations between the social 
competence scales and autistic children's performance on the picture sequencing task (as 
used originally by Baron-Cohen e t al. 1986) were not significant.
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In sum, the available evidence seems to suggest that there is a relationship between autistic 
people's social communication skills and their performance on both conceptual perspective 
taking and some false belief tasks. This seems to support the theory o f mind account of 
autism. On the basis o f this evidence it could be argued that autistic children who show 
theory o f mind ability, also have better social understanding and social communication 
skills. However, it is not possible to conclude that there is a cause-effect relationship, 
since the autistic children who pass theory of mind tasks are higher functioning than those 
who fail, and so they may have developed other strategies to solve the theory o f mind 
tasks. It is also possible that their social communication skills are learned using unusual 
strategies. Therefore, in order to draw any clear conclusions, it is important that 
researchers investigating theory of mind in autism control those factors which may 
contribute to the performance of autistic people. These factors are discussed in the next 
section .
12.4. What factors need to be controlled in studying theory o f mind ability 
in autism?
As any researcher or clinician who works with autistic children is aware, autism is a 
condition diagnosed on the basis of behavioural symptoms rather than on the basis of a 
certain etiology. Although qualitative impairment in social interaction, abnormal language 
patterns and stereotyped patterns of interests or activities are the main diagnostic features of 
autism, individual differences between autistic people are marked. Furthermore, the 
clinical picture o f an autistic person may change with age (Bishop, 1989). While a child 
around the age of four or five may show a number of autistic features, and be diagnosed as 
autistic, by the time he/she is in his/her teens some of these features may have disappeared.
Another major dimension in autism is mental retardation since 70% to 80% of autistic 
children are also learning disabled (Ungerer, 1989), a fact which contributes to the 
difficulty of establishing the precise nature o f children's difficulty in cognitive tasks.
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Variation in the comprehension of language is a further factor which may contribute 
ambiguity to the results of a study of autistic people.
Furthermore, as we saw in section 12.2, the tasks that are used to test mental state 
attribution may involve additional cognitive demands which may determine the performance 
of the autistic child. Thus many complicating factors are present in autism research. What 
needs to be done to control the affect of those factors? These will be discussed in the 
following subsections.
Severity of autism: It has already been emphasised that individual differences between 
autistic people are marked, and also that the autistic features of an individual may change 
with age. Therefore if the research aim is to investigate whether a cognitive element may 
underlie autistic features, such as impaired mental state attribution, it would be informative 
to use standard measures to define the sample in terms of their autistic characteristics. In 
other words, including a standard autism scale would give a clearer picture of the autistic 
sample. It would then be possible to look at the interaction between the performance of the 
group on various cognitive measures (e.g. passing or failing on theory of mind tasks) and 
the expression of autism (e.g. the quality of social interaction, the quality of language and 
stereotypic behaviours).
If it is established that autistic children who pass theory of mind tasks have better social 
communication skills then those who fail, then one may want to look at whether there is a 
parallel change in both areas over time. In other words, a longitudinal study could be 
carried out to investigate whether autistic children who fail theory o f mind tasks and show 
severe social communication difficulties, with age become able to pass these tasks and also 
show better social adaptation.
General mental ability level: One strategy that has been adopted by researchers to overcome 
the difficulty that autistic children's general mental ability level may crucially influence their 
performance, is to study autistic people who have higher general abilities, in the hope that, 
with this approach, the results of research could point to factors specific to autism. Most of
the researchers in the theory of mind area have taken the approach of using high 
functioning autistic subjects. As well as focusing on higher ability autistic children, 
researchers have also included learning disabled control groups in order to control for the 
effect o f general mental ability on performance.
Language level: The results o f  the present thesis strongly suggest that language abilities of 
autistic children are strong predictors for their performance on the verbal knowledge 
attribution tasks. It would be particularly useful to investigate how language ability relates 
to performance on the other theory o f mind tasks.
The specific cognitive demands of the tasks: Researchers investigating the development of 
theory of mind ability in autism have devised ingenious experiments and have included a 
number of control questions to ensure that the children are able to follow the task.
However, one question which arose from the present thesis is whether the autistic 
children's difficulty in predicting another person's behaviour on the basis o f that person's 
mental state is simply due to their difficulty with making an inference. Thus, it is important 
to control for the possibility that a task which is used in the investigation o f a specific 
cognitive ability of an autistic child, is actually measuring only that skill.
12.5. C on clusions
There are two main conclusions to be drawn from the results o f  the studies reported in this 
thesis. The first is that autistic children do show some metarepresentational skills, contrary 
to the theory o f mind account of autism. The second is that autistic children's language 
abilities are a strong predictive factor of their performance on theory o f mind tasks.
Furthermore, since autism is a condition with impairments in the areas of language and 
social interactions combined with stereotyped behaviours, and in addition the majority of 
autistic people have learning disabilities, it seems unlikely that there is a single factor 
accounting for this very complex condition. What seems to be necessary, therefore is to 
take a multifactorial approach to identify the interaction between the different factors
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involved. This does not mean that searching for a primary underlying factor is not useful, 
on the contrary, it is valuable because it may initiate new avenues o f research. Once 
sufficient data are collected to suggest that a factor seems to underlie certain autistic 
features, then one can take the next step o f looking to see how that factor fits into the 
overall picture. Currendy there appears to be sufficient data to suggest that autistic people 
have some difficulties in understanding other people's mental states, which may partly 
account for their social communication difficulties.
What seems to be necessary next, is to investigate the relation between the autistic child's 
general mental ability, language comprehension, severity o f autistic features expressed and 
performance on a number o f different mental slate attribution tasks in order to establish 
whether inability to understand other people's mental states can account for the social 
communication difficulties independently from general mental ability and other language 
skills.
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A ppendix 2. M cN em ar's  exact (binom ial) T ests  experim en t 1.
O ldest Group: (6;06-7;08)
"OWN" condition 
guess trial
ANSWERS Know Guess
know
trial
Know 0 (0 ) 18 (.75) 18
Guess 1 (.04) 5 (.20) 6
1 23 24 (pc. OOl )
"OTHER" condition 
guess trial
ANSWERS Know Guess
k now
trial
Know 2 (.083) 16 (.66) 18
Guess 1 (.04) 5 (.20) 6
3 21 24 (pc.O O l)
Cross tabulation of response frequencies in the "own” and "other" 
con d ition s
The four response patterns 
are denoted a,b,c and d 
corresponding to cells in the 
McNemar tables above.
ANSWER
guess trial
know know a b
trial guess 1 c d
"OWN"
condition
"OTHER" condition
a b e d total
a 0  0  0  0 0b 2 13 0  3 18
c 0 0  0  1 1d 0 3 1 1 5
total 2 16 1 5 24
2 4 3
M iddle G ro u p : (5 ;06-6 ;05)
"OWN" condition 
guess trial
ANSWERS Know Guess
know
trial
Know 1 (.023) 27 (.62) 28
Guess 4 (.093) 11 (.25) 15
5 38 43 (p<.001)
"OTHER" condition 
guess trial
ANSWERS Know Guess
know
trial
Know 4 (.093) 27 (.627) 31
Guess 6 (.139) 6  (.139) 12
10 33 43 (p<.001)
Cross tabulation o f response frequencies in the "own" and "other" 
co n d ition s
The four response patterns 
are denoted a,b,c and d 
corresponding to cells in the 
McNemar tables above.
guess trial
ANSWER euess
k now know 1 a btrial guess 1 c d
"OWN"
condition
"OTHER" condition
total
a 0  1 0  0 1
b 2 18 3 4 27
c 0 2 0  2 4
d 2 6 3 0 11
total 4 27 6  6 43
2 4 4
Youngest G ro u p : (4 ;05-5 ;05)
"OWN" condition 
guess trial
know
trial
ANSWERS
Know
Know 
8 (.14)
Guess 
19 (.35) 27
Guess 6 (.11) 21 (.38) 27
14 40 54
"OTHER" condition 
guess trial
know
trial
ANSWERS
Know
Know 
11 (.20)
Guess 
24 (.44) 35
Guess 5 (.09) M (.25) 19
16 38 54
(jx .01)
(p<.001)
Cross tabulation of response frequencies in the "own" and "other" 
conditions
The four response patterns 
are denoted a,b,c and d 
corresponding to cells in the 
McNemar tables above.
guess trial
ANSWER euess
know know 1 a btrial guess 1 c d
"OTHER" condition
b (1 total
a 2 4 1 1 8
"OWN" b 3 13 1 2 19
condition  c 3 1 1 1 6
d ?, 7 2 10 21
total 10 25 5 14 54
2 4 5

Autistic low language level (mean BPVS age equivalent 4; 11)
"OWN" condition 
guess trial
ANSWERS Know Guess
A ppendix  4. M cN em ar's  ex act (binom ial) Tests e x p e rim en t 2.
know
trial
Know 3 (.214) 2 (.142) 5
Guess 0 (0 ) 9  (.642) 9
3 11 14
"OTHER" condition 
guess trial
ANSWERS Know Guess
know
trial
Know 3 (.214) 4 (.285) 7
Guess 1 (.071) 6  (.428) 7
4 10 14 (P-.37)
Cross tabulation o f response frequencies in the "own" and "other" 
con d ition s
The four response patterns 
are denoted a,b,c and d 
corresponding to cells in the 
McNemar tables above.
guess trial
ANSWER guess
know know 1 a b
trial guess 1 c d
"OWN"
con d ition
"OTHER" condition
total
1 1 0  1 3
b 1 1 0  0 2
0 0  0  0 0
d 1 2  1 5 __ 2
total 3 4 1 6 14
2 4 7
Autistic high language level (mean BPVS age equivalent 9;06)
"OWN" condition 
guess trial
ANSWERS Know Guess
know
trial
Know 4 (.285) 8 (.571) 12
Guess K.071) 1 (.071) 2
5 9 14 (p<.039)
"OTHER" condition 
guess trial
ANSWERS Know Guess
k now
trial
Know 0 (0 ) 11 (.785) 11
Guess 0 (0 ) 3 (.214) 3
0 14 14 (p<.001)
Cross tabulation of response frequencies in the "own" and "other" 
con d ition s
The four response patterns 
are denoted a,b,c and d 
corresponding to cells in the 
McNemar tables above.
guess trial
ANSWER guess
know know 1 a btrial guess 1 c d
"OWN"
co n d ition
"OTHER" condition
total
a 0  3 0  1 4
b 0 7 0  1 8
c 0 1 0  0 1
d 0 0  0 1 1
total 0  11 0  3 14
2 4 8
C hildren with Down's Syndrom e
"OWN" condition 
guess trial
know
trial
ANSWERS
Know
Know 
3 (.176)
Guess 
3 (.176) 6
Guess 1 (.058) 10 (.588) 11
4 13 17
"OTHER" condition 
guess trial
know
ANSWERS
Know
Know 
1 (.058)
Guess 
3 (.176) 4
Guess 4 (.235) 9  (.529) 13
5 12 17
Cross tabulation of response frequencies in the "own" and "other” 
co n d itio n s
The four response patterns 
are denoted a,b,c and d 
corresponding to cells in the 
McNemar tables above.
guess trial
ANSWER I know
know know a b
trial guess 1 c d
"OTHER" condition
a 0 2 1 0 3
"OWN" b 0 1 1 1 3
co n d itio n  c 0 0 1 0 1
d 1 0  1 8 10
total 1 3  4  9 17
249
4-years-o ld  ch ild ren
"OWN" condition 
guess trial
know
trial
ANSWERS
Know
Know 
8 (.47)
Guess 
6 (.352) 14
Guess 1 (.058) 2 (.117) 3
9 8 17
"OTHER" condition 
guess trial
know
trial
ANSWERS
Know
Know 
6  (.352)
Guess 
5 (.294) 11
Guess 2  (.117) 4 (.235) 6
8 9 17
Cross tabulation o f response frequencies in the "own" and "other" 
con d ition s
The four response patterns 
are denoted a,b,c and d 
corresponding to cells in the 
McNemar tables above.
guess trial
ANSWER guess
know know 1 a btrial guess 1 c d
"OTHER" condition
total
a 4 2 1 1 8
"OWN" b 1 3  1 1 6
condition c 1 0  0  0 1
d 0 0  0  2 2
total 6 5 2 4 17
2 5 0
5-years-o ld  ch ild ren
"OWN" condition 
guess trial
ANSWERS Know Guess
know
trial
Know 2 (.09) 13 (.59) 15
Guess 0(0) 7 (.31) 7
2 20 22 (p<.0005)
"OTHER" condition 
guess trial
ANSWERS Know Guess
know
trial
Know 1 (.045) 15 (.68) 16
Guess 0(0) 6 (.27) 6
1 21 22 (pc.0005)
Cross tabulation o f response frequencies in the "own" and "other" 
con d ition s
The four response patterns 
are denoted a,b,c and d 
corresponding to cells in the 
McNemar tables above.
guess trial
ANSWER guess
know know 1 a btrial guess 1 « d
"OTHER" condition
total
a 0 1 0  1 2
"OWN" b 1 12 0  0 13
co n d ition  c 0 0  0 0 0
d 1 2  0 4 7
total 2 15 0  5 22
2 5


A PPEN D IX  7. Raw  d a ta  fo r  e x p e rim en t 1.
Group
1
1
1
1
Self knows 
1 
1 
1 
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
0
1
1
1
1
0
1 0
1 0
1
1
0
1
1
1
1
1
0
1
1
2
1
2 1
2 1
2 1
2 1
2 1
2 0
2 0
2 0
2 1
2 0
2 1
2 1
2 1
2 0
2 1
2 1
2 0
2 0
2 1
2 1
2 0
2 1
2 1
2 0
2 1
2 1
2 0
Other knows Other guesses
0  0
1 1 
1 0
1 0
0  0
1 1
1 0
0  1
1 0
1 0
1 0
1 0
1 0
1 0
1 0
0  0
1 0
1 0
1 0
0 0
1 0
1 0
1 0
1 0
0  0
0  1
1 0
1 0
1 0
1 0
1 0
0  0
1 0
1 0
1 0
1 0
1 0
0 0
1 0
1 0
1 1
1 1
1 0
0  0
1 0
1 0
0  1
1 0
1 1
1 0
0  1
Self Guesses
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
2 5 4
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2
5
5
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
1
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
1
0
0
0
1
0
0
1
0
1
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
1
Group 1. is the oldest group with the mean age o f 6  years and 9 months 
Group 2. is the middle group with the mean age o f 5 years and 9  months 
Group 3. is the youngest group with the mean age o f 4 years and 9  months.
2 5 6
APPEN D IX  8. Raw  d a ta  fo r  e x p e rim en t 2.
Group Self knows 
1 0
1 0
1 1
1 0
1 1
1 0
1 1
1 0
1 0
1 0
1 0
1 1
1 0
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4
0
0
0
0
0
0
Self Guesses 
0 
0 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0
0
1
1
1
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
1
1
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
1
1
1
0
0
0
1
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
Other knows 
0 
1
0
1
1
0
0
1
0
1
0
0
0
1
0
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
0
1
1
1
0
1
1
1
1
0
0
1
1
0
0
1
0
1
1
1
1
1
1
0
1
Other guesses
1
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
1
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
1
1
0
1
0
0
1
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
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4 1 0 1 1
4 0 0 0 0
4 0 0 0 0
4 1 0 1 0
4 1 0 1 0
4 1 0 1 0
4 1 0 1 0
4 0 0 0 0
4 0 0 0 0
4 1 0 1 0
4 0 0 0 0
4 .1 0 1 0
4 1 0 1 0
4 1 1 1 0
4 0 0 1 0
5 0 0 1 1
5 0 0 0 0
5 1 0 0 0
5 0 0 0 0
5 0 0 0 0
5 1 1 1 0
5 1 0 0 1
5 0 0 0 0
5 0 0 0 0
5 1 1 1 0
5 0 0 0 1
5 1 0 1 0
5 0 0 0 0
5 0 0 0 0
5 1 1 0 1
5 0 0 0 0
5 0 1 0 1
Group 1. is the low language level autistic children 
Group 2. is the high language level autistic children 
Group 3. is the 4-year-old normal children 
Group 4. is the 5-year-old normal children 
Group 5. is the children with Down's Syndrome.
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